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THE, law governing the liability of an occupier to persons injured while on
his property seems to have been perdurably frozen in the trident of channels
dug by the judges of the nineteenth century. Invitees, licensees and tres-
passers-these are all we know and all we need to know. It is true that of
late there have been subsurface rumblings and, in other common-law juris-
dictions, even cracks in the ice. So, England has recently abolished the dis-
tinction between licensees and invitees, and imposed on the occupier a "com-
mon duty of care" toward all lawful visitors.' This legislation sprang from
a feeling, strongly expressed in recent years, that the character of the plain-
tiff in his lawful entry on the defendant's premises should be no more than
a relevant circumstance in determining whether the defendant has discharged
his duty of care. It ought not to be imported into the law as a categorical
proposition, for the answer to the question of whether the defendant has dis-
charged his duty should depend on the totality of the circumstances.2 The
mechanical application of the traditional categories of visitor, and of such
concepts as traps and unusual dangers, is a manifestation of the lamentable
tendency to transmute propositions of fact into propositions of law, which
Glanville Williams has called the "besetting sin of the law of tort."3
fSenior Fellow, Yale Law School. The author is indebted for assistance with some
of the research on United States law to Mr. William J. Weir, Jr., a second-year student
at the Yale Law School, and to Mr. Eugene Wishod, a graduate of the Yale Law School,
class of 1958. Professor Sweeney of the New York University Law School read the
manuscript of the section on French law and gave valuable advice and guidance. Some
references to French case law were supplied by Professor Tunc of the Faculty of Law
of the University of Paris.
1. Occupiers' Liability Act, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31 (1957). The legislation was based
On the Law Reform Committee, Third Report: Occupiers' Liability to Invitees, Licensees
and Trespassers, CmD. No. 9305 (1954). The act went into force January 1, 1958.
2. Thus, in Hawkins v. Coulsdon & Purley Urban Dist. Council, [1954] 1 Q.B. 31.9,
337 (C.A.), Lord Justice Denning (as he then was) said: "The duty is not to invitees
as a class, nor to licensees as a class, but to the very person himself who is lawfully
there. What is reasonable care in regard to him depends on all the circumstances of the
case."
3. Williams, The Application of the Contributory Negligence Act to Liability for
Dangerous Premises, 13 CoNv y. (n.s.) 414, 416 (1949).
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This is one movement of opinion. But alongside it there continues in many
quarters a stubborn fondness for the old approach. Between invitees, licensees
and trespassers, a Scottish Law Lord once said, "there is no half-way house,
no no-man's land."'4 This emphatic assertion of the sanctity of the trichotomy
still represents the structure of the law in the United States. Even in Eng-
land, the feeling is prevalent that the subrules defining the duty of an oc-
cupier of land toward trespassers need no amending. The Law Reform Com-
mittee in their Third Report, while recommending the merger of licensees
and invitees, expressly approved the present state of the law with respect to
both adult and child trespassersY
The purpose of this Article is to attack this branch of the law in its stub-
bornest entrenchment. It will be argued that the defendant's liability toward
plaintiffs who are injured while trespassing could be harmoniously and prof-
itably -absorbed into a general theory of negligence. The distinct position of
licensees and invitees will not be expressly considered, on the assumption
that once the rules relating to trespassers are shown to be unnecessary and
indeed obstructive of justice, the rules which relate to licensees and invitees
will, a fortiori, be rendered superfluous. For this purpose, the case law in
common-law jurisdictions will be shown to reveal that the traditional rules
are under great strain and stress. This examination of the leading common-
law jurisdictions, with particular emphasis on those recent developments that
ease the position of the trespasser plaintiff, will be set beside the relevant
civil law of France. This will be followed by an evaluation of the techniques
and policies involved.
UNITED STATES
The domestic law on duties to trespassers has recently been the subject of
such comprehensive and penetrating studies that no attempt at an extensive
recapitulation will be made here.6 An encapsulated general summary will be
4. Robert Addie & Sons (Collieries) v. Dumbreck, [1929] A.C. 358, 371 (Scot.)
(Lord Dunedin). The passage runs: "What I particularly wish to emphasize is that
there are the three different classes-invitees, licensees, trespassers .... Now the line
that separates each of these three classes is an absolutely rigid line. There is no half-
way house, no no-man's land between adjacent territories."
5. Law Reform Committee, supra note 1, § 80.
6. See 2 H".aPF & JAMES, ToRTs 1435-70 (1956) [hereinafter cited as HAlpER &
JAMES]; James, Tort Liability to Occupiers of Land: Duties Owed to Trespassers, 63
YALE L.J. 144 (1953). Other helpful writings on the problem in the United States are
PROSSER, TORTS 432-45 (2d ed. 1955); Bohlen, The Duty of a Landowner Towards Those
Entering His Premises of Their Own Right, 69 U. PA. L. Rav. 142 (1921); Eldredge,
Tort Liability to Trespassers, 12 TEMP. L.Q. 32 (1937) ; Green, Landowner v. Intruder;
Intruder v. Landowner. Basis of Responsibility in Tort, 21 MiCH. L. REv. 495 (1923);
James, Inroads on Old Tort Concepts, 14 NACCA L.J. 226 (1954); Comment, Duty of
Conduct Owed by Property Owner to Trespasser, 38 MARQ. L. REv. 194 (1955) ; Note,
Landowners' Liability in New Jersey: The Limitation of Traditional Immunities, 12
RuTGEas L, Rv, 599 (1958).
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followed by a survey of a few important jurisdictions and reference to in-
dividual decisions of special significance.
In the nineteenth century, the prevailing view of an occupier's duty as
nothing more than an obligation to refrain from willful or wanton conduct
was modified by a more merciful approach to plaintiffs who had been injured
on the tracks of railroads. This exception, evidenced by the celebrated turn-
table case, 7 was in fact applied not only within the confines of the "attractive
nuisance" doctrine and the child-plaintiff situation but also more broadly to
adult trespassers injured by trains.8 Again, in many railroad cases, child
plaintiffs were held to be elevated to the status of licensee by tacit permission
inferred from the inactivity of the occupier. Obtaining a wide application,
this inference was sometimes applied to the advantage of an adult plaintiff.0
Although occasionally rooted in the facts of the case, it was often, however,
a palpable fiction used to broaden the scope of duty in situations where per-
mission was clearly absent but where, for other reasons such as the frequency
of trespassers, mitigation of doctrine seemed necessary. Its application had,
and continues to have, the double demerit of caprice and deception.'0
In the twentieth century, the position of the child trespasser has been
progressively eased, mostly by way of an increasing and widening application
of the theory of "attractive nuisance." '" At the same time, more general
.liberalizing innovations have appeared-in some jurisdictions with a good
deal of vigor but more often sporadically and shyly. If the trespasser is in-
jured by the conduct of an activity on the premises rather than by the con-
dition of the premises themselves, courts have been more willing to allow
recovery. 12 The plaintiff's remedy may be rationalized within the confines of
conventional doctrines when the trespasser has been injured by the occupier's
initiation of a dangerous operation on the land after the trespasser has en-
7. Railroad Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657 (1873). England too had an early
and leading turntable case which took up a very lenient position towards the child plain-
tiff. Cooke v. Midland G.W. Ry., [1909] A.C. 229 (Ire.).
8. Clampit v. Chicago St. P. & K.C. Ry., 84 Iowa 71, 50 N.W. 673 (1891); Ahne-
feld v. Wabash R.R., 212 Mo. 280, 111 S.W. 95 (1908); Patton v. Railway Co., 89
Tenn. 370, 15 S.W. 919 (1890) ; Delaney v. Milwaukee & St. P. Ry., 33 Wis. 67 (1873).
Some jurisdictions have a "lookout" statute, requiring operators of trains to maintain
a lookout, and placing a burden of proof on them to prove compliance. Under such a
statute in Arkansas it has been held that neither the plaintiff's trespasser status nor his
intoxicated condition prevents recovery. Thompson v. Carley, 140 F.2d 656 (8th Cir.
1944). A recent case allowing recovery to a "tecfinical" trespasser on railroad tracks is
Braithwaite v. South Durham Steel Co., [1958] 1 Weekly L.R. 986 (Q.B.1
9. 2 HARPER & JAMES 1467-70.
10. Ibid. In Lyshak v. City of Detroit, 351 Mich. 230, 88 N.W.2d 596 (1958), Justice
Smith took the view that treatment of the child plaintiff as an implied licensee was an
undesirable fiction. He preferred to apply the principle that "the right of a child to life,
and to life unmaimed, outweighs the landowner's right to the exclusive possession of
his property." I. at 248, 88 N.W.2d at 605.
11. 2 HARPER & JAMES 1447-61.
12. Annots., 40 A.L.R. 778 (1926), 156 A.L.R. 1226 (1945).
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tered, for then the occupier's conduct may be regarded as wanton, at least if
he was aware of the trespasser's presence. 13 But when the activity is a con-
tinuing one or the occupier is unaware of the presence of the particular plain-
tiff, the old doctrines are not so easily applied and courts may be forced to
a more daring espousal of general negligence principles. 14 Even absent the
inception of a new activity or knowledge concerning the plaintiff's presence.
however, the form of the old doctrines may sometimes be used, for a court
may say that an occupier who, without appropriate safeguards, conducts a
dangerous activity on his premises when he knows that trespassers often
come onto his land, is behaving wantonly or recklessly.', Alternatively, of
course, liability is simply denied in many such cases.' 6
When the injury arises from the static condition of the premises, whether
natural or artificial, the old doctrines have a much tighter grip than in cases
of injury arising through the occupier's activities,17 though it must be re-
membered that the distinction between condition and activity is so tenuous
that it is eminently susceptible to manipulation for policy reasons. An old
line of cases supports an enlarged theory of liability for dangerous conditions
that exist adjacent to a highway. Plaintiffs have been allowed to recover for
injuries arising from such conditions although they were "technical" tres-
passers.'8 But, with this exception, the bases of recovery for injuries caused
by static dangers are still narrow. If the dangerous condition is a natural
one, it is generally conceded that there is no possibility of recovery.19 If the
13. Peaslee, Duty to Seen Trespassers, 27 HARV. L. REv. 403 (1914).
14. 2 HARPER & JAMES 1463; Smith, Liability of Landowners to Children Entering
Without Permission, 11. HARV. L. Ray. 349, 364-65 (1898).
15. This was the approach used in Blaylock v. Malernee, 185 Okla. 381, 92 P.2d 357
(1939), discussed note 67 infra.
16. See, e.g., notes 24-25 infra and accompanying text.
17. 2 HARPER & JAMES 1435-61.
18. Sawiki v. Connecticut Ry. & Lighting Co., 129 Conn. 626, 30 A.2d 556 (1943);
Ruocco v. United Advertising Co., 98 Conn. 241, 1.19 Atl. 48 (1922) ; Crogan v. Schiele,
53 Conn. 186, 5 At. 673 (1885) ; Sanders v. Reister, 1 Dak. 151, 46 N.W. 680 (1875) ;
Durst v. Wareham, 132 Kan. 785, 297 Pac. 675 (1931); Murray v. McShane, 52 Md.
217 (1879) (plaintiff stopped on door sill of house to adjust his shoe and was hit by
falling brick) ; Holmes v. Drew, 151 Mass. 578, 25 N.E. 22 (1890) ; Runkel v. City of
New York, 282 App. Div. 173, 123 N.Y.S.2d 485 (1953) (if abandoned building which
collapsed on trespassing children was located near highway, liability possible) ; 36 Mien.
L. Rav. 159 (1937); Annot., 159 A.L.R. 136 (1945); Annot., 14 A.L.R. 1397 (1921).
With respect to dangerous conditions adjacent to the highway, this favorable attitude
toward trespasser plaintiffs is linked with ideas of public nuisance. See Barnes v. Ward,
9 C.B. 392, 137 Eng. Rep. 945 (C.P. 1850), where the court held that the plaintiff's
action was not barred by his trespasser status, since the excavation which rendered the
way unsafe to those who used it with ordinary care was a public nuisance. See alo
Healy v. Vorndrain, 65 App. Div. 353, 72 N.Y. Supp. 877 (1901); Gibson v. Johnson,
69 Ohio App. 1.9, 42 N.E.2d 689 (1941); Downes v. Silva, 57 R.I. 343, 190 Atl. 42
(1937); Haywood v. South Hill Mfg. Co., 142 Va. 761, 128 S.E. 362 (1925); Harrold
v. Watney, (18981 2 Q.B. 320 (C.A.).
19. 2 HARPER & JAMES 1435. On the difficulty of distinguishing between natural and
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condition is an artificial one, the plaintiff's chances are enhanced, though the
distinction between natural and artificial conditions is a blurred borderline
much spotted with the blood of children. The main approach here has been
through the "attractive nuisance" doctrine. Also, certain unnatural conditions
have been designated as highly dangerous and liability has been based on the
occupier's foresight of the presence of trespassers. For an artificial condition
which, though dangerous, is not highly dangerous, the adult plaintiff will
have little chance of recovery-though a child may be in a somewhat better
position.20
Finally, a tendency has appeared in some jurisdictions, sharply contradicted
in others, to refuse to apply the traditional occupier's immunities to defend-
ants other than the occupier.21 Welcome as this tendency may be as a con-
traction of unnecessary immunities, it may be criticized for introducing into
the law the additional and difficult distinction between the occupier and the
nonoccupier.
Massachusetts
An example of a jurisdiction where the old dogmas have retained their
pristine simplicity is Massachusetts. Here the sophisticated convolutions that
have worried other states in their efforts to modernize the law have left the
judicial mind untroubled and untainted. In 1920 and 1921, the Massachusetts
courts declared that the duty of an occupier to a mere licensee (and, a for-
tiori, to a trespasser) was to refrain from willful or wanton misconduct.22
artificial conditions, see the comment of the New Jersey Appellate Division in Simmel
v. NXew Jersey Coop Co., 47 N.J. Super. 509, 136 A.2d 301, 304 (App. Div. 1957),
quoted in text at note 63 infra.
20. Cockerham v. R. E. Vaughan, Inc., 82 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 1955). On artificial con-
ditions generally, see 2 HARPE & JAMEs 1435-61..
21. 2 HARPER & JAMES 1433-34; Annot., 90 A.L.R. 886 (1934). With respect to
Massachusetts, New York and California, this point will be explicitly discussed. Other
cases worthy of notice are Lewis v. I. M. Shapiro Co., 132 Conn. 342, 44 A.2d 124 (1945)
(defendant contractor held liable to trespasser on adjoining land for collapse of wall);
McCaffrey v. Concord Elec. Co., 80 N.H. 45, 114 Atl. 395 (1921) (trespassing status
of boy on tree held relevant to deny liability of defendants who were not occupiers but
maintained electric wires in tree; but see dissent by Peaslee, J., id. at 49, 114 Atl. at 397) ;
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Bartmess, 181 Okla. 501, 76 P.2d 352 (1937) (defendant owner
of oil lease held liable to adjoining landowner whose cattle trespassed and were poisoned
by ponds polluted by defendant's operations); Irwin Savings & Trust Co. v. Pennsyl-
vania R.R., 349 Pa. 278, 37 A.2d 432 (1944) (occupier's immunities do not apply to
defeudant trespassers) ; Fitzpatrick v. Penfield, 267 Pa. 564, 574, 109 At]. 653, 657 (1920)
("The defense of no liability for injury to a trespasser is personal to the owner of the
premises trespassed upon; it does not inure to the benefit of strangers to the title, adjoin-
ing owners, or other trespassers.") ; Roe v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 53 R.I. 342, 166 Atl.
695 (1933) (defendant who has the right to exclude the plaintiff enjoys the same im-
munities as the occupier).
22. Hafey v. Turners Falls Power & Elec. Co., 240 Mass. 155, 133 N.E. 107 (1921):
Robbins v. Athol Gas & Elec. Co., 236 Mass. 387, 128 N.E. 417 (1920).
1959]
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No distinction was made between the natural condition of the land and
dangerous appliances or operations thereon,2 nor between the occupier and
other persons conducting lawful business on the land.24 In 1924, these views
were confirmed in a case which involved a seven-year-old boy who, having
been permitted to enter the premises, was burned by a fire used for heating
tar. The defendant, the court felt, was under no duty to take precautions for
the child's protection.25
In 1935, a licensee plaintiff was allowed to recover from a licensee defend-
ant who had created a dangerous condition on another's premises. 20 The
opinion did not indicate whether its rationale would be extended to the tres-
passer plaintiff, a question which was again raised but left unanswered in a
later case the same year.2 7 Two 1938 cases supplied the answer-a harsh
one. In the first, the trespasser plaintiff, a ten-year-old boy, was injured by
the collapse of a pole around which the defendants had excavated. 2 The in-
jury took place on a Sunday when the defendants had left the excavations
and their machinery unattended. The court held that the defendants were the
owner's business invitees, enjoying in this context the owner's immunities,
and that, in the absence of reckless or willful misconduct, they were not
liable. This decision was quickly followed by one in which the child plain-
tiff, after climbing a pole in a playground, was killed by touching electric
wires whose covering had rotted. The court took the view that, while on the
pole, the child was a trespasser or at most a licensee, and that the action must
fail inasmuch as the defendant had not created a dangerous situation in a
place where others had a right of access equal to his own.2 9 This case may
be contrasted with a later decision which allowed a trespasser to recover for
23. Relying on O'Brien v. Union Freight R.R., 209 Mass. 449, 95 N.E. 861 (1911),
where it was held that a licensee could not recover for injuries sustained when he was
struck by ashes thrown by an engineer from a locomotive.
24. Hafey v. Turners Falls Power & Elec. Co., 240 Mass. 155, 133 N.E. 107 (1921).
This was a case of an injury to the plaintiff when a steel fishing rod he was carrying
came into contact with overhead cables which were dangerously low. In Sale v. East
Kootenay Power Co., [1931] Can. Sup. Ct. 712, [19311 4 D.L.R. 593, discussed in text
at note 156 infra, the Supreme Court of Canada came to the same conclusion on very
similar facts.
25. Pilon v. Easthampton Gas Co., 248 Mass. 57, 142 N.E. 640 (1924). See also
Marengo v. Roy, 318 Mass. 719, 63 N.E.2d 893 (1945).
26. Sarna v. American Bosch Magneto Corp., 290 Mass. 340, 195 N.E. 328 (1935).
This is often quoted as a leading authority on the separation of the positions of occupier
and nonoccupier. The trial judge had instructed the jury that there could be no recovery
if the decedent had been a trespasser.
27. Mitchell v. Lynn Fire & Police Notification Co., 292 Mass. 165, 197 N.E. 456
(1935).
28. Mikaelian v. Palaza, 300 Mass. 354, 15 N.E.2d 480 (1938).
29. Urban v. Central Mass. Elec. Co., 301 Mass. 519, 17 N.E.2d 718 (1938). The
Sarna case, supra note 26, was distinguished on the ground that here the defendant had




damage to his goods caused by the trespassing activities of another.3" It
would thus seem that in Massachusetts the trespasser's right of recovery,
apart from cases of wanton or willful misconduct, is limited to situations in
which he has been injured by one who had no more right to be on the
premises than he.
The confinement of Massachusetts doctrine to liability for willful or wanton
misconduct has been confirmed in a decision handed down in 1956.31
New York
New York is a more typical jurisdiction. Starting with a simple allegiance
to the wanton-or-willful rubric, the New York courts slowly took notice of
supplementary approaches. At first, it was held that contractors working on
the premises enjoyed the same immunities as the occupier, 32 that no special
principle was applicable to dangerous activities, 33 and that there was no lia-
bility to a trespasser for simple, active negligence.34 These views were con-
firmed in 1916 35 although, in an isolated judgment that same year, Judge
Cardozo seems to have adopted a distinction between passive and active
negligence and also to have looked favorably upon excluding the nonoccupier
from the occupier's immunities.3 8
In the late 1920's, a shift occurred. It was held that a boy trespassing on a
truck was owed a duty of care by the operators of a streetcar with which
the truck had collided. 37 And the representative of a boy who had been
killed after climbing scaffolding erected by a railroad company and then
touching badly insulated wires maintained there by an electric company was
allowed to recover against the latter, although not against the railroad. 8 This
clear separation between the positions of the occupier and the nonoccupier
30. Hanifin v. C. & R. Constr. Co., 313 Mass. 651, 48 N.E.2d 913 (1943).
31. Trott v. Yankee Network, Inc., 335 Mass. 9, 138 N.E.2d 280 (1956). Other
important Massachusetts decisions are Wurm v. Allen Cadillac Co., 301 Mass. 413, 17
N.E.2d 305 (1938) ; Haskins v. Grybko, 301. Mass. 322, 17 N.E.2d 146 (1938) ; Potter
v. Gilmore, 282 Mass. 49, 184 N.E. 373 (1933); Ciarmataro v. Adams, 275 Mass. 521,
176 N.E. 610 (1931); Falardeau v. Malden & Melrose Gas Light Co., 275 Mass. 196,
175 N.E. 471 (1931); Prondecka v. Turners Falls Power & Elec. Co., 241. Mass. 100,
134 N.E. 352 (1922); McIntyre v. Converse, 238 Mass. 592, 131 N.E. 198 (1921);
Wentzell v. Boston Elevated Ry., 230 Mass. 275, 119 N.E. 652 (1918); Zink v. Foss,
221 Mass. 73, 108 N.E. 906 (1915); Mallock v. Derby, 190 Mass. 208, 76 N.E. 721
(1906).
32. Downes v. Elmira Bridge Co., 179 N.Y. 136, 71 N.E. 733 (1904).
33. Waitzmann v. A. L. Barber Asphalt Co., 1.90 N.Y. 452, 83 N.E. 477 (1908).
34. Roche v. American Ice Co., 140 App. Div. 341, 125 N.Y. Supp. 323 (1910).
35. Abbey v. Village of Watkins, 175 App. Div. 660, 161 N.Y. Supp. 688 (1916).
36. Constantino v. Watson Contracting Co., 219 N.Y. 443, 114 N.E. 802 (1916).
37. North v. David Donaldson Co., 131 Misc. 170, 226 N.Y. Supp. 382 (Sup. Ct.
1928), which should be compared with the English decision in Farrugia v. Great W. Ry.,
[1947] 2 All E.R. 565 (C.A.), discussed in text at note 115 infra.
38. Ferrari v. New York Cent. R.R., 224 App. Div. 182, 230 N.Y. Supp. 60, aff'd,
250 N.Y. 527, 166 N.E. 311. (1928).
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was affirmed in 1932 39 and 1935.40 In 1940 the Ireland case reviewed the
law of this field 41 and took the position that a nonoccupier enjoys the
occupier's immunities when he is acting on the occupier's behalf but not when
he has come on the premises for his own purposes. This rationale is more
plausible than persuasive. In some sense, of course, the defendant who is
legally present is always acting for the occupier's purposes. The distinction
between a man who pays rent to the occupier for the privilege of setting up
a structure and the man who is paid to set up a structure for the occupier
is not rooted in any functionally significant difference. Nonetheless, the Ire-
land decision now represents the law in New York and was applied to a
similar situation in 1956.42
In the event of injury to a trespasser from a highly dangerous structure
or activity, New York has adopted a more liberal attitude. The 1949 French
case involved a seven-year-old boy who sustained injuries when he came in
contact with the defendant's high-voltage apparatus, which was inadequately
enclosed and was near an area where children often played.43 It was held
that a cause of action existed even if the child were regarded as a trespasser,
and that an occupier who operates an inherently dangerous apparatus may
owe a duty of care to those who technically are trespassers. The court felt
impatient with the use of "occupier" and "trespasser" labels in this context
and suggested that the questions of existence of duty and discharge of duty
should be determined by an examination of the extent of risk involved. 44
In spite of its refusal to accept the "attractive nuisance" doctrine, New
York has reached this position by demanding that the occupier abstain from
affirmative acts of negligence toward the trespasser. 45 Cases resulting in re-
covery under this approach generally are those brought by child plaintiffs.
The current position, reviewed in the 1954 decision of Mayer v. Temple
Properties, Inc.,46 seems to be that the maintenance of a dangerous structure
39. Cavanaugh v. People's Gas & Elec. Co., 234 App. Div. 402, 254 N.Y. Supp. 835,
aff'd, 260 N.Y. 547, 184 N.E. 86 (1932).
40. Ehret v. Village of Scarsdale, 269 N.Y. 198, 199 N.E. 56 (1935). A significant
feature of the Ehret case was that the danger zone extended beyond the premises.
41. Ireland v. Complete Mach. & Equip. Co., 174 Misc. 91, 21 N.Y.S.2d 430 (App.
T. 1940).
42. Gold v. Rosenblatt, 1 App. Div. 2d 894, 149 N.Y.S.2d 415 (1956).
43. French v. Central N.Y. Power Corp., 275 App. Div. 238, 89 N.Y.S.2d 543 (1949).
44. The court was here relying on and referring to the earlier decisions of Morrison
v. New York Tel. Co., 277 N.Y. 444, 14 N.E.2d 785 (1938) (citing Newark Elec. Light
& Power Co. v. Garden, 78 Fed. 74, 77 (3d Cir. 1897)), and Kingsland v. Erie County
Agricultural Soc'y, 298 N.Y. 409, 84 N.E.2d 38 (1949).
45. See cases cited notes 43, 44 supra.
46. 307 N.Y. 559, 122 N.E.2d 909 (1954). Other New York cases to be noticed are
Levine v. City of New York, 2 N.Y.2d 246, 140 N.E.2d 275, 159 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1957);
Nicoletti v. General Linen Supply Laundry Co., 285 App. Div. 957, 138 N.Y.S.2d 159
(1955); Runkel v. City of New York, 282 App. Div. 173,.123 N.Y.S.2d 485 (1953);
Pupek v. Wesnofski, 264 App. Div. 880, 35 N.Y.S.2d 476 (1942); Keenan v. Lawyers
Mortgage Co., 254 App. Div. 348, 5 N.Y.S.2d 18 (1938); Moriarty v. New York Cent.
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or operation without adequate protection and in a spot where the occupier
knows that trespassers may come, will in itself constitute affirmative negli-
gence. In view of this, one may wonder what would constitute passive negli-
gence or what is gained by abstaining from an explicit integration of this
branch of the law into the general theory of negligence.
California
In California, an interesting tendency to invoke a theory of general negli-
gence law has arisen. This development has been based on a provision of the
California Civil Code which, much in the manner of the French Code Civil,
comprehensively imposes liability for injuries occasioned by a want of ordi-
nary care.47 California courts have usually proceeded by way of the customary
distinctions between invitees, licensees and trespassers and the graduated
duties based thereon. But the suggestion has recently been made that the
code provision allows an escape from these confines, 48 a suggestion borne out
by a number of significant cases.49 California is still unwilling, however, to
apply a general negligence approach to cases involving static conditions of
the premises."
R.R., 124 N.Y.S.2d 284 (Sup. Ct. 1953); Calore v. Domnitch, 5 Misc. 2d 895, 162
N.Y.S.2d 173 (N.Y.C. City Ct 1957).
47. CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. § 1714 (1954). The section reads: "Everyone is respon-
sible, not only for the result of his willful acts but also for an injury occasioned to an-
other by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property or person,
except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury
upon himself." Compare with articles 1382 and 1383 of the French Code Civil, quoted
in text at notes 191, 192 infra.
48. Note, 13 CALiF. L. REv. 72 (1924). In Fernandez v. Consolidated Fisheries, Inc.,
98 Cal. App. 2d 91, 96, 219 P.2d 73, 76 (1950), the court described the customary in-
quiry into the status of the plaintiff as trespasser, licensee or invitee as "unrealistic,
arbitrary, and inelastic," and pointed out the availability in California of the statutory
authority on the standard of care owed.
LA. Civ. CoDE ANN. art. 2316 (1952) proclaims a general liability for negligence,
but, like California, Louisiana has customarily proceeded in this area along the usual
common-law distinctions between trespassers, licensees and invitees. See Taylor v. Baton
Rouge Sash & Door Works, Inc., 68 So. 2d 159 (La. Ct. App. 1953); Comment, At-
tractive Nuisances in Louisiana, 11 TUL. L. REv. 468 (1937).
49. Fernandez v. Consolidated Fisheries, Inc., szpra note 48, and, following the Fer-
nandes case, Radoff v. Hunter, 323 P.2d 202 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958) ; Hession v. City
& County of San Francisco, 258 R?2d 50 (Cal. Dist Ct. App. 1953); Fernandez v.
American Bridge Co., 104 Cal. App. 2d 340, 231 P.2d 548 (1951).
50. This is the conclusion that seems to emerge from Yoshiko Yamauchi v. O'Neill,
38 Cal. App. 2d 703, 102 P.2d 365 (1940) (liability for active negligence to licensee);
Colgrove v. Lompoc Model T Club, Inc., 51 Cal. App. 2d 18, 124 P.2d 128 (1942) (fol-
lowing Yamnauchi) ; Oettinger v. Stewart, 24 Cal. 2d 133, 148 P.2d 19 (1944) (with re-
spect to licensees, willful-and-wanton rule confined to conditions; where active conduct
involved, duty of care eists) ; Wilson v. City of Long Beach, 71 Cal. App. 2d 235, 162
P.2d 658 (1945) (no liability to child trespasser, since, even assuming duty to abstain
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The contrast between the positions of the occupier and the nonoccupier
defendant also has been a subject of discussion in the California cases. Ap-
parently, the only time that a trespasser is owed a greater duty by a non-
occupier than by an occupier is when the nonoccupier defendant is a tres-
passer himself.51 A defendant who is a business visitor or invitee of the
occupier enjoys the same immunities as the occupier. 2
New Jersey
Very advanced and liberal decisions may be found in New Jersey. An
example is the Guinn case, an early, leading opinion ruling on the distinction
from active negligence owed, no breach here); Fernandez v. Consolidated Fisheries,
Inc., 98 Cal. App. 2d 91, 219 P.2d 73 (1950) (duty to exercise reasonable care toward
known licensees or trespassers so far as active operations are concerned) ; Church v.
Headrick & Brown, 101 Cal. App. 2d 396, 225 P.2d 558 (1950) ; Fernandez v. American
Bridge Co., 104 Cal. App. 2d 340, 231 P.2d 548 (1951) (duty to exercise reasonable care
toward known trespassers so far as active operations are concerned); Palmquist v.
Mercer, 43 Cal. 2d 92, 272 P.2d 26 (1954) (plaintiff on runaway horse struck head on
understructure of trestle maintained by defendants on land occupied by others; no lia-
bility since no active negligence) ; Allen v. Jim Ruby Constr. Co., 138 Cal. App. 2d 428,
291 P.2d 991 (1956). California applies the doctrine of attractive nuisance but an im-
portant recent decision takes the view that the doctrine is a harsh one to occupiers and
should not be extended. Wilford v. Little, 144 Cal. App. 2d 477, 301 P.2d 282 (1956).
This case stresses the duty of parents to guard their children, and holds that a body of
water, whether natural or artificial, cannot in itself constitute an attractive nuisance.
See Schmidt, Liability in California for the Drowning of Trespassing Children, 8 HAST-
INGS L.J. 300 (1957) ; Comment, Trespassing Children: Restatement of Torts Section
339 in California, 46 CALIF. L. Rv. 610 (1958). But compare Reynolds v. Willson, 308
P2d 464 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957), where $50,000 damages were recovered under attrac-
tive nuisance theory for injuries suffered by a two-year-old boy in a private swimming
pool. The defendants had allowed children to use the pool in warm weather and had
later left it in a dangerous condition. Generally, artificial bodies of water are not held
to be attractive nuisances unless, as in this case, hidden perils are present. For recent
demonstrations of this view see Ansin v. Thurston, 101 So. 2d 808 (Fla. 1958) ; Anneker
v. Quinn-Robbins Co., 323 P2d 1073 (Idaho 1958); cases cited in 21 NACCA L.J. 59-
62 (1958).
51. Anderson v. Western Pac. R.R., 17 Cal. App. 2d 244, 61 P2d 1209 (1936);
Roberts v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 102 Cal. App. 422, 283 Pac. 353 (1929); Davoust
v. City of Alameda, 149 Cal. 69, 84 Pac. 760 (1906). In Langazo v. San Joaquin Light
& Power Co., 32 Cal. App. 2d 678, 90 P.2d 825 (1939), recovery was granted against
an electric company which maintained- wires across- a, field. The defendant had violated
a Railroad Commission 6rder which had the force'of lawy: This conduct, the court held,
was negligence per se.
52. Hamakawa v. Crescent Wharf & Warehouse Co., 4 Cal. 2d 499, 50 P.2d 803
(1935) ; Kirkpatrick v. Damianakes, 15 Cal. App. 2d 446, 59 P.2d 556 (1936) (a seem-
ingly harsh decision; the plaintiff had driven her car into a private alleyway by mistake
and was injured by the negligent backing of the defendant) ; Borgnis v. California Ore.
Power Co., 84 Cal. App. 465, 258 Pac. 394 (1927) (another fishing rod and sagging wire




between occupier and nonoccupier defendants.53 The defendant there main-
tained a line carrying electric wires across the open land of another; he was
held liable to the administrator of a plaintiff who was killed when he walked
into a charged wire which had broken and was trailing on ihe grass. As to
the owner of the land, the decedent was a trespasser or mere licensee. The
court said that the landowner's immunities with respect to trespassers rest
on the need to preserve the land's beneficial use and should not be extended
to others. To do otherwise, the court reasoned, would be needlessly to extend
an exception to the general rule that a man is responsible for those results
of his negligence that are reasonably to be anticipated. 4 In actions against
the occupier of land, however, New Jersey has traditionally applied the cus-
tomary wanton-and-willful rule,55 although, in a number of recent cases, there
are indications that this limitation is being displaced.
For example, in the 1951 Strang case,56 a child plaintiff recovered for
burns sustained when he brushed against a fire lit on the defendant's land
by the defendant's janitor and left unattended. Noting evidence that children
had used the area for play, the court said that "the inquiry is whether the
utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition is slight as compared
with the risk to the children involved. Human safety is of far greater con-
cern than unrestricted freedom in the use of land."'57 This declaration seems
to find general negligence theory applicable, as did the Harris case in 1953.5s
There, the injury arose when a six-year-old child fell into a trench which
had been excavated by the defendant in a lot adjacent to a school. Applying
the Strang case, the court held that the child, a licensee by acquiescence,
could collect.55 The court professed to see no basis for a distinction between
a dangerous instrumentality and a dangerous condition. Though the plaintiff
was not acknowledged to be a trespasser, this decision, attacking as it does
distinctions which are dominant in the trespasser situation, is of great im-
portance, for it is one of the first judicial attempts to dispense with the
hitherto inviolate discrimination between dangerous activities and conditions.
This radical approach was strengthened by the tone of the opinions in
Taylor v. New Jersey Highway Authority >o in 1956 and has been carried
53. Guinn v. Delaware & Atl. Tel. Co., 72 N.J.L. 276, 62 AtI. 412 (Ct. Err. & App.
1905). A similar case is Earl W. Baker Util. Co. v. Haney, 203 Okla. 91, 218 P.2d 621
(1950).
54. 72 N.J.L. at 278, 62 At. at 413.
55. Ibid.; Hoberg v. Collins, Lavery & Co., 80 NJ.L. 425, 78 At!. 166 (Ct. Err. &
App. 1910) ; Folley v. United Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 13 N.J. Misc. 293, 178 Atl. 95 (Sup.
Ct. 1935).
56. Strang v. South Jersey Broadcasting Co., 9 N.J. 38, 86 A.2d 777 (1952).
57. Id. at 45, 86 A.2d at 780.
58. Harris v. Mentes-Williams Co., 11 N.J. 559, 95 A.2d 388 (1953).
59. Id. at 562, 95 A.2d at 389.
60. 22 N.J. 454, 126 A.2d 313 (1956). The plaintiff was the guest of a tenant, but
the drift of the judgment is generally deprecatory of the category approach to liability
in this area.
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further by the significant judgment of the appellate division in Simm eI v.
New Jersey Coop Co. 61 The plaintiff in Simmel was a child of four who had
trespassed and been severely burned on a vacant lot recently acquired by the
defendants. The lot was located across the street from a large housing pro-
ject, but was used as a refuse dump where rubbish was set on fire and left
to smoulder. Although the defendants denied knowledge of the presence of
fires on the lot, a verdict in the plaintiff's favor was confirmed by the New
Jersey Appellate Division, which said:
The jurisprudence of the past gave to the occupier of land a special
privilege to be careless. But today the broad tendency of the law is to
impose upon him, as upon other members of society, a duty to exercise
reasonable care to avoid injury to others .... This tendency to subject
him to that duty, with all the elasticity inherent therein, wars not only
against the severe traditional views governing an occupier's liability to
trespassers and licensees, but also against the somewhat mollified, yet
rather particularized set of rules of the Restatement of Torts,. §§ 329-
342.62
The court went on to criticize the conventional distinctions between natural
conditions, artificial conditions and activities: "But it cannot but be noticed,
looking at the matter from an a priori standpoint, that natural conditions
shade into dormant artificial conditions created by him in the past; and ...
the latter in their turn shade into his current activities.' ' O
The court was willing to find that the defendant's knowledge of fires and
habitually trespassing children on the lot constituted questions of fact for the
jury. On this point the decision was reversed by the supreme court, 4 which
took the view that the judge had misdirected the jury on the nature of the
proof required to show knowledge on the part of the defendant. But the
general observations of the appellate division were not disturbed by the su-
preme court and they stand as a peak of advancement in the progress of
integrating duties to trespassers with a general theory of negligence.0 5
61. 47 N.J. Super. 509, 136 A.2d 301 (App. Div. 1957).
62. Id. at 513, 136 A.2d at 303.
63. Id. at 514, 136 A.2d at 304.
64. 28 N.J. 1, 143 A.2d 521 (1958). In Lorusso v. DeCarlo, 48 N.J. Super. 112, 13b
A.2d 900 (App. Div. 1957), the child plaintiff had been burned by a fire started on the
defendant's lot by a trespasser. The appellate division, ordering a new trial, held that
there may be liability for an artificial condition caused by a trespasser if the defendant
occupier should have anticipated that such a condition might be set up by such a person.
65. Other recent and advanced decisions in New Jersey are Wytupeck v. City of
Camden, 25 N.J. 450, 136 A.2d 887 (1957) ; Imre v. Riegel Paper Co., 24 N.J. 438, 132
A.2d 505 (1957); Diglio v. Jersey Cen. Power & Light Co., 39 N.J. Super. 140, 120
A.2d 650 (App. Div. 1956); Hoff v. Natural Ref. Prod. Co., 38 N.J. Super. 222, 118
A.2d 714 (App. Div. 1955). New Jersey was once a somewhat harsh jurisdiction toward
trespassing plaintiffs and did not recognize the attractive nuisance doctrine until the




Scattered throughout the welter of case law in this field are decisions
which seem landmarks of liberality. Often, they are not sustained by later
development or are contradicted by the broad trend of authority in the juris-
diction. Usually, they appear to result from peculiar local pressures or from
the unusually tragic and horrifying nature of the victim's injury. For ex-
ample, an eighteen-year-old trespasser recovered for injuries sustained when
he lit a grass rope and lowered it into a disused oil well which stood some
thirty to forty yards from a beaten pathway.66 In neglecting to plug the well
to ten feet below the surface, the defendant was in breach of statutory duty.
The court held that the plaintiff was at most a technical trespasser, in the
sense that he might reasonably have supposed his presence would not be
objected to by the defendant, and that the defendant was guilty of wanton
or reckless conduct in failing to make the well safe. This may be regarded
as a satisfactory result reached by an unnecessarily tortuous line of reason-
ing. The court felt compelled to qualify the plaintiff's trespasser status with
unreal speculations about the extent of the defendant's objection to the plain-
tiff's presence and was then driven to talk of an omission to take positive
safeguards as reckless conduct. A similar approach is found in a later oil-
well case in 1939.67
A more frank avowal of a general negligence approach is to be found in
Clark v. Longview Public Service Co.,68 in which the eighteen-year-old plain-
tiff was injured when her hair blew against uninsulated electric wires. She
had ventured into an enclosure surrounding a pump-house and had grasped
a truss-rod in order to look through a window. In spite of her apparent
trespassing status, the case was presented and the jury instructed under gen-
eral negligence principles. The defendants raised no objections to this pres-
entation and the Supreme Court of Washington affirmed a verdict for the
plaintiff, saying:
[I]t matters not whether the persons entering the enclosure did so by
invitation, by license, or whether they were merely trespassers. There
was sufficient evidence to show that the appellant must have known that
66. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Witcher, 141 Okla. 175,-284 Pac. 297 (1.929).
67. Blaylock v. Malernee, 185 Okla. 381, 92 P.2d 357 (1939). The plaintiff's father
was an employee of the defendant and the court placed the plaintiff in the category of
"technical" trespasser. It seems that in Oklahoma children below the age of fourteen are
always regarded as "technical" trespassers. Town of Depew v. Kilgore, 117 Okla. 263,
246 Pac. 606 (1926). The jurisdiction is not otherwise liberal to trespassing plaintiffs.
Leading cases are Ford v. United States, 200 F.2d 272 (10th Cir. 1952) ; Dennis v. Spil-
lers, 199 Okla. 311, 185 P.2d 465 (1947); Sinclair Prairie Oil Co. v. Smith, 186 Okla.
631, 99 P.2d 903 (1940); Ramage Mining Co. v. Thomas, 172 Okla. 24, 44 P.2d 19
(1935); Gypsy Oil Co. v. Ginn, 115 Okla. 76, 241 Pac. 794 (1925); Texas 0. & E. Ry.
v. McCarroll, 80 Okla. 282, 195 Pac. 139 (1-920); City of Shawnee v. Cheek, 41 Okla.
227, 137 Pac. 724 (1913).
68. 143 Wash. 319, 255 Pac. 380 (1927).
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young and old people were in the habit of congregating in great numbers
near this pump-house, and the jury were justified in believing that the
appellant should have reasonably anticipated that young people especial-
ly might enter this enclosure. 9
The duty which the owner of high-voltage electricity owes to all per-
sons-whether invitees, licensees or trespassers-who it may have reason
to believe may come into its proximity, is to guard them from injury
resulting from the dangerous appliances; and it cannot relieve itself from
liability, even as against a trespasser, by showing that it merely refrained
from inflicting wanton and wilful injury.71
The Cla k case can, of course, be explained as illustrating only a general
tendency to impose extraordinary liability on the operators of electrical ap-
paratus,71 or, more broadly, as manifesting a special liability for those who
maintain highly dangerous structures or conduct unusually hazardous activ-
ities. But these explanations are no more than oblique admissions that con-
siderations fundamental to the general law of negligence are pertinent. The
same may be said of the courts' attitudes toward railroads and dangerous
conditions adjoining the highway. 72 The inevitable question is whether any-
thing is to be gained by this fragmentary recognition of the utilitarian nature
of the problem while expressly shutting out such considerations in the bulk
of the cases.
Although the leading precedents in a few jurisdictions and isolated decisions
in others exhibit an intelligent awareness of the real interests and claims that
must be balanced, these advances are matched by a continuing crop of me-
chanical adjudications. The Kentucky courts hold that if more than 150
people daily cross a railroad track at a particular point, they become licensees
69. Id. at 322-23, 255 Pac. at 381.
70. Id. at 323, 255 Pac. at 381-82.
71. This tendency is well marked. See Schorr v. Minnesota Util. Co., 203 Minn.
384, 281 N.W. 523 (1938) (where sixteen-year-old boy is injured by touching electric
cables, there is a question for the jury) ; Ekdahl v. Minnesota Util. Co.. 203 Minn. 374,
281. N.W. 517 (1938) (fifteen-year-old boy recovered for injury after touching electric
cable); Annot., 56 A.L.R. 1021 (1928); Annot., 17 A.L.R. 833 (1922); Annot., 14
A.L.R. 1023 (1921). But see Waddell v. New River Co., 141 W. Va. 880, 93 S.E.2d
473 (1956) (fourteen-year-old boy climbed pole in wooded area frequented by children;
injured by electric wires; action failed; West Virginia does not recognize the attractive
nuisance doctrine). In general, Washington is not very liberal to the trespassing plain-
tiff. Leading cases are: Mail v. M. R. Smith Lumber & Shingle Co., 47 Wash. 2d 447,
287 P.2d 877 (1955) ; Meyer v. General Elec. Co., 46 Wash. 2d 251, 280 P.2d 257 (1955) ;
Deffland v. Spokane Portland Cement Co., 26 Wash. 2d 891, 176 P.2d 311 (1947);
Schock v. Ringling Bros. & Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, 5 Wash. 2d 599, 105
P.2d 838 (1940) ; Bolden v. Independent Order of Odd Fellows, 133 Wash. 293, 233 Pac.
273 (1925) ; Gasch v. Rounds, 93 Wash. 317, 160 Pac. 962 (1916) ; Barnhart v. Chicago,
M. & St. P. Ry., 89 Wash. 304, 154 Pac. 441 (1916); West v. Shaw, 61 Wash. 227, 112
Pac. 243 (1910) ; Anderson v. Northern Pac. Ry., 19 Wash. 340, 53 Pac. 345 (1898).
72. See text accompanying notes 8, 18 supra.
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and the railroad necessarily incurs a duty to take precautions for their safe-
ty.7 3 If the number is less than 150. no such duty exists. Lines must be
drawn somewhere, and there is nothing inherently ridiculous about Ken-
tucky's arbitrary figure (though it must present a peculiar problem of evi-
dence). But posing the question in terms of the plaintiff's elevation from the
category of trespasser to that of licensee is not the most sensible way of in-
quiring into the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct.
A Pennsylvania decision is illustrative. The court refused recovery to a
seven-year-old trespasser plaintiff who was burned by an underground fire
when the surface of a rubbish dump on which he was playing gave way.74
The decision turned on the fact that the subterranean location of the fire
amounted to a latent condition as contrasted with an actively and apparently
burning fire. In terms of potential danger, one would think a hidden fire at
least as dangerous as an obvious one, but the mechanical application of the
.'condition" label at once rendered recovery impossible.
Admittedly, the manipulation of categories or the refusal to go beyond them
need not be evidence of a mechanical judicial attitude, but rather may derive
from a conscious application of judicial policy which seeks to restrict the
scope of the trespasser's right to recovery. 75 If such is the case, it would be
a great deal healthier to have this conflict exposed in the open arena of a
debate on the reasonableness of requiring certain standards of behavior from
occupiers of land than to have the issues damped down and obscured under
the blanket of stale doctrine. In this field, frank avowals of hostility to an
enlargement of the area of recovery are rare today. But as late as 1953 the
Supreme Court of Indiana was willing to adopt the following pronouncement
from an earlier decision:
Restrictions upon the use of property diminishes [sic] pro tanto the beneficial
character of the use, and hence the law imposes restrictions as seldom
as possible and never except upon the strongest grounds. The law which
is reluctant to impose restraint upon an owner's use of his land even
when causing damage beyond his boundary, is more unwilling to impose
restraint upon a user which is dangerous only to those who intrude upon
his land. 76
This quotation was adopted in a case in which recovery was refused the hus-
band of a woman who had been killed while trying to rescue her three-year-
I
73. Louisville & N.R.R. v. Jones, 297 Ky. 528, 180 S.W.2d 555 (1944).
74. Rush v. Plains Township, 371 Pa. 117, 89 A.2d 200 (1952) ; see the dissent by
Justice Musmanno, id. at 121, 89 A.2d at 201.
75. Cf. Hart, Positivisn and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARv. L. REV.
593,611 (1958).
76. Neal v. Home Builders, Inc., 232 Ind. 160, 185, 111 N.E.2d 280, 292 (1953),
quoting Holstine v. Director Gen. of R.R., 77 Ind. App. 582, 593, 134 N.E. 303, 307
(1922).
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old child. The infant had become trapped inside a semicompleted house which
was unattended and unsecured.77
More often, a denial of recovery comes from a court's express or tacit
refusal to elect one of the numerous devices that might enable it to find for
the plaintiff. Such an outcome may be seen in a case in which the defendant
had (with permission) parked his dirt-loading machine on church grounds
at a place somewhat removed from the area used for church activities. The
fifteen-year-old plaintiff played on the machine and was injured by the col-
lapse of the loading crane which had been left suspended in the air.78 Deny-
ing recovery, the court held that the plaintiff was a trespasser on the defend-
ant's property and that the defendant's only duty was not to injure him
wantonly or willfully. Although the outcome of this case may not be particu-
larly harsh, it could well have been different if use had been made of any one
of several different alternatives. The court could have found that the machine
was highly dangerous and that its unsecured condition constituted wanton or
reckless conduct on the part of the defendant. Alternatively, since the de-
fendant was neither the occupier of the premises nor acting on behalf of the
occupier, the occupier's immunities could have been denied him. Again, the
"attractive nuisance" doctrine could have been applied in spite of the plain-
tiff's age. Best of all would have been a discussion of the facts in the light
of general considerations of the reasonable or unreasonable behavior of plain-
tiff and defendant. The result in such a case might well have been the same.
but the real considerations involved would have been aired and put up for
debate. 79
Sumnry
The tangled state of the law with regard to trespassers in United States
jurisdictions is revealed in the gallant but inevitably unsuccessful attempt of
the Restatement of Torts to achieve a synthesis. The law of liability for in-
juries to trespassers in the Restatement comprises fourteen sections and a
little over a thousand words.80 Distinctions are drawn between (inter alia)
trespassers, licensees and invitees; known and unknown trespassers; highly
77. Reversing the Indiana Appellate Court, 104 N.E.2d 395 (1952). But see the
Supreme Court dissents of Chief Justice Emmert, 232 Ind. at 203, 111 N.E.2d at 295,
and Justice Gilkison, 232 Ind. at 191, 111 N.E.2d at 297. Compare Wilinski v. Belmont
Builders, Inc., 143 N.E.2d 69 (Ill. App, -Ct 1957), where an eleven-year-old boy recovered
under the attractive nuisance doctrine for injuries sustained after climbing a ladder
propped against the wall of an unfinished building; Miller v. South" of Scot. Elec. Bd.,
[1958] 7 CURRENT LAw § 423 (H.L. July 3, 1958) (Scot.), where a boy was injured
by touching electric cables in a partly demolished building and the House of Lords held
there was a prima facie case to be answered.
78. Keck v. Woodring, 201. Okla. 665, 208 P.2d 1133 (1948).
79. A vital consideration here would be the enhanced jury discretion entailed by an
adoption of general negligence principles. This is discussed in text accompanying notes
291-93 infra.
80. RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 329, 333-39, 381-84, 386-87 (1934).
[Vol. 68:633
DUTIES TO TRESPASSERS
dangerous activities and those which are dangerous but not highly so; con-
ditions which are artificial and highly dangerous and those which lack one of
these attributes; conditions which the occupier creates or maintains and those
which he does not. The concept of controllable force is also introduced. Per-
haps no better job could have been done in digesting the existing law. But
one can hardly forbear to inquire whether such an attempt was worthwhile,
unless of course it is understood as a deliberate exposure of chaos for the
purpose of encouraging reform.
ENGLAND
The duty owed by the occupier to the trespasser in English law is very
well settled. 8' Leading judicial pronouncements have spoken of it as follows:
The owner of the property is under a duty not to injure the trespasser
wilfully; "not to do a wilful act in reckless disregard of ordinary human-
ity towards him"; but otherwise a man "trespasses at his own risk."8 2
Towards the trespasser the occupier has no duty to take reasonable care
for his protection or even to protect him from concealed danger. The
trespasser comes on to the premises at his own risk. An occupier is in
such a case liable only where the injury is due to some wilful act involv-
ing something more than the absence of reasonable care. There must be
some act done with the deliberate intention of doing harm to the tres-
passer, or at least some act done with reckless disregard of the presence
of the trespasser.83
And the Law Reform Committee in its Third Report felt able to sum-
marize the English position in a sentence: "The trespasser enters entirely at
his own risk, but the occupier must not set traps designed to do him bodily
harm, or do any act calculated to do bodily harm to a trespasser whom he
knows to be, or who to his knowledge is likely to be, on his premises. '8 4
81. In view of the tight, unitary nature of the English jurisdiction, it is necessary
to deal with cases in a detailed way in order to reach a statement of the law. This sec-
tion will accordingly analyze decisions in the fashion that is customary in English legal
argument.
82. Latham v. R. Johnson & Nephew, [1913] 1 K.B. 398, 411 (C.A. 1912) (Hamil-
ton, L.J.). Lord Justice Hamilton was here, in part, adopting the language of the Judi-
cial Committee of the Privy Council in Grand Trunk Ry. v. Barnett, [1911.] A.C. 361,
370 (P.C.) (Ont.).
83. Robert Addie & Sons (Collieries) v. Dumbreck, [1929] A.C. 358, 365 (Scot.)
(Lord Hailsham). English law thus adopted, in 1929, the so-called "Massachusetts" or
harsh view of the occupier's duty to the seen trespasser.
84. Law Reform Committee, Third Report: Occupiers' Liability to Invitees, Licen-
sees and Trespassers, CmD. No. 9305, § 28 (1954). For general discussions, see SALMOND,
TORTs 514-35 (12th ed. Heuston 1957); SmET, TORTS 191-208 (1955) ; Wirim, TORT
703-17 (6th ed. Lewis 1954); Hart, Injuries to Trespassers, 47 L.Q. REv. 92 (1931);
Marsh, The History and Comparative Law of Invitees, Licensees and Trespassers (pts.
1-2), 69 L.Q. REv. 182, 359 (1953); Williams, The Duties of Non-Occupiers in Respect
of Dangerous Premises, 5 MoDRx L. REv. 194 (1942).
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The theoretical structure of this approach is no different when the tres-
passer is a child; nonetheless, on identical facts the practical outcome of a
case is often different. Any trespasser may become a licensee if the land-
owner, by his passivity, repeatedly acquiesces in the trespass and such cases
of implied license are usually those of children at play.85 Furthermore, a child
who comes on land as a lawful visitor will not be converted into a trespasser
simply because he meddles with an attractive object, though in similar cir-
cumstances an adult would certainly be held to be trespassing.8, On the other
hand, the child who comes on land as a trespasser is in no better position
than the trespassing adult, except that conduct on the part of the occupier
may amount to recklessness when directed toward a child, although the same
conduct would not amount to recklessness with respect to an adult.8 7
The foregoing doctrinal propositions have application only when the de-
fendant is the occupier of the premises in question. It has become apparent
in the English decisions that the law is quite different when the defendant
is someone other than the occupier. The historical process by which the posi-
tion of the occupier separated from that of the nonoccupier defendant is not
difficult to trace.
Relevant pronouncements were rare until the past few decades. An early
case in point was Corby v. Hill,88 in which an owner of land gave permission
to the defendant, who was doing building work on the land, to place materials
on the owner's private road. The defendant left a pile of slates lying in such
an obstructive position that the plaintiff, who was lawfully using the road
with the landowner's permission, fell and was injured. Chief Justice Cock-
burn was content to make the point that the landowner himself would have
been liable to the plaintiff for setting up a trap and that the defendant could
not enjoy greater immunity than could the landowner. The nonoccupier user
must exercise at least as much care toward the occupier's licensees as must
the occupier himself.
In Bolch v. Smith,89 the plaintiff, engaged as a workman in a public dock-
yard, was given permission by the occupiers, his employers, to use certain
paths to gain access to a lavatory. The defendant was a contractor whom the
occupiers had allowed to erect machinery in the yard. He placed a revolving
shaft across one of the paths and the plaintiff, while returning from the
85. Cooke v. Midland Great W. Ry., [19091 A.C. 229 (Ire.) ; Gough v. National
Coal Bd., [1954] 1 Q.B. 191 (C.A. 1.953).
86. Cases cited note 85 supra; Corp. of the City of Glasgow v. Taylor, 119221 1
A.C. 44 (Scot. 1921).
87. Edwards v. Railway Executive, [1952] A.C. 737; Excelsior Wire Rope Co. v.
Callan, [19301 A.C. 404; Robert Addie & Sons (Collieries) v. Dumbreck, [19291 A.C.
358 (Scot.); Liddle v. Yorkshire (No. Riding) County Council, [19341 2 K.B. 101
(C.A.); Hardy v. Central London Ry., [1920] 3 K.B. 459 (C.A.); see Law Reform
Committee, supra note 84, § 30.
88. 4 C.B. (n.s.) 556, 140 Eng. Rep. 1209 (C.P. 1858).
89. 7 H. & N. 736, 158 Eng. Rep. 666 (Ex. 1862).
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lavatory, stumbled and caught his arm in the shaft, thereby sustaining severe
injuries. The court found the defendant not liable. The decision seems to rest
on tvo grounds: first, that the plaintiff had the choice of several paths which
could have led him to and from the lavatory and, by selecting the one beset
with danger, he had in some sense consented to the risk; and, second, that
the danger was obvious and not a trap. More significantly, the point that the
defendant was not the occupier was considered. Baron Wilde remarked, "I
will decide the case as if it were a question between the plaintiff and the
owners of the yard, because if they are not responsible for putting up the
shaft, a fortiori the defendant is not."90 The implication of this passage is
ambiguous. The statement may mean that the duty of an occupier toward a
visitor on his land is always more extensive than the duty imposed upon one
who is not the occupier. The modern trend of the law unquestionably is in
quite the opposite direction. More probably, it means that, in this particular
case, the occupier owed a more stringent duty than did the defendant, since
the occupier was also the employer of the plaintiff. Whatever interpretation
be put on the case, it does not seem to be authority for the proposition that
has been ascribed to it, namely, that the duty of a nonoccupier "is exactly
the same as that of the occupier." 91
The next case of any relevance is Castle v. Parker.92 The plaintiff was a
customs house officer who, in order to get to certain bonded vaults, used to
take a short cut along a passageway which ran through a half-erected build-
ing. Servants of the defendant subcontractor had pierced the passageway
with an opening into which the plaintiff fell. His action was unsuccessful.
The opinions contain remarks which bear upon the evolution of duties to
trespassers, saying that, since the defendant was a mere contractor and not
the occupier, he was under no duty to keep the passageway safe. 93 This
seems to be another faint suggestion along the lines of Bolch v. Smith that
the duty of a nonoccupier may be less onerous than that of the occupier.
Baron Bramwell observed simply that the defendant "could not be in a worse
situation than the owner of the premises. '94
In Kinber v. Gas Light &" Coke Co.,95 the plaintiff entered the land to
view a house where workmen of the defendants, who were not the occupiers,
were making repairs. The workmen failed to warn the plaintiff of a hole
which they had made in the stair-landing floor, and, on stepping there, she
fell and was injured. This time, the defendants were held liable and the court
rejected the argument that. as nonoccupiers, they were under no duty to
warn the plaintiff even of concealed dangers which they had caused. The
90. 158 Eng. Rep. at 670.
91. CLEmx & LINDSELL, ToRTs 688 (llth ed. 1954).
92. 18 L.T.R. (n.s.) 367 (Ex. 1868).
93. Ibid.
04. Ibid. Baron Bramwell also remarked: "The plaintiff may possibly not have been
a trespasser, though I am not quite sure of that." Ibid.
95. [1918] 1 K.B. 439 (C.A.).
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effect of this decision is only to assert that, on the given facts, the duty of
the nonoccupier was as stringent as that of the occupier. The opinion does
nothing to prescribe circumstances in which the duties of the two might
diverge.
This first handful of cases, then, acknowledges the possibility of some fis-
sion between the duties of occupier and nonoccupier, but does so only by
implication and certainly not by way of propositional formulation. Indeed it
was not until two leading trespasser cases in 1929 and 1930 that there was
any serious canvassing of the view that the duty of the nonoccupier might,
in some way, be the more exacting.
In the first of these cases, Robert Addie & Sons (Collieries) v. Dun-
breck,96 the defendant occupiers were held not liable for the death of a tres-
passing boy, aged four, who had been killed in their haulage system. But in
Excelsior Wire Rope Co. v. Callan,97 on strikingly similar facts, nonoccupier
defendants were held to be liable. To distinguish these two cases is a trying
task. One popular approach is to ignore the question of occupancy and to
base the distinction solely on other facts. So it can be said that in Addie, at
the moment the defendants put the haulage machinery into motion, they were
not in a position to see the trespassing children, while in Excelsior, the man
who gave the signal to start the wheel was only about twenty yards away
and could easily have observed the children if he had looked around. Thus.
in the latter case there may have been an element of recklessness which was
absent in the former.98 Another approach is to deny that the principles
96. [1929] A.C. 358 (Scot.).
97. [1930] A.C. 404.
98. This was the method of distinguishing the two cases adopted by Lord Justice
Scrutton in Mourton v. Poulter, [1930] 2 K.B. 183, 190 (C.A.), and favored by SAL-
MOND, TORTS 519-20 (12th ed. Heuston 1957). The fact that the defendants were twenty
yards away from the machinery does not appear in the Excelsior case itself but was
pointed out in Mourton v. Poulter, supra at 189. Montrose, Note, 17 MODERN L. REV.
265 (1954), points out that the Addie case was argued on the basis of the principles
governing liability for defects in the static condition of the premises, while the Excelsior
case was put to the court as an issue of negligence in the conduct of a dangerous activity.
This is certainly a valid point and it is not suggested here that the contrast between
occupiers and nonoccupiers is the true ground of distinction between the two cases but
only that this contrast exists.
In CLERK & LINDSELL, TORTS 692 & n.(c) (11th ed. 1954), it is still maintained that
"The duty of licensees and invitees towards trespassers is the same as that of the oc-
cupier." The learned editor refers to Mourton v. Poulter for this proposition but ac-
knowledges that "in Calain's case . .. [the Excelsior case] Lord Atkin seemed to suggest
some difference." Lord Atkin surely did more than "seem to suggest" and the support-
ing statements of Lords Warrington and Thankerton should be -noticed. See text accom-
panying notes 99-101 infra.
UNDERHILL, TORTS 180-81 (16th ed. 1949) is, however, a vigorous advocate of the
view that the idea of occupation is the vital point in distinguishing Addie v. Dumbreck
from the Excelsior case. The point is noted in WINFELD, TORT 711 (6th ed. Lewis 1954),
and by SALMOND, TORTS 525 n.68 (12th ed. Heuston 1957) where, after citing the cases
distinguishing the position of the nonoccupier from that of the occupier, the learned editor
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governing the duty of an occupier to a trespasser had any relevance in Excel-
sior, since the defendants there were not the occupiers-a view for which
a good deal of authority exists in the case itself:
[I]n cases of a similar kind questions have arisen in respect to the duty
owed by owners of property or occupiers of property in relation to
dangers which exist upon that property .... There has arisen in respect
to the duties of owners and occupiers of land an elaborate series of de-
cisions which have involved the consideration of the precise difference
between invitees of the occupiers, licensees of the occupiers, or tres-
passers upon the land. In my view, in this case none of those questions
is relevant, and that particular branch of the law which deals with the
obligations of occupiers of land towards those persons who come upon
the land is not at issue at all in this particular case. The defendants in
this case were not occupiers oy the land in question.9
In spite of the fact that the last sentence is not subordinated by a causal
conjunction, it seems clear that Lord Atkin was ready to remove the case
from the ambit of the authority of Addie v. Dumbreck on the simple ground
that the defendant was not the occupier. Lord Warrington, too, seems to have
held this view: "The question whether the children were invitees, licensees
or trespassers for the purpose of a case in which the defendant has a dan-
gerous machine on his own land is not a question which need engage our
attention in this case."'u0 And was not Lord Thankerton making the same
point? He observed: "The normal class of case which has arisen ... is where
the main question at issue concerns the capacity in which the person injured
got access to the property in question .... In the present case it seems to me
that there can be no issue as regards that point."'u0
These passages show repeated adumbration of an incipient gulf between
the positions of the occupier and nonoccupier as defendants. The possibility
matured into reality in three later decisions-Buckland v. Guildford Gas
Light & Coke Co., 0 2 Davis v. St. Mary's Demolition & Excavation Co.103
and Creed v. McGeoch & Sons. 0 4 In all three cases the plaintiffs were chil-
dren. In each, the defendant did not immediately initiate a hazardous opera-
tion leading to the plaintiff's injury, though it could be said that the injury
came from a source of danger stemming from activities on the land. They
makes the comment: "It is hard to be enthusiastic about them. Why should the contrac-
tor whom I employ to dig a hole in my field be liable when I am not?" But it is not
clear whether Heuston, in making this comment, is deploring the liability of the non-
occupier or the absence of liability of the occupier.
99. [1930] A.C. at 412 (opinion of Lord Atkin). (Emphasis added.)
100. Id. at 411.
101. Id. at 413.
102. [1949] 1 K.B. 410 (1948).
103. [1954] 1 Weekly L.R. 592 (Q.B. 1953), Montrose, Note, 17 MODERN L. REV.
368 (1954).
104. [1955] 1 Weekly L.R. 1005 (Liverpool Assizes), Montrose, Note, 19 MODFRN
L. RFV. 79 (1956).
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are all cases in which an action against an occupier defendant might be ex-
pected to fail, yet the actions against nonoccupier defendants actually suc-
ceeded. This in itself would be highly suggestive that the idea of occupancy
is crucial to the decisions, and, in fact, that very point is emphatically made
in all three opinions.105
In Buckland, the plaintiff's decedent was killed by electrically charged
wires which the defendants had strung over a tree on a farmer's land. The
child had strayed from a path on the land and climbed the tree. The court
was inclined to think that the plaintiff had a license to cross the field and
climb the tree, but went on to say that:
[E]ven if . . . the inference ought to be drawn that she was not per-
mitted to be in the field but was a trespasser when she was by the tree,
she was nevertheless in the circumstances of this case one to whom, in
my judgment, the defendants owed a duty. The classifications into which
persons may fall according as, in relation to the occupier of the land,
they are his invitees or his licensees or are trespassing, do not have
decisive significance when considering in the present circumstances the
position of the defendants. The occupier of the field might owe different
duties to those who were his invitees from the duties which he owed to
those who were his licensees. The duties owed by the defendants to those
in the two classes would be the same. If someone trespassed on the field
the duties owed to him by the occupier would be most limited . . . . In
considering whether the defendants had a duty to such a trespasser, the
fact that vis-A-vis the occupier of the land the person was a trespasser
would be a very relevant circumstance to have in mind, but it would not
in all cases be a conclusive one.106
Although the judge does not explicitly say that the defendants would not have
been liable had they been the occupiers, he says enough to warrant this con-
clusion.
The occupancy point was made again in the second of the three cases,
Davis v. St. Mary's Demolition & Excavation Co. The plaintiff was a child
105. The advocates of the "activity duty" approach would prefer to have these cases
decided on the theory that the defendants were engaged in current operations on the
land. See Montrose, Note, 19 MODERN L. REv. 79 (1956). The ratio decidcndi of the
cases, however, is clearly that the defendants were not the occupiers.
106. [1949] 1 K.B. at 419-20. Buckland's case may be compared with the Northern
Ireland decision in McLaughlin v. Antrim Elec. Supply Co., [1941] No. Ire. L.R. 23
(C.A. 1940), where the plaintiff, a boy of twelve, was injured by touching electric cables
after climbing a structure erected by the defendants to carry the cables. The boy was a
trespasser but the defendants had breached a statutory provision by failing to post ade-
quate warnings and in not taking adequate measures to prevent climbing. The action
failed: "In my opinion the duty owed by the defendants to the plaintiff is entirely de-
pendent on the determination of the class into which the plaintiff properly falls." Id. at
28 (opinion of Andrews, L.C.J.). See also the Australian decision of Thompson v. Banks-
town Corp., 87 Commw. L.R. 619, [1953] Argus L.R. 165 (Austl.), discussed in text
accompanying notes 178-84 infra, and the decision of the Court of Cassation discussed in
text accompanying -note 240 infra.
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who had trespassed on a site where the defendants were carrying on demoli-
tion work under contract with the owners. The child loosened some bricks
in a wall which was in an unsafe condition, thus causing the wall to fall on
him. The site was easily accessible from an open space where children played,
and children often came there only to be ordered away by the workmen. The
accident took place on a Sunday when no servants of the defendant were
present.
The judge confessed that "any decision which puts the defendants in a
different position from the occupier of the land is one which must be con-
sidered with very great care."' 10 7 Since he had earlier admitted that "if the
defendants were the occupiers of the site and the plaintiff was a trespasser,
that clearly would be an end of the case,"1 0 s his finding for the plaintiff
clearly shows his acceptance of the more exacting duty of a nonoccupier. This
is the first case which can confidently be said to turn upon the fact that the
defendant was not the occupier.
The argument was taken up in Creed v. McGeoch,109 which presented facts
similar to those in Davis. The nonoccupier defendant had left a trailer parked
near a stretch of land often frequented by children. The inevitable child
plaintiff was injured while playing with the trailer on a Saturday afternoon
when none of the defendants' servants was present. The court found the
defendants liable:
Iuch of the argument before me was directed to the question whether
the defendants were in occupation of the ground on which the trailer
rested. A somewhat unusual feature of this case is that the defendants
seek to establish that they were in occupation and owed no higher duty
to the plaintiff than such as is imposed on occupiers in respect of infant
trespassers; on the other hand, the plaintiff contends that whether or no
she was a trespasser vis-a-vis the true occupiers, the defendants were
not in occupation and owed a higher duty .... It may appear surpris-
ing, at least to the parties, that the measure of the defendants' obligation
to the plaintiff should depend upon the answer to the question whether
they were in occupation of the land .... It seems to me, however, that
there is no escape from the conclusion that as the authorities stand the
distinction. . . does exist.110
Nature of Nonoccupier's Duty
These three decisions leave no doubt that the English courts now recog-
nize occupation of the premises by the defendant as a category which carries
special legal connotations in cases of injury to those who come upon the land.
The decisions also delimit the extent to which the duty of the nonoccupier
1M7. [1954] 1 Weekly L.R. at 596.
108. Id. at 594.
109. [1955] 1 Weekly L.R. 1005 (Liverpool Assizes).
110. Id. at 1008. The judge eventually found the plaintiff to be a licensee, but this
erns alm,,st an afterthought in the opinion, which turns chiefly on the fact that the
defendants were not in occupatioti.
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is more extensive or more stringent than that of the occupier. In Excelsior
Wire Rope Co. v. Callan, Lord Atkin said that the duty of the nonoccupier
defendants was "to take reasonable precautions to see that the children were
not injured by the occasional use to which the owners put that dangerous
machine.""' And in Buckland, the court spoke of the plaintiff as being
"within the group of those whom the defendants ought to have had in con-
templation." The opinion goes on: "She was a neighbour in the sense in which
that word was used by Lord Atkin in what Lord Wright calls his well known
aphorism in Donoghue v. Stevenson.' '" 2 Davis v. St. Mary's Demolition &
Excavation Co. acknowledged that the plaintiff's argument was based on
Donoghue v. Stevenson, that is to say, upon the general duty of care in negli-
gence, and, upholding this argument, rendered a decision for the plaintiff.
Creed v. McGeoch also described the plaintiff's argument as resting on the
general duty of care expressed in Donoghue v. Stevenson and then proceeded
to adopt the plaintiff's position.
Thus, although the occupier of land is bound only to refrain from willful
or reckless conduct toward the trespasser, the nonoccupier is bound by the
more rigorous general duty to take care. It is not difficult to detect the con-
ventional reasons for this distinction. The occupier's privileged position is
said to derive from the sanctity which surrounds the possession of real prop-
erty. "The ultimate reason for exempting a landowner from liability in such
a case seems to be the public policy of allowing him to make the most bene-
ficial use of his land .... ,,n3 Since the nonoccupier lacks the divinity which
111. [1930] A.C. at 413.
112. [1949] 1 K.B. at 419. The "well known aphorism" referred to is the celebrated
statement by Lord Atkin in Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562, 580 (Scot.), of
the circumstances in which a duty of care exists:
[I]n English law there must be, and is, some general conception of relations giv-
ing rise to a duty of care, of which the particular cases found in the books are
but instances. The liability for negligence, whether you style it such or treat it as
in other systems as a species of "culpa," is no doubt based upon a general public
sentiment of moral wrong doing for which the offender must pay. But acts or
omissions which any moral code would censure cannot in a practical world be
treated so as to give a right to every person injured by them to demand relief....
The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law, you must not in-
jure your neighbour; and the lawyer's question, Who is my neighbour? receives
a restricted reply. You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which
you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who, then,
in law is my neighbour? The answer seems to be-persons who are so closely
and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contem-
plation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions
which are called in question.
113. 18 HARv. L. REv. 150 (1904); see Hart, Injuries to Trespassers, 47 L.Q. REV.
92, 107 (1931):
The reason why an occupier will be liable to a trespasser for any positive act
done with knowledge of the trespasser's presence and with the deliberate intention
of injuring him, or with reckless disregard of the danger to him, appears to be
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hedges landownership, he must take his chances with the ordinary principles
of negligence. So runs the legend. We may today question "how far sanctity
of landed property ought to be recognised as a legal value of greater impor-
tance than the physical safety of the community,"' n 4 but the origins of the
doctrine are obvious.
An analogous distinction has appeared in cases in which the plaintiff was
injured through the negligence of the driver of a vehicle while trespassing
with respect to someone other than the driver.
The English Court of Appeal was squarely faced with such a problem in
Farrugia v. Great Western Ry. 115 The plaintiff, a small boy, was running
behind the defendants' truck in an attempt to remount it, having already
been on it unlawfully. A box on the truck proved too large to pass under a
bridge and was knocked off, injuring the plaintiff. The defendants' counsel
pressed the argument that the boy was making an unreasonable and illegal
use of the highway, and that he, therefore, must be considered a trespasser
to whom the defendants owed no duty of care. But the court, holding that
the plaintiff's action must succeed, remarked:
It appears to me that the defendants and their driver, having created be-
tween them a potential source of danger which would impinge on any-
body on the highway in the near neighbourhood, must be taken to have
owed a duty towards anybody who might be on the highway in the near
neighbourhood, whether he was there lawfully or whether he was there
unlawfully. I cannot see, on any ground of principle or common sense,
why a distinction should be made between the plaintiff running in the
road to get on the lorry and a foot passenger lawfully crossing the road
immediately behind the lorry. I should have thought the duty was a duty
to take care vis-a-vis anyone-not this plaintiff as such, but anyone-the
general class of persons who, at the moment when the danger material-
ised, might happen to be in the near neighbourhood. 116
It is doubtful, however, that the plaintiff would have succeeded if he had
been trespassing on the truck at the actual instant when he sustained the in-
jury, unless the defendants were guilty of reckless disregard of his known
presence." 7 The idea of trespass toward the owner of the vehicle which
that the law exactly prescribes the relation of an occupier to a trespasser whose
presence is known. This relation is worked out in that part of the law of torts
which deals with the plea of inanus nwlliter imposuit as a defence to an action of
assault brought against the occupier by the trespasser.
114. Marsh, The History and Comparative Law of Invitees, Licensees and Tres-
passers, 69 L.Q. REv. 182, 184 (1953).
115. [1947] 2 All E.R. 565 (C.A.).
116. Id. at 567.
117. In Howard v. Pickfords, Ltd., reported only in 79 SOL. J. 69 (K.B. 1935), a
child sat on a truck's running board furthest from the curb. When the truck drove
away the child was thrown off and injured. It was held that the defendants, employers
of the truck driver, were not liable. Apparently the driver did not breach any duty by
failing to inspect the far side of the truck before driving off. But it is difficult to under-
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caused the injury was probably as central in Farrugia as is trespass against
the defendant's land in the case of dangerous premises. The status of the
plaintiff as a trespasser on the defendant's property at the moment of injury
thus seems to have become a vital factual element in the English law of tort.
Occupancy Duty and Activity Duty
Of even more recent growth is another and more radical development
which threatens to overlap and complicate the differentiation between oc-
cupiers and nonoccupiers-a distinction between injury caused by a defect
in the premises themselves and injury caused by some activity or operation
thereon. In the first situation-static defect-the traditional categories of
entry determine the occupier's duty; in the second-active operation-the
character of the plaintiff's entry is regarded as irrelevant, at least if he is a
lawful visitor, and the liability of the occupier must be established in the light
of general principles of negligence.
The earliest expression of this approach is generally taken to be found in
the 1954 judgment of Lord Justice Denning (as he then was) in Dunster v.
Abbott."38 The plaintiff was a salesman who, while leaving the defendant's
house on a dark, wet night, walked into a ditch. The defendant, thinking the
plaintiff had safely departed, switched off an outside light which might have
assisted the plaintiff in finding his way out. Although the court held that the
defendant was not in breach of any duty, Lord Justice Denning said:
[I]t does not matter whether the plaintiff was an invitee or a licensee.
That distinction is only material in regard to the static condition of the
premises. It is concerned with dangers that have been present for some
time in the physical structure of the premises. It has no relevance in
regard to current operations, that is, to things being done on the prem-
stand how the driver could mount the cab of the truck and make a prudent start with-
out seeing the child on the running board. Although the decision is very briefly reported,
it seems a fair conjecture that the court was strongly moved by the trespassing status
of the child. Two decisions of the English Court of Appeal have held that where a
master prohibits his driver from giving lifts, the master is not liable to passengers who
are injured by the driver's negligence when they have been given rides in defiance of
the master's orders. Twine v. Bean's Express Ltd., 62 T.L.R. 458 (C.A. 1946); Conway
v. George Wimpey & Co., [1951] 2 K.B. 266 (C.A.). These cases raise a fundamental
question of the nature of a master's liability in tort, on which see Hughes & Hudson,
The Nature of a Master's Liability in the Law of Tort, 31. CAN. B. REV. 18 (1953:
Newark, Twine v. Bean's Express, Ltd., 17 MoERx L. R'V. 102 (1954).
118. [1954] 1 Weekly L.R. 58 (C.A. 1953); see Montrose, Note, 17 MODERN L.
REV. 265 (1954). Newark, supra note 117, at 109-13, coined the terms "occupancy duty"
and "activity duty" for this distinction. He cites traces of it in the earlier case law.
Professor Newark, by virtue of this article, is one of the earliest writers to perceive
and encourage the notion of an "activity duty." His colleague at the Queen's University
of Belfast, Professor Montrose, has contributed greatly to the evolution of the notion
in a series of very penetrating case notes in the Modern Law Review. See notes 98, 103,
104 supra, 120, 123, 131 infra.
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ises, to dangers which are brought about by the contemporaneous activ-
ities of the occupier or his servants or of anyone else. The instance was
put ...of the driving of a vehicle, but many others can be imagined.
In regard to current operations, the duty of the occupier-or of the per-
son conducting the operations-is simply to use reasonable care in all
the circumstances. This duty is owed alike to all persons lawfully on the
premises who may be affected by his activities: and it is the same whether
the person injured is an invitee or a licensee, a volunteer or a guest.1 19
Switching off a light while a visitor is leaving may indeed reasonably be
called active conduct. It does not, however, set a force in motion but rather
creates a dangerous condition. What if the light is switched off half an hour
before the visitor arrives? Could an argument still be put that the injury
stems from the occupier's activity, or must we then speak in terms of a dan-
gerous condition? How close to the accident in time must the activity be
to be regarded as a "current operation"? And should this make a vital dif-
ference ?
In Slade v. Battersea & Putney Hospital Management Comm.,120 the court
was prepared to apply this approach to a plaintiff who slipped on a part of
the floor where polish had been applied but not rubbed off. This was an
alternative ground of the decision, for the court had previously held that the
plaintiff might recover under the classical rules of liability to an invitee or
licensee. The judge confessed, however, that the occupancy-activity distinc-
tion appealed to him "because it seems to be common sense.' 121 Interestingly
enough, the court also remarked that "We need not bother ourselves with
what might be the position of a trespasser.' 22 The dichotomy was again
followed by the Court of Appeal in Slater v. Clay Cross Co.,1 '3 where the
plaintiff, a licensee by acquiescence, was struck by the defendants' railway
train which they operated on their land:
The duty of the occupier is nowadays simply to take reasonable care to
see that the premises are reasonably safe for people lawfully coming on
to them: and it makes no difference whether they are invitees or licen-
sees. At any rate, the distinction has no relevance to cases such as the
present where current operations are being carried out on the land. If a
landowner is driving his car down his private drive and meets someone
lawfully walking on it, then he is under a duty to take reasonable care
so as not to injure the walker; and his duty is the same no matter
whether it is his gardener coming up with plants, a tradesman delivering
goods, a friend coming to tea, or a flag seller seeking a charitable gift.12 4
119. [1954] 1 Weekly L.R. at 62.
120. [1955] 1 Weekly L.R. 207, [1955] 1 All E.R. 429 (Q.B.), Montrose, Note, 18
MODERN L. Rn'. 395 (1955).
121. [1955] 1 Weekly L.R. at 211.
122. [1955] 1 All E.R. at 431. This sentence does not appear in the version of the
judgment given in the Weekly Law Reports.
123. [1956] 2 All E.R. 625 (C.A.), Montrose, Note, 19 MODERN L REv. 691 (1956).
124. [1956] 2 All E.R. at 627 (Denning, L.J.).
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But earlier in Slater, Lord Justice Denning had said: "If she were a tres-
passer on this railway, she would, of course, have no cause of action .... M25
This question of the availability of the activity-duty concept to the trespasser
plaintiff was obliquely raised in the 1955 Court of Appeal decision of Ran-
dall v. Tarrant.120 There, the plaintiff, after parking his car at the side of a
public highway which ran across the defendant's farm land, walked on to the
farm. The defendant attempted to drive a baler past the parked car and, in
so doing, damaged it. His defense was that the plaintiff had parked the car
for the purpose of trespassing on the farm, that this amounted to an improper
use of the highway, and that the car was an accessory to the trespass and
tainted, as it were, by the same fault. The court held that parking the car for the
purpose of trespassing on the defendant's field did not render it a trespasser
on the highway; accordingly, judgment was for the plaintiff.
But suppose that the car had been parked for a clearly improper purpose
and thereby became a trespasser on the highway. Would this relieve the de-
fendant from his duty to drive past it carefully? The Court of Appeal, observ-
ing that no such case had been litigated, declined to express an opinion on
the outcome.1 27 The facts need be changed only a little to sharpen the issue.
Suppose a case, not of damage to property, but of striking a pedestrian on
one's driveway. 128 Would it make any difference if the walker was a tres-
passer ?129 Would it matter if the driver-occupier knew the status of the
visitor? Is he relieved from an obligation to drive carefully by that status?
With respect to licensee plaintiffs, the passage of the 1957 Occupiers' Lia-
bility Act may have made these questions academic, though some English
commentators take the view that the act applies only to injuries caused by
the static condition of the premises and that actions based on injury caused
by activities must still be grounded on the common law.'80 If they are cor-
rect, the activity-duty approach no doubt will flourish.
125. Id. at 626.
126. [1955] 1 Weekly L.R. 255 (C.A.), Montrose, Note, 18 MODERN L. REV. 395
(1955).
127. [1955] 1 Weekly L.R. at 260.
128. As in the example given by Lord Justice Denning in Slater v. Clay Cross Co.,
[1956] 2 All E.R. 625, 627 (C.A.), quoted in text accompanying note 124 supra.
129. See a query raised by Montrose, Note, 17 MODERN L. Rav. 265, 267 (1954).
130. 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31. Section 1(1) of the Act reads: "The rules enacted by the
two -next following sections shall have effect, in place of the rules of the common law,
to regulate the'duty which an occupier of premises owes to his visitors in respect of
dangers due to the state of the premises or to things done or omitted to be done on
them." (Emphasis added.) Section 1(2) goes on, however, "The rules so enacted shall
regulate the nature of the duty imposed by law in consequence of a person's occupation
or control of premises . . . ." (Emphasis added.)
It has been argued that in spite of the language of § 1(1), the scope of the act must
be taken to be restricted by the language of § 1.(2) to cases of injury caused by defects
in the condition of the premises. See Odgers, Occupiers' Liability: A Further Comment,
CAmB. L.J. 39-40 (1957) ; Payne, The Occupiers' Liability Act, 21 MODERN L. REV. 359,
367-68 (1958). Contra, SALMOND, TORTS 481 (12th ed. Heuston 1957).
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The distinctions between occupier and nonoccupier defendants and between
occupancy and activity duties have recently been confirmed and illustrated by
a leading decision of the House of Lords-A. C. Billings & Sons v.. Riden.131
The defendants were contractors who had been engaged by the occupiers of
premises to remodel an entrance to a private home. The work made access
to the premises impossible except by passing through the forecourt of the
house next door and stepping up some three feet from there onto a ramp.
The plaintiff, a social visitor to the caretaker of the house under repair,
gained access to the premises safely but, on leaving after dark, fell into a
sunken area of the adjacent house and sustained injuries. The defendants
were found liable, but with damages reduced by one half due to the plaintiff's
contributory negligence.' 32 That a plaintiff who was clearly a licensee should
recover under English law for a danger obvious to her is in itself surprising,
though the ground for the decision is not clear. In the Court of Appeal, the
majority opinion had clearly rested on the theory that a general duty of care
must govern those who conduct activities on land:
The duty of care . . . rests on anyone who does work on the land, in-
cluding the occupier himself. If the occupier does work on his own land,
he is under the same duty as a contractor. The reason is because the duty
arises, not out of the fact of occupation, but out of the fact that he is
doing work which he knows or ought to know may bring danger to
others; and that gives rise to a duty of care . .. .13
In the House of Lords, on the other hand, Lord Reid seemed to rest his
opinion on the fact that the defendants were not the occupiers of the prem-
ises:
The only reasonable justification I know of for the rights of a licensee
being limited as they are is that a licensee generally gives no considera-
tion for the rights which the occupier has given him and must not be
allowed to look a gift horse in the mouth. That cannot apply to the
appellants, who gave no concession to the respondent.... In the present
case I see no reason why the contractor who chooses to prevent safe
access by visitors should be entitled to rely on any speciality in the law
of licensor and licensee.' 34
Lord Somervell, however, followed the approach of Lord Justice Denning
in the Court of Appeal and advanced the general duty of care owed by a
131. [1958] A.C. 240 (1957), affirming [1957] 1 Q.B. 46 (C.A. 1,956). See Mont-
rose, Note, 20 MODERN L. REv. 287 (1957) (on Court of Appeal decision) ; Montrose,
Note, 21 MoDmN L. REv. 76 (1958) (on House of Lords decision).
132. The principle of apportionment of damages was generally introduced into the
English law of tort by the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act, 1945, 8 & 9
Geo. 6, c. 28.
133. [1957] 1 Q.B. at 56 (opinion of Denning, L.J.).
134. [1958] A.C. at 249-50. And, in the Court of Appeal, Lord Justice Denning had
felt it necessary to remark, "At the outset I desire to stress that we are not concerned
here with the liability of an occupier of land but with the liability of a contractor who
is doing work on land." [1957] 1 Q.B. at 55.
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person executing work on premises.13  In turn, Lord Keith was troubled
about the exact location of the plaintiff when she sustained the injury. If the
accident started on the premises on which the defendants were working, he
agreed that the plaintiff could recover; but if the accident started next door,
the plaintiff, being a trespasser there, could not recover against the defend-
ants:
The trespass was insignificant and certainly excusable. But I cannot see
how the contractors' men, assuming they advised or encouraged the
trespass, are in any different position from the plaintiff. If a person
encourages a trespass and another person accepts the encouragement.
both being aware of the position, and the actual trespasser is injured by
some danger on the land trespassed on, known to both. there is no prin-
ciple I know of which would attach liability to the instigator or encour-
ager in a question with the trespasser .... 136
Since he was willing to assume that the accident had begun on the premises
where the defendants were working, Lord Keith joined in the judgment for
the plaintiff.
Summary
Apart from the statutory innovation of the Occupiers' Liability Act, two
judicial tendencies appear to be working toward improving the position of
the trespasser plaintiff in English law. First is the denial to nonoccupier
defendants of the immunities enjoyed by the occupier, as in Buckland v.
Guildford Gas Light & Coke Co.,' 3 7 Davis v. St. Mary's Demolition & Ex-
cavation Co.138 and Creed v. McGeoch..381 With a broad interpretation of the
notion of activity, these cases could all be rested on the theory of activity
duty. Nevertheless, they were not.
Second, the notion of activity duty as opposed to occupancy duty is gain-
ing currency. So far, it has been squarely applied only to cases of plaintiffs
lawfully on the premises, as in Dunster v. Abbdtt,140 Slade v. Battersea &
Putney Hospital Management Comm. 14 1 and Slater v. Clay Cross Co.14 " But
in A. C. Billings & Sons v. Riden,143 the plaintiff clearly was a technical
135. [1958] A.C. at 263-66.
136. [1958].A.C. at 262.
137. [1949] 1 K.B. 410 (K.B. 1948), discussed in text accompanying note 106 supra.
13& [1954] 1 Weekly L.R. 592 (Q.B. 1953), discussed in text accompanying notes
107-08 supra.
139. [1955] 1 Weekly L.R. 1005 (Liverpool Assizes), discussed in text accompany-
ing notes 109-10 supra.
140. [1954] 1 Weekly L.R. 58 (C.A. 1953), discussed in text accompanying notes
118-19 mspra.
141. [1955] 1 Weekly L.R. 207 (Q.B.), discussed in text accompanying notes 120-
22 supra.
142. [1956] 2 All E.R. 625 (C.A.), discussed in text accompanying notes 123-24
supra.
143. [1958] A.C. 240 (1957), discussed in text accompanying notes 131-36 supra.
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trespasser at some point in the period of time surrounding the accident, yet
she recovered.
The situation was much the same in Randall v. Tarrant 144 and Farrugia
v. Great Western Ry.145 It is important to note that in the first two cases
the plaintiffs were adults. The picture is complicated, however, by the possi-
bility that A. C. Billings & Sons v. Riden rests on the fact that the defendant
was not the occupier.
The distinctions between occupier and nonoccupier and between occupancy
and activity duties alleviate the doctrinal obstacles which impede recovery for
the trespasser plaintiff, though it will be suggested that they are not the most
rational or efficient techniques for accomplishing this result. At the same time,
it must not be thought that the trend in England is one of uniform liberaliza-
tion. Where the new distinctions are not applicable the harsh or mechanical
decision still occurs to demonstrate the inadequacy of the new approaches.140
SELECTED COMMONWEALTH JURISDICTIONS
Canada
On the whole, the Canadian provinces have not looked with much favor
upon tendencies to enlarge the trespasser's right of recovery. Instead, they
have adhered to the narrow formula expressed by Lord Hailsham in Addie
v. Dumbreck.1 47 Thus, Ontario's law on liability to trespassers was stated as
follows in a 1943 opinion: "While it is clear that the owner of land cannot
change the condition of his premises so as to cause injury to the trespasser
after he knows the trespasser is there, without proper notice of the change
144. [1955] 1 Weekly L.R. 255 (C.A.), discussed in text accompanying notes 126-
27 supra.
145. [1947] 2 All E.R. 565 (C.A.), discussed in text accompanying notes 115-16
supra.
146. Examples of such decisions are: Adams v. Naylor, [1944] K.B. 750 (C.A.)
(denying recovery to child injured while trying to retrieve ball from mine field where
fence and warning notice were submerged by drifting sand), aff'd, [1946] A.C. 543
(holding that the plaintiff had suffered "war injuries" and therefore no civil action lay) ;.
Sullivan v. Lipton, [1955] CUmENT LAw YEARAooI § 1789 (Q.B.) (child denied recovery
for injury sustained when another child threw container of sulphuric acid in garden of
unoccupied house, although children had been injured in this way on two previous oc-
casions); Phipps v. Rochester Corp., [1955] 1 Q.B. 450 (1954) (boy of five denied re-
covery for injury sustained by falling into trench which defendants left open on land
where they knew children played; the opinion of Mr. Justice Devlin contains a full and
discerning review of the authorities, but ends, it is submitted, with a harsh adjudication).
The Scottish courts have recently rejected the English distinction between occupancy
duty and activity duty, reaffirmed the sanctity of the propositions in Addie v. Dumbreck
and rejected the notion of applying special rules to children. Murdoch v. A. & R. Scott,
[1956] Sess. Cas. 309 (Scot. 2d Div.).
147. See text accompanying note 83 supra. The Canadian decisions up to 1929 are
summarized and discussed in MacDonald, Liability of Possessors of Premises, 7 CAN.
B. REv. 665 (1929); MacDonald, Child Trespassers, 8 CAN. B. REv. 1 (1930).
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to the party trespassing, the trespasser must take the premises as he finds
them and the sole duty of the occupier is not to change the condition of the
premises to his disadvantage. 1 48 And the courts of Ontario have recently
indicated that this branch of the law is still dominated by the categories of
invitee, licensee and trespasser.
149
This simple affirmation of the English doctrine of three decades ago has
often led to harsh results in Canadian decisions. For instance, a seaman who
lost his way in a dense fog and drove off the edge of a wharf has been
denied recovery because a trespasser. 15 So has a plaintiff who stepped on
the defendant's land to retrieve a parcel which he had dropped when walk-
ing on the highway in the dark.' 51 Child plaintiffs also are treated with less
solicitude than in other jurisdictions. The burden of showing that a child
has become a licensee through the inactivity of the occupiers is a very heavy
one in Canada, 152 and the doctrine of "attractive nuisance," though recog-
nized, is sparingly applied. 153 An open door in the street leading to an un-
148. Tolfree v. Russel & Jennings & Toronto, [1942] Ont. 724, 728, [1943] 2 D.L.R.
234, 245 (C.A. 1937); see King v. Northern Nay. Co., 27 Ont. L.R. 79, 6 D.L.R. 69
(C.A. 1912); Canadian Nat'l Rys. v. Lancia, [1949] Can. Sup. Ct. 177, [1949] 1 D.L.R.
737. In a case where the defendant breached a statutory duty by failing to maintain a
bridge in a safe condition, the plaintiff was held to be a trespasser on the highway when
he drove over the bridge in a truck loaded beyond the statutory maximum. The defend-
ant's only duty was not to set a trap for the plaintiff. But it was held that the unsafe
condition of the bridge constituted a trap and the plaintiff was allowed to recover. At-
wood v. Municipal Dist. of Cochrane, [1949] 1 West. Weekly R. (n.s.) 858 (Alberta
Dist. Ct.). Assuming that the overloading of the truck was in no way the cause of the
accident, are we to assume that there might be circumstances in which the condition of
the bridge, while unsafe, would not constitute a trap, so that the driver of an overloaded
truck could not recover? Such a holding could only be justified by a retributive argu-
ment based on the plaintiff's outlaw status.
149. White v. Imperial Optical Co., [1957] Ont. Weekly N. 192, 7 D.L.R.2d 471
(C.A.).
150. Canadian Pac. Ry. v. McCrindle, [1956] Can. Sup. Ct. 473, 2 D.L.R.2d 449.
He was a trespasser, since he was outside the area necessary to approach his ship. The
jury had found for the plaintiff, but with a finding of contributory negligence. The
Court of Appeal of British Columbia affirmed the verdict, holding the deceased to have
been a licensee. The Supreme Court of Canada reversed, stating that there was no evi-
dence that he was a licensee.
151. Barrow v. Watkins, [1934] Ont. Weekly N. 221 (C.A.). The plaintiff fell into
an uncovered opening on the defendant's land, about 4'4" from the highway. The Court
of Appeals treated the plaintiff as a deliberate trespasser and held that the opening was
not adjacent to the highway.
152. Pianosi v. Canadian Nat'l Rys., [1943] Ont. Weekly N. 766, [1944] 1 D.L.R.
161 (C.A. 1943). A somewhat broader statement of the duty to licensees than the tradi-
tional notion of giving warning of concealed dangers is to be found in the Supreme Court
of Canada decision of Booth v. St. Catharines, [1948] Can. Sup. Ct. 564, [1948] 4 D.L.R.
686.
153. Ottawa v. Munroe, [1956] Can. Sup. Ct. 756, [1955] 1 D.L.R. 465 (1954). This
case of the child of an apartment house tenant injured in the apartment house washroom
is a good example of a narrow and mechanical application of the categories of liability.
[ Vol. 68:633
DUTIES TO TRESPASSERS
finished building has been held not to be an allurement to an eleven-year-old
boy,154 and a child who had been taken by her father for a truck ride to
premises where he had business was held to be a trespasser there and unable
to recover for injuries sustained.1' In another case, the child plaintiff, while
trespassing on the defendants' right of way, was carrying a steel fishing rod
which touched power lines suspended ten feet above the ground. In spite of
the jury's finding that the defendants were negligent in having their power
lines so close to the ground, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the plain-
tiff could not recover: "The finding of the jury that the defendants were
negligent... if it implies negligence quoad the plaintiff, cannot be supported
on the evidence. They owed no duty to the plaintiff."' 5
In Koehler v. Pentecostal Assemblies of Canada 157 a child trespasser was
burnt by treading on hot ashes which the defendants had spread on their
land. At the trial plaintiff argued that general principles of negligence were
applicable, but this position was rejected by the court. The judge took the
view that the well-settled categories of liability should not be lightly dis-
turbed. The general negligence approach, the court felt, might sometimes be
relevant but not in a case (such as this) where the defendants were the
occupiers of the land. 5 8
A further example of the strictness of Canadian rules is furnished by Rio-
pelle v. Desjardins,'5 9 in which the defendants' workmen, while excavating
A stimulating discussion of it is to be found in Jeffrey, Accidents to Children, 31 Atism.
L.J. 442 (1957). Other cases illustrating the posture adopted towards child plaintiffs are
Pedlar v. Toronto Power Co., 29 Ont. L.R. 527, 15 D.L.R. 684 (1913), af'd, 30 Ont.
L.R. 581, 19 D.L.R. 441 (1914); Robinson v. Village of Havelock, 32 Ont. L.R. 25, 20
D.L.R. 537 (C.A. 1914); Craig v. Canadian No. Pac. Ry., 47 B.C. 453 (1933); Des-
jardins v. Gatineau Power Co., 74 Que. C.S. 205, [1936] 3 D.L.R. 338; Haines v. Brews-
ter, [1938] 2 West. Weekly R. 285, [1938] 3 D.L.R. 246 (Alberta); Canadian Pac. Ry.
v. Kizlyk, [1944] Can. Sup. Ct. 98, [1944] 2 D.L.R. 81, Note, 22 CAN. B. REV. 549. In
Kidyk the plaintiff was a child attending a rural school held in a converted railway
car on the defendant's siding. Other cars were nearby on the tracks. The plaintiff, a
twelve-year-old girl, was killed while passing between tvo cars, ninety feet away from
the school car, when they were being pulled together. At the trial the defendants were
allowed to ithdraw on the ground that the plaintiff was a trespasser. The majority of
the fManitoba Court of Appeal ordered a new trial and the order was sustained in the
Supreme Court of Canada by a three-to-two majority on the ground that the question
of whether or not the plaintiff was a trespasser should have been left to the jury. The
opinion of Justice of Appeal Davis in the Supreme Court of Canada took notice of and
approved § 334 of the American Restatenwnt of Torts, which proposes liability where
the occupier knows or should know that trespassers constantly intrude on a limited area
of his land and he carries on an activity involving risk of death or serious bodily harm
without reasonable care for their safety.
154. Wallace v. Pettit, 55 Ont. L.R. 82 (C.A. 1923).
155. Bettles v. Canadian Nat'l Rys., 64 Ont. L.R. 211, [1929] 4 D.L.R. 175 (C.A.).
156. Sale v. East Kootenay Power Co., [1931] Can. Sup. Ct. 712, [1931] 4 D.L.R.
593, 594 (opinion of Anglin, C.J.).
157. 7 D.L.R.2d 616 (B.C. 1957).
158. Id. at 624
159. [1950] Ont. L.R. 93 (1949).
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a trench on the defendants' premises, saw children about but did not warn
them off. The children climbed down into the trench, where one of them
was killed when a huge stone fell. The defendants were exonerated on the
ground that the child was a trespasser. The workmen's acquiescence in his
presence could not convert him into a licensee, since they were not in a posi-
tion of authority under the occupier. 16 0
Perhaps one may interpret this reasoning as a manifestation of the tough-
ness and brashness of an expanding frontier community, where the patern-
alistic welfare yearnings of more settled societies have not yet been felt with
any force. Whatever the reason, the Canadian courts do not suffer child
trespassers to come to them with great hopes of success. The general picture
is simple and strict. Even here, however, one or two strands of mitigating
doctrine may be detected.
While the distinction between the occupier and the nonoccupier defendant
has not emerged in Canada with anything like the clarity with which it may
be seen in England, the trend is nevertheless faintly perceptible. In Koehler
v. Pentecostal Assemblies,1 1 the court was willing to concede that general
principles of negligence may be applicable when the defendant is not the oc-
cupier. The point was also made in Coburn v. Saskatoon,1" 2 where the plain-
tiff, a trespasser on a railroad track, was injured by the fall of an overhead
municipal bridge. The trial judge granted a nonsuit on the ground that the
plaintiff was a trespasser. But the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal took the
view that the plaintiff's trespasser status was a defense available only to the
occupiers of the tracks and ordered a new trial. The same approach-reserv-
ing the defenses which refer to the plaintiff's status to occupier defendants-
was taken by the British Columbia court in Laverdure T,. City of l'ictoria,
in which the plaintiff was a child licensee.163
A line of cases in British Columbia demonstrates a more vigorous aware-
ness of possible radical approaches in this area. Justice of Appeal O'Halloran
of the court of appeal there has waged an extended and notable campaign for
the introduction of general negligence considerations. Dissenting in Power
v. Hughes,' 4 he attacked the conventional discrimination between invite,,
and licensees, and urged the court to impose a common duty of care along
the lines of the Donoghue v. Stevenson doctrine?6' In this, he anticipated
both the views expressed by Lord Justice Denning in Dunster .v. .bbott, 1' ;
and the passage of the English Occupiers' Liability Act. He returned to the
point in his concurring opinion in Kennedy v. Union Estates Ltd.: "[I In
160. Id. at 97.
161. Supra note 157.
162. [1935] 1 West. Weekly R. 392, [1935] 2 D.L.R. 810 (Sask. C.A.).
163. 7 West. Weekly R. (n.s.) 333 (B.C. 1952) (plaintiff fell into a trench dug by
defendants who were not the occupiers).
164. [1938] 2 West. Weekly R. 359, 53 B.C. 64, [1938] 4 D.L.R. 136 (C.A.).
165. Supra note 112.
166. Text accompanying note 119 supra.
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weighing the relationship between the parties in the particular case, the search
for the duty should not be halted by the ready appearance of what at first
appears to be a convenient category; nor should the main problem of negli-
gence be obscured in an effort to place the injured person in a rigid and
exclusive category." 167
Justice of Appeal O'Halloran made his strongest contribution in Crewe v.
North Anerican Life Assurance Co.1 68 In that case, the plaintiff, who worked
for a contracting firm engaged by the defendants to maintain some neon
signs on the roof of their building, used the fire escape to gain access to the
roof. This practice was a breach of a statutory regulation, but the defendants
had neither objected to it nor offered an alternative means of ascent, though
alternative routes were available. A majority of the British Columbia Court
of Appeal held that the plaintiff became a trespasser through his use of an
unlawful means to reach the roof. Consequently, he was unable to recover
for injuries sustained when the fire escape collapsed. Dissenting, Justice of
Appeal O'Halloran said that, on all the facts of the case, the defendants
owed a duty of care to the plaintiff:
It may be a common tendency to attempt classification of the various
human relationships which may give rise to a breach of duty. But . . .
such classifications cannot be final. They cannot be set up as inflexible
yard-sticks but must be regarded rather as convenient instruments fash-
ioned and refashioned from time to time in the judicial workshops, to
record and harmonize the relationship between the law and altering social
and business conditions and outlooks. The standard of duty must be de-
duced from the facts in the particular case at the particular time.169
This vigorous dissent from what must be regarded as a bad and mechanical
decision discloses that the general negligence approach is at least an object of
discussion in Canada.
Moreover, it is an approach which seems to have triumphed, at least
obliquely, in the earlier British Columbia Court of Appeal decision, Hiatt v.
Zien.170 There, the defendants occupied a vacant lot which was habitually
used by truck drivers to gain access to another building. So using the lot,
the plaintiff was injured by a car carelessly driven by a servant of the de-
fendant. The trial judge bad held that the defendants would be liable whether
the plaintiff were a licensee or a trespasser. In the court of appeal, the justices
were inclined to regard the plaintiff as a licensee and to base liability on this
ground, but the opinion contains remarks of special interest:
167. 55 B.C. 1, [1940] 1 D.L.R. 662, 672 (C.A.), aff'd, [1940] Can. Sup. Ct. 625,
[1940] 3 D.L.R. 404.
168. 58 B.C. 103, [1942] 4 D.L.R. 75 (C.A.).
169. Id. at 127, [1942] 4 D.L.R. at 91-92. See also Justice of Appeal O'Halloran's
dissent in Ingle & Ingle v. Hanson, 63 B.C. 481 (C.A. 1947).
170. 54 B.C. 450, [1940] 1 D.L.R. 736 (C.A. 1939); see Wright, Note, 17 CAN. B.
Rm,. 445 (1939).
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Assuming, however, contrary to the view expressed, that respondent was
a trespasser, the trial Judge would still hold appellants responsible for
the accident. May one place a motor car in motion either way without
first ascertaining that no one, whether a trespasser or not is in his way?
Is it a comprehensive and satisfactory statement to say that there must
be a deliberate intention to do harm to the trespasser-a malicious act,
or is reckless disregard of the consequences enough? . . . It may be that
humanitarian considerations are at least as important as property rights
and that where danger of life or limb is involved the responsibility of
the occupier may not be less because of the status of the victim.
Again is it necessary that the occupier must know that the trespasser
is before him or behind him, or is it enough that he ought to know
having regard to modern conditions and density of population? These
may be questions for later determination. 1 71
These seeds of liberality in the Canadian cases may sprout into a more
general recognition of a duty to take care when engaged in active operations.
The recent Manitoba decision of Lengyel v. Manitoba Power Coin m'n per-
haps augurs such a trend.' 72 There, the defendants erected a "portable sub-
station" in a ditch alongside a highway. The structure was marked simply by
a red flag and was protected by a climbable fence.
The child plaintiff climbed the fence and was severely injured. In holding
the defendants liable, the court stressed the general dangers of erecting such
structures near the highway without full measures of protection and warn-
ing. To regard this case as one of a trespasser plaintiff and occupier defend-
ant would be, the court felt, an unjustifiable extension of immunities. To
establish liability, in the court's view, it was not even necessary for the plain-
tiff to offer proof that the vicinity of the structure was frequented by chil-
dren.' 73
171. 58 B.C. 451-52, [1940] 1 D.L.R. at 738-39. The trial judge had relied on the
English authority of Mourton v. Poulter, [1930] 2 K.B. 183 (C.A.), which was decided
on the principle of liability to a trespasser for introducing a fresh danger on to the
land with knowledge of the trespasser's presence.
172. 23 West. Weekly R. (n.s.) 497, 12 D.L.R.2d 126 (Man. C.A. 1957).
173. This case was to some extent anticipated by the Supreme Court of Canada de-
cision in Bouvier v. Fee, [1932] Can. Sup. Ct. 118, [1932] 2 D.L.R. 424 (1931), allow-
ing recovery to a child who touched a cement mixer which defendants were operating on a
vacant lot close to a public lane. These cases are understandable as an extension of the
well established principle of liability in English law for defendants who leave dangerous
allurements on the highway. Lynch v. Nurdin, 1 Q.B. 29, 113 Eng. Rep. 1041 (1841).
They may be compared with Schoeni v. King, [1944] Ont. L.R. 38, [1944] 1 D.L.R. 326
(C.A. 1943). There contractors working for the defendant were using a box of mortar
which rested partly on the highway. They had also put down a sand pile on the high-
way. The plaintiff was a child of four who played in the sand, fell into the mortar box
and was burned by the lime in it. The trial judge held that if the plaintiff fell into the
part of the box which was resting on the highway he could recover, but that if he fell
into that part of the box which rested on the defendant's premises different considera-
tions would apply. [1943] 4 D.L.R. 536, 539. Fortunately, the judge was able to hold
that the plaintiff was injured on the highway and the action succeeded. The decision was
[Vol. 68:633
DUTIES TO TRESPASSERS
This decision, which may be compared with Buckland v. Guildford Gas
Light & Coke Co.174 in England and with Thompson v. Bankstown 175 in
Australia, is an encouraging advance. It must not, of course, be taken as
heralding a general application of negligence theory in Canada, since the
special features of ultrahazardous potentiality and proximity to the highway
will probably be regarded as limiting its scope.
Australia
Although the courts of Australia and New Zealand largely follow English
precedent in this field, independently significant decisions and appraisals have
recently been reported in both jurisdictions.
The duty of the occupier of premises towards a trespasser was stated in
conventionally narrow terms by Justice Herron in the New South Wales case
of Vale v. Whiddon :176 "Subject to one qualification, the occupier owes no
duty at all to a trespasser as to the condition of the premises. A person tres-
passes at his own risk and cannot complain of any injury he may receive
through the premises being dangerous or unsafe. The qualification is that
the occupier must not deliberately injure the trespasser."
This statement of the occupier's position seems to eliminate liability even
for reckless conduct towards the known trespasser, and the leading Australian
text on the law of torts takes the view that an occupier may stand by and
fail to warn a trespasser of an impending danger.'7 7 This very restricted
view of the duty is, however, clearly confined to the case of the plaintiff who
sues the occupier for injuries caused by defects in the premises. The Aus-
tralian courts have come to recognize the concept of activity duty and have
moved further in this direction than have the courts in England. The topic
is considered and surveyed in the centrally important decision of Thompson
v. Bankstown.78
In this case, the defendant maintained a series of wooden poles carrying
high tension cables on a public road. A ground wire ran down one of the
poles to within three feet of the earth and the staples securing this wire had
decayed. The plaintiff was a boy of thirteen who attempted to reach a bird's
affirmed by the Court of Appeal. The outcome of the case, though fortunate, is surely
based on ridiculous reasoning.
174. [1949] 1 K.B. 410 (1948), supra note 102.
175. 87 Commw. L.R. 619, [1953] Argus L.R. 165 (Austi.), infra note 178.
176. 50 N.S.W. St. 90, 105 (1949).
177. FLEmING, TORTs 464 (1957). But this observation is probably meant as a spe-
cial reference to the occupier's absence of a duty to take active steps to protect a tres-
passer. Broader statements of the general duty with respect to a trespasser may be found
in such Australian decisions as Rodgerson v. J.B. Zander Pty. Ltd., [1921] Vict. L.R.
103, 109, 27 Argus L.R. 59, 62 (1920), where Justice Cussen stated that an occupier
might be liable to a trespasser "for wilful harm, or for harm inflicted by want of reason-
able care after knowledge of the special danger."
178. Thompson v. The Council of the Municipality of Bankstown, 87 Commw. L.R.
619, [1953] Argus L.R. 165 (Austl.).
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nest lodged in the pole by standing on a bicycle. He touched the ground wire
and received an electric shock when it came into contact with the bicycle.
Restoring a verdict for the plaintiff, the High Court of Australia referred to
the difficulty of "choosing between two competing categories of the law of
torts."' 79 The competing categories were the general principles of negligence
and the restricted duties owed by an occupier of land with respect to struc-
tures he controls. The Supreme Court of New South Wales had treated the
case as one to be governed by the second category, and accordingly, had found
for the defendant on the ground that the plaintiff was a trespasser.180 The
justices of the High Court were disposed rather to decide the matter on neg-
ligence principles.
[T]his is not a case to be dealt with as depending upon the duties of
a person in control or occupation of a "structure" or "premises" towards
a person coming upon them. The law which... should be applied ... is
that which imposes a duty of care upon those carrying on . . . the em-
ployment of a highly dangerous agency. No doubt the question still is
whether the plaintiff qualified as a person entitled to recover for the
consequences to him of a failure to take proper care in the use and con-
trol of a dangerous agency and this may depend upon the definition of
the duty, or of the measure of care. But this distinction upon which...
this case turns does not for that reason lose importance. The point is
that the defendant's responsibility to the plaintiff does not depend on
the defendant's control or "occupation" of the pole or the character the
plaintiff assumed in reference to the pole when he placed his bicycle
against it, leaned his body upon it and put his arms around it or, if that
be what he did, when he grasped the wire. It is a mistake to treat the
question as if it was: did the plaintiff's touching of the post, his prop-
ping the bicycle and leaning his body upon it, putting his arms against
it, constitute a "trespass" so that if he had damaged the pole, he might
have been liable for the damage? A man or child may be infringing
upon another's possession of land or goods at the time he is injured and
it will be no bar to his recovery, if otherwise he can make out the con-
stituent elements of a cause of action.'
This is a case in which the defendant was clearly the occupier of the struc-
ture and in which the plaintiff was just as clearly a trespasser, yet the plain-
tiff succeeded. It might be possible to regard the decision as an extension of
the "activity duty" approach to the case of a trespassing plaintiff. But, in fact,
the judgments of the High Court seem to go even further than that. For the
opinions lay no particular stress on the distinction between a structural defect
and the conduct of an activity. They seem content to assert that circum-
stances may determine that a duty to take care exists, and do not seek to
confine the nature of those circumstances within the notion of "activity duty."
"The true question, as we think, is whether the plaintiff acting as he did falls
179. 87 Commw. L.R. at 623, [1953] Argus L.R. at 166.
180. The decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales is reported in 69
Weekly N. 64 (N.S.W. 1952).
181. 87 Commw. L.R. at 628, [1953] Argus L.R. at 169-70.
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within the scope of the defendant's duty of care.' 1 82 "It would be a miscon-
ception of the rule [i.e., the rule limiting occupier's liability] to regard it as
precluding the application of the general principle of M'Alister (or Donog-
hue) v. Stevenson to a case where an occupier, in addition to being an oc-
cupier, stands in some other relation to a trespasser so that the latter is not
only a trespasser but is also the occupier's neighbour, in Lord Atkin's sense
of the word ... "183
Of course, the most obvious circumstance that might make the trespasser
a "neighbour," thereby imposing a duty of care on the occupier, would be the
conduct of a hazardous operation on the premises by the occupier. But other
circumstances are conceivable which could, under this approach, support an
argument that the occupier owes a duty of care even with respect to struc-
tural defects. The decision thus seems to be a theoretical advance on the
position obtaining in England.184
New Zealand
The merits of the Australian High Court's approach may be illustrated by
comparing the Thompson case with the 1954 decision of the Supreme Court
of New Zealand in Napier v. Ryan. s  In that case, the plaintiff, a boy of
thirteen, was injured when his foot was caught in the crown wheel and pinion
of a carousel owned by the defendant Ryan, who was acting under a contract
with the local Returned Services Association (the other defendants in the
action). Upon leaving the premises for the night, Ryan secured the machine,
but unauthorized persons released it. The plaintiff was injured while playing
on it with other children who started up the machinery. The jury found that
the condition of the machinery constituted a concealed danger, and that the
premises were occupied both by Ryan and the Returned Services Association.
But the question whether the premises at the time of the accident were under
the control of the Association or Ryan was not answered.
The Chief Justice, under his powers of answering questions of fact not
covered by the jury. held that the premises were under the control of both
defendants. Since the defendants were in occupation and control, the court
felt that the strict rules of occupiers' liability applied and the action must fail.
The judgment turns largely on the question of whether the child was a licen-
see by acquiescence (the court held that he was not), and on whether the
182. Id. at 630, [1953] Argus L.R. at 171.
183. Id. at 64243, [1953] Argus L.R. at 179 (Kitto, J.). The statement of doctrine
here was reiterated by Justice Taylor in the High Court decision of Commissioner for
Rys. v. Hooper, 89 Commw. L.R. 486, 504 (Austl. 1953): "[flt is clear that circum-
stances may arise, unrelated to questions of the safety of the occupied premises, in which
the obligations of the occupier for both negligent acts of commission and omission fall
tti be determined in accordance with the general principles of liability for negligence."
184. This is the view taken by Jeffrey, who discusses the case in his valuable article,
.Accidents to Children, 31 AUSTL. L.J. 442 (1957).
185. [1954] N.Z.L.R. 1234, 8 N.Z. Local Gov. R. 377.
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defendants were in occupation and control. The court professed to follow the
distinction between the liability of occupiers and nonoccupiers outlined in the
English cases discussed earlier.18 6 Counsel for the plaintiff wished to submit
the case under the general principles of negligence, but this submission was
not favorably received; the judgment contains no reference to the notion of
"activity duty" and, surprisingly, no reference to the decision of the High
Court of Australia in Thompson v. Bankstown. 87
The New Zealand Court of Appeal heard much fuller argument with re-
spect to the applicability of general principles of negligence in the case of
Perkowski v. Wellington City Corp. in 1956.188 There, the deceased was a
licensee who had used a diving board in a public pleasure ground established
by the defendants. Diving from the board was dangerous at low tide, but the
defendants had posted no warning. The deceased having been killed when
he dove into shallow water, the jury found that, although the board did not
constitute a concealed danger, the defendants had been negligent in not post-
ing a warning. The argument by counsel for the plaintiff ably and fully re-
viewed the English and Australian decisions on the notion of activity duty,
but the court said that, though the principle of activity duty was now a part
of the law, it had no application to the facts of the case.18 9 The decision,
surely a harsh one to the licensee plaintiff, is a rather vivid illustration of
the weakness of the distinction between "occupancy duty" and "activity
duty."
FRANcE
Any attempt to expound the French law on liability to trespassers would
be unprofitable without first offering at least a thumbnail sketch of the gen-
eral structure of delictual liability in French civil law. 19" This legal system
186. See text accompanying notes 102-12 supra.
187. The decision of the New Zealand Supreme Court is considered and criticized
in Davis, Liability for Dangerous Premises, 32 N.Z.L.J. 135 (1956).
188. [1957] N.Z.L.R. 39 (C.A. 1956).
189. I conclude, therefore, that, though an occupier may owe to visitors on his
premises duties which are in addition to what I have called the occupier's duty,
and though, in particular, he may owe the duty which is defined in Donoghue v.
Stevenson, that latter duty has no relation to injuries which result only from the
dangerous condition of the premises . . . . In the present case, if the Corporation
be held to be the occupier of the spring-board, I can find no evidence which could
give rise to the duty for which the appellant contends.
[1957] N.Z.L.R. at 60-61 (opinion of Barrowclough, C.J.).
190. Helpful accounts are to be found in VON MEHREN, THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM:
CASES AND MATERIALS 339-414 (1957) [hereinafter cited as VON MEBREN]; LAWSON,
NEGLIGENCE IN THE CIVIL LAW passim (1950); Amos & WALTON, INTRODUcTION TO
FRExc LAW 211-57 (1935); DAVID & DE VRIES, THE FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM: AN
INTRODUCTION TO CIVIL LAW SYSTEMS passim (1958); Lawson, The Duty of Care in
Negligence: A Comparative Study, 22 TuL. L. REv. 111 (1947) ; Lee, Torts and Delicts:
A Comparative View of French and English Law, 27 YALE L.J. 721 (1918); Marsh,
The History and Comparative Law of Invitees, Licensees and Trespassers, 69 L.Q. REV.
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presents a method of approach to questions of liability totally removed from
the common-law tradition of slow-maturing, nominate torts. The Civil Code
offers no more than a few sweepingly assertive propositions (articles 1382-
86), out of which have been spun, by the decisions of the courts (la juris-
prudence) and the writings of the jurists (la doctrine), the whole web of
French tort law.
Article 1382 is the enunciation of fault as a foundation of liability. Widely
copied and imitated, it proclaims: "Any act by which a person causes damage
to another makes the person by whose fault the damage occurred liable to
make reparation for such damage."' 191 This notion of fault is elaborated by
article 1383: "Everyone is liable for the damage he causes not only by his
acts but also by his negligence or imprudence."' 192
The framers of the Code went on to supplement these simple declarations
as to fault with somewhat more specific references to certain situations. So,
part of article 1384 reads:
A person is liable not only for the damage he causes by his own act but
also for that caused by the acts of persons for whom he is responsible
or by things that he has under his guard.
Masters and employers are liable for the damage caused by their ser-
vants and employees in the exercise of the functions for which they have
been employed.'93
And article 1386 runs:
The owner of a building is responsible for the damage caused by its collapse
[rine] when this has taken place because the building was not maintained
properly [d~faut d'entretien] or because it was badly constructed [par le
vice de sa construction]J .1 4
These materials are clean and simple, and with them French jurists have
raised an impressive structure. For nearly a century after the passage of the
359, 386-87 (1953) ; Walton, Liability for Danuage Done by Inanimate Things, 49 JURID.
REV. 359 (1937); Walton, Delictual Responsibility in the Modern Civil Law, 49 L.Q.
REV. 70 (1933) ; Book Review, Torts Under the French Law, 8 Am. L. REV. 508 (1874).
Excerpts from many of the leading French decisions may be found in VON MEHIREN
and in LAwSON, op. Cit. supra.
191. The translation of the relevant articles of the Civil Code is taken here from
VON MIEHREN 33940.
192. The concept of fait in article 1382 is equivalent to that of intentional (delictual)
inflictions of harm. Article 1383 thus extends the notion of fault by indicating that it
also embraces negligent (quasi-delictual) conduct. 1 MAZEAUD, MAZEAUD & TUNC,
TRAITL THtORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE LA RESPONSABILIT CvILE 56-57 (5th ed. 1958)
[hereinafter cited as MAZEAUD].
193. The portions of article 1384 relating to the liability of parents and of teachers
and artisans and the 1922 and 1937 amendments have been omitted inasmuch as they are
not relevant to the present discussion. For the complete text of article 1384, see DALLOZ,
CODE CIVIL 532 (1958).
194. Article 1385, which has been omitted here, deals with liability for injuries caused
by animals. For a translation, see VON MEHREN 340.
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Civil Code in 1804, the French law of civil responsibility rested on the per-
vasive notion of fault, as expressed in articles 1382 and 1383. But with the
coming of the Industrial Revolution, the solvent powers of this queen of con-
cepts waned. The toll levied by industrial enterprises on their weakest par-
ticipants often made the burden of proving fault an intolerable one. As one
commentator puts it: "To make the liability of . . . [the industrialist] depend
on proof that he was at fault would be to condemn the workman to bear
alone the risk of injury from those powerful forces that worked for the profit
of his employer."' 8
As a result, the French courts in the late nineteenth century were casting
around for a method of extracting some notions of presumption of fault or
strict liability from the simple precepts of the Civil Code. An attempt was
made to enlarge the scope of article 1386, which refers to the collapse of
buildings. This article placed the plaintiff in a slightly better position than
did article 1382, for, under 1386, lack of fault would be no defense to the
owner of a building, once the plaintiff had shown the requisite reason for its
collapse. There are decisions at this time which apply article 1386 to the fall
of a tree,19 6 and, most significantly, to the breakdown of a machine in a fac-
tory.197 But such artificial aggrandizing of article 1386 could scarcely provide
an adequate remedy. There are limits beyond which the concept of a "build-
ing" cannot with any decency be pushed, and, in any case, 1386 did not give
enough help to the plaintiff. The onerous burden of proving a defect of
construction or inadequate maintenance remained upon him.
The breakthrough eventually came in a daring and radical interpretation
of the first clause of article 1384, which speaks of liability for things a per-
son has under his guard. 198 There appears to be little doubt that the framers
of the Code had intended this clause to serve only as an introduction to the
specific instances enumerated in the later clauses of article 1384 and in articles
1385 and 1386. The first clause was to be an explanation and justification of
the principle of vicarious responsibility and the strict or semistrict liabilities
for animals and buildings. French jurists in the early and middle nineteenth
century never questioned this truism. 19 9 At the close of the century, however,
it came to be seen that the clause might be deliberately misunderstood as
projecting a much broader principle of strict liability than the few specific
instances it introduced. In 1896, this theory was vigorously argued before
195. 1 SA vAE, TKaITi D LA RsPoNsAzBa.- CivLz 422 (2d ed. 1951) [herein-
after cited as SAVATIER]. Henceforth, all translations from the French are those of the
author, unless otherwise indicated.
196. Vox M nx 376-77, extracting Cour d'Appel de Paris, Aug. 20, 1877, [1878]
Sirey Recueil G~n~ral [hereinafter cited as S.] II. 48. But see text accompanying note
203 infra.
197. Lejou v. Sockt6 des Usines de la Providence, Cour de Cassation (Ch. civ.),
April 19, 1887, [1887] S. I. 217. For a summary of this case, see VoN MEHREN 377.
198. "Control" would be a more natural translation of garde, but the concept has
become so important and at the same time so artificial in French law that it seems
better to distinguish it by an exact transliteration.
199. 1 SAvATiER 423.
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the Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassation in a case involving injury to an
employee by the explosion of steampipes in a boat.200 It won acceptance and
so initiated a principle of presumption of fault against the defendant when
damage has been caused by a thing under his guard. 201 This principle has
since become the insatiable cormorant of the French law of torts, threaten-
ing, as it does, to devour the notion of fault and to dominate utterly the field
of delictual recovery. Under this presumption, the plaintiff need only show
that damage was caused to him through the agency of a thing of which the
defendant was the guardian. Liability ensues unless the defendant can dis-
charge the heavy burden of showing that the damage was the result of force
Inajeure, or unforeseeable accident, or the victim's own fault.2 0 2
The Trespasser Plaintiff in French Law
French law has no special rules creating and treating such categories as
those of invitee, licensee and trespasser. The relevance of the nature of the
plaintiff's entry upon premises is taken up under general principles of un-
foreseeable accident and fault of the victim. Any search in the French trea-
tises for explicit discussion of the instances and problems which figure in
Anglo-American texts will only be frustrating. The most profitable method
is to read extensively in the French surveys of liability under articles 1384
and 1386, and in discussions of the general defenses of unforeseeable accident
and fault of the victim. Here, relevant observations occasionally can be
gleaned.
Some cases of injury to visitors will, by their nature, fall under the terms
of article 1386, dealing with the collapse of buildings. A leading modern
French treatise defines "building," for the purposes of this article, as "every
putting together of materials designed by man to raise a structure above the
ground. ' ' 3 Another treatise comments that the concept of a building covers
"movable objects incorporated in the building or which are accessory to
it. '"204 It has been held to apply to the paving of a well 205 and to gas pipes
20. Guissez, Cousin et Oriolle v. Teffaine, Cour de Cassation (Ch. civ.), June 16,
1896, [1897] Dalloz Jurisprudence [hereinafter cited as D.] 1. 433, [1897] S. 1. 17. For
extracts of the case, see VoN MEHRzN 379-81.
201. The particular problem of injuries to employees was covered by compensation
legislation in 198. After this, the principle of presumption of fault under article 1384,
introduced in the Guissez case, supra note 200, suffered something of a regression, but
it came back to full triumph and final adoption in Jand'heur v. Les Galeries Belfortaises,
Cour de Cassation (Ch. rdunies), Feb. 13, 1930, [1930] D. I. 81, [1930] S. I. 121. See
text accompanying note 214 infra; LAWSON, NEGLIGENCE IN THE CIVIL LAW 46-50 (1950).
202. See notes 234-38 infra and accompanying text.
203. 2 MAZEAUD 32.
204. 2 COLIN & CAPITANT, COURS ]ULMIENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 263 (10th
ed. 1948) [hereinafter cited as COLIN & CAPITANT]; Comp. des Immeubles de la Plaine
Monceau v. Garnier, Cour de Cassation (Ch. req.), March 29, 1897, [1897] Dalloz Heb-
domadaire [hereinafter cited as D.H.] I. 216, [1898] S. I. 65; Cour d'appel de Poitiers,
April 17, 1941, [1941] Dalloz Analytique 236.
205. LL.,u, TRiuxr PRATIQUE DE LA REsPONSABILITL CIVIIE 710 (5th ed. 1955)
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embedded in the ground,20 6 but not to electric wires attached to a building.20 7
The damage must result from the collapse (rubne) of the building, which in
turn must involve a complete or partial fall of the materials which make up
the building.20 8 In one decision, the Court of Appeal of Paris went so far as
to hold that article 1386 would cover a plaintiff's asphyxiation by fumes
coming from a chimney which had been blocked by the fall of pieces of
plaster; but this judgment has provoked critical comment from the jurists.2"9
Thus, despite an occasional deviant decision, the scope of the article is nar-
rowly limited and will cover only a fragment of the mass of cases involving
injuries to trespassers.
When article 1386 is applicable, the plaintiff, to invoke it successfully,
must demonstrate that the collapse resulted from a defect in construction or
from faulty maintenance. In the majority of cases, offer of such proof by the
plaintiff would amount to proof of fault on the part of the defendant and thus
would alternatively establish prima facie liability under the general fault prin-
ciple of article 1382. In an occasional case the defendant would be immune
under 1382 (as when he was not the builder and could not have discovered
the defect of construction even by the exercise of due diligence), and, in such
cases, article 1386 does operate as a species of strict liability. Generally. how-
ever, the plaintiff is much better off under the guardianship rubric of article
1384, and it is usually the defendant who seeks to bring the case under
1386.210
Article 1386 speaks of the liability of the owner (prapri6taire) of a build-
ing. Interpreted strictly, this term excludes the liability of a tenant. Accord-
ingly, the owner of leased premises remains liable under 1386, though, of
course, he may be able to recoup his losses from the tenant.211 Whereas ap-
plication of 1386 to a specific defendant forecloses suit under 1384 against
the same defendant, a 1386 action probably does not prevent invoking 1384
[hereinafter cited as LALOU] citing Cour d'Appel de Nancy, May 30, 1945, [1946] D. 14.
The headnote to the case reads: "By buildings in Article 1386 should be understood, not
only edifices in the usual sense ... but also any work of an immobile nature, constructed
from any material, and permanently embedded in the ground, so that its collapse might
cause damage."
206. LA.ou 710, citing Tribunal Civil de Tours, June 3, 1930, Gazette du Palais, 8 Oct.
1930, [hereinafter cited as G.P.]
207. LALou 710, citing Tribunal Civil de Rouen, March 21, 1949, [1949] Juris Clas-
seur P6riodique II 5003, [1949] G.P. I. 248.
208. 2 MAZaAUD 34-36 n.1044(4), citing Tribunal Civil de Nantes, May 7, 1935,
[1935] G.P. II. 252; 2 MAZFAUD 36 n.1044(5 bis), citing Tribunal Civil de Caen, April
16, 1,947, [1949] D. 5; Caisse Primaire S6cur. Soc. de Besan'on v. Ptabl. Camelin, Cour
de Cassation (Ch. civ.), Dec. 14, 1956, [1957] D. 72.
209. 2 MAZEAUD 36 n.1044(6), citing Cour d'Appel de Paris, Jan. 18, 1942, [1942]
G.P. 1. 178. The comment of the authors on this decision is: "N'est-ce pas aller un peu
loin?"
210. 2 MAZEAUD 20.
211. Id. at 24-25.
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against another defendant such as a tenant..2 12 Consequently, a structure may
be deemed a "building" for the purposes of an action against the owner and,
simultaneously, a "thing" for the purposes of an action against the tenant or
other "guardian." The plaintiff thus may be in a stronger position when
suing the tenant, inasmuch as he will receive assistance from the presump-
tion of fault which article 1384 calls into play.
Duties To Trespassers Under Article 1384
Because of the favorable presumption which article 1384 accords a plaintiff,
the great majority of injuries while on the premises of another will, if liti-
gated, occasion actions under that article. The problems involved cannot be
understood without a further statement of how the article operates.
A series of attempts to curtail the concept of "thing" under 1384 have been
repulsed. Although it was once held that the term did not apply to immov-
ables, this position was rejected by a judgment of the Court of Cassation in
1928.213 Again, it was argued that the principle of article 1384 must be re-
stricted to things dangerous by their nature, but the same court decided
otherwise in 1930, and today, article 1384 covers all choses inanim6es, in
other words everything--except perhaps when the injury is caused by the
collapse of a building.21 4 It is true that liability depends upon a certain de-
gree of participation by the thing (under defendant's guard) in the causing
of the damage: the liability is for le fait de la chose.21 5 But it is difficult to
conceive of any infliction of injury without the participation of inanimate
things. If interpreted in an extreme fashion, article 1384 could, as one jurist
remarked, cover every situation but the collision of two naked persons. 216
Clearly, some limiting principle must be adhered to, or 1384 will govern the
whole field of tortious events and render otiose the basic fault notion of
article 1382. The delineation of such a principle has proved troublesome,
however, and remains unclear.
One early attempt to place severe limits on the operation of 1384 was
made by arguing that the article could not apply when the thing in custody
was, at the moment it caused damage, being actively operated by a human
212. Soc. les Fils de Bardiner v. Soc. Ferr6 et Duffourg, Cour de Cassation (Ch.
civ.), Aug. 4, 1942, [1943] S. I. 89; 2 MAZEAUD 15 (4th ed. 1947), citing Tribunal Civil
de Saumur, July 22, 1943, [1943] G.P. II. 192. The fifth edition of 2 MAZEAUD 21-22
takes the view that where 1386 is applicable, 1384 is totally excluded.
213. Vidal v. du Taiguy, Cour de Cassation (Ch. req.), March 6, 1928, [1928] D. I.
97, [1928] S. I. 225. Earlier the Cour de: Cassation had refused to apply article 1384 to
immovables. Pallois v. Dalivoust, Cour de Cassation (Ch. civ.), June 26, 1.924, [1924]
D. I. 159, [1925] S. I. 65; 2 MAZEAUD 190.
214. Jand'heur v. Les Galeries Belfortaises, Cour de Cassation (Ch. rdunies), Feb.
13, 1930, [1930] D. I. 81, [1930] S. I. 121; 2 MAZEAJD 191; LAWsoN, NEGLIGENCE IN
THE CIVIL LAw 249-79 (1950). For the proposition that 1384 is inapplicable to cases of
the collapse of a building, see 2 MAZEAUD §§ 1201, 1208 n.(1l bis).
215. 2 COLIN & CAPITANT 248.
216. Ripert, Note, [1930] D. I. 57, 59, quoted in VON MEHREN 401.
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being. But, after a titanic controversy, a judgment of the full chambers of
the Court of Cassation finally established that article 1384 must be applied to
an accident caused by the operation of a vehicle.217 Thus, 1384 came to cover
negligent operation as well as the more limited category of damage caused
through a defect in the thing itself, and its practical scope was enormously
expanded.
It has also been argued that article 1384 is inapplicable if the "thing"
played a purely passive or inert role in causing damage,218 as when a bicyclist
is injured when he collides with a properly parked car. In 1941, this theory
was strenuously advanced against a plaintiff who, in crossing the terrace of
a caf6, tripped over a folding chair lying flat on the floor.2 10 But the Court
of Cassation rejected defendant's argument and applied article 1384.
After these cases, it seems unsafe to say anything more than that, before
article 1384 will be applied, the "thing" must have been substantially in-
volved in causing injury. It must be a cause g~niratrice of the damage.2 2 -
In determining what amounts to "generating cause" a court inevitably falls
back on notions of fault. Thus, the application of article 1384 has become so
extensive that it can be made workable only by injecting notions of fault and
so retreating, in a circular fashion, to article 1382..221
When article 1384 is deemed pertinent, the burden it places on the de-
fendant is not lightly thrown off. There is some dispute among French jurists
as to whether 1384 preserves the notion of fault, imposing on the defendant
only a presumption of fault, or whether instead it eliminates the relevance
of fault theory altogether and creates a jurisprudence of risk.222 Those who
advocate the second viewpoint see in it le principe du risque de propri&t,
and regard liability under 1384 as strict and the article itself as creating a
presumption of responsibility rather than a presumption of fault. However
this may be, the defendant can only escape by showing an unforeseeable ac-
cident (cas fortuit or force maieure) or a fault of the victim which was un-
foreseeable and unavoidable.
The critical importance of the 1384 presumption makes it a vital matter
to determine what persons may be attacked under this doctrine. The article
speaks broadly of persons who have "things under their guard." Finding the
217. Jand'heur v. Les Galeries Belfortaises, supra note 214. See excerpts in Vo.N
MEHREN 399.
218. 1 SAVATIER 452-58.
219. Pialet v. Guise, Cour de Cassation (Ch. civ.), Feb. 24, 1941, [1941] D. 85,
[1941] S. I. 201. See excerpts in VON .MERREN 401-02.
220. 2 MAZEAUD 207; Desbons v. Consorts Deyssieu, Cour de Cassation (Ch. civ.),
Jan. 23, 1945, [1945] D. 317, [1946] S. 1. 57; Taupin v. Arrachepied, Cour de Cassation
(Ch. civ.), March 5, 1947, [1947] D. 296.
221. 1 SAVATIER 432-35.
222. 2 COLIN & CAPITANT 278 speaks of article 1384 as establishing a presumption
of fault. 1 SAVATIER 425, 427 suggests that there is more than a presumption of fault




guardian has thus become an elemental inquiry for the French law of torts
and one that has provoked great juristic dispute. One commentator took the
view that the decisions on the question of locating the guardian were so
fluid that to offer strict definitions would be futile, that the concept was rather
a flexible one which bent under the demands of policy.2 23 Another commen-
tator was prepared to hazard a general description of the guardian as the
one who has ultimate control and at the same time draws the benefit from
the use of the thing ("la haute direction en mzeme temps que le profit"). 224
Certainly, the owner is generally liable under 1384's guardianship principle.
He may rebut the presumption of his guardianship, however, and establish
that it has been transferred to another. In the typical case of the employee
who drives his employer's truck, the employer will generally be the guardian.
But he is entitled to show that, in the particular case, guardianship had
passed to the servant, if the servant enjoyed free use and the personal con-
trol of the thing (le libre usage et le con tr~le personnel).°225 It is noteworthy
that if the servant is deemed to be the guardian, the master will avoid auto-
matic vicarious liability, for the servant is then acting outside the course of
his employment. If the master retains guardianship, the principle of article
1384 can be invoked against him directly, and vicarious liability need not be
relied upon. The owner of an automobile is deemed to retain guardianship
when another is driving with his consent.2 2 6 but not when the car has been
stolen.22 7 Thus, guardianship has no necessary connection with title. On the
bagis of these decisions, the guardian has been defined as the person having
an independent power of giving instructions with respect to the "thing" (cehd
qui a, en fail, un pouvoir autonome de comniandernent relativenent a la
chose) .228
Plaintiff's Status as a Defense
In one instance of French law, which may serve as an introduction to the
broader aspects of the problem, the character of the plaintiff's entry has been
made specifically relevant. This is the case of the automobile guest, transport
bn6vo'le or transport gratuit. In the ordinary case of injury in an auto-
mobile accident, article 1384 operates against the defendant. But if the plain-
223. Saleilles, La ResponsabilitN du Fait des Choses Devant la Cour Sup&iezure die
Canada, 1911 REVUE TnmxEsmuELLE DE DaoiT Civm 23.
224. 1 SAVAT ER 461.
225. 2 CoLIN & CAiITANT 269.
226. Vingut v. LaGarde, Cour de Cassation (Ch. req.), June 26, 1934, [1934] G.P.
IL. 714. For extracts from this case, see VoN 'MEHR n 404-05,
227. Cannot v. Docteur Franck, Cour de Cassation (Ch. rdunies), Dec. 2, 1941,
[1942] D. 25, [1941] S. I. 217. See excerpts in VON MEHREN 407-08.
228. 2 MAZEAUD 132-33. Professors Mazeaud and Tunc draw upon a judgment of
the Cour d'Appel de Paris, July 18, 1930, [1930] G.P. II. 674, where the court said that
the notion of guard is characterized by "full independence, a power to command and
direct, to exercise supervision and control, so that the guardian has the ability to give
orders and instructions through which he renders himself legally liable." 2 'MAZEAUD 129.
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tiff was a guest in the defendant's automobile, he cannot invoke 1384's pre-
sumption of fault and must prove fault under 1382.229 The position of the
automobile guest is, in this respect, generally regarded by French jurists as
an instance of the voluntary assumption of risk. There is in this connection
an interesting passage in one contemporary treatise which suggests a faint
recognition in French doctrine of an invitee-licensee dichotomy akin to that
of Anglo-American law.
This idea is often expressed by saying that in such cases the victim has
accepted in advance the risks he has run. He will not be able to invoke
the presumption of Article 1384, for he will be taken to have forfeited
it, and he will not be able to obtain damages unless he can prove fault
in the guardian of the thing.
This principle has been firmly laid down in many judgments dealing
with automobile guests ... ; in our view it must also apply to any case
in which a person has suffered damage through the instrumentality of a
thing which another has put at his disposal gratuitously and without
consideration. So this would apply if for example a man should slip and
hurt himself on a friend's staircase, or in any case where the accident
was caused by a thing such as a football, a gun or a skate . . . used in
a sport or a game in which the victim took part with others of his own
free will....
But the doctrine of assumption of risk does not apply and the victim
may rely on Article 1384 when the thing has not been put at his disposal
by a purely altruistic act on the part of the guardian. This would be the
case where the victim has made use of the thing not in his own interests
but in those of the guardian, to render him some service, even though
he may not get paid for it . . . or where the driver has offered a lift in
his car with some business motive (out of a wish to close a deal or to
sell the car). 230
229. Gasse v. Saby, Cour de Cassation (Ch. civ.), March 27, 1928, [19281 D. 1. 145,
[1.928] S. I. 353, COLIN & CAPITANT 330 (Supplement). The automobile guest may,
however, invoke article 1384 against the driver of another car colliding with the car in
which the plaintiff is riding. 1 SAVATIER 164 n.(7), citing Tribunal Civil de Seine, Dec.
11, 1934, [1935] D. 45; Tribunal Civil de Corbeil, Jan. 12, 1933, [1933] G.P. I. 578.
Children who are automobile guests are not taken to have accepted the risk and may
invoke article 1384. 2 COLIN & CAPITANT 276 n.2. Where the automobile guest is unable
to rely on article 1384 and must prove fault under article 1382, it was once thought that
he must prove more than ordinary fault, that he must prove faute lourde. But this was
rejected in Gasse v. Saby, Cour de Cassation (Ch. civ.), March 27, 1928, [1928] D. I.
145, [1928] S. I. 353, 2 MAZEAUD 290. So in one case the plaintiff automobile guest re-
covered against the driver who had driven his decrepit car over a very bumpy road so
that the steering gear broke. The court held that this was not a cas fortuit exonerating
the defendant from fault. Leroy v. Suchet, Cour de Cassation (Ch. req.), March 8, 1937,
[1937] D.H. 314, 1 MAZEAUD 561.
230. 2 COLIN & CAPITANT 276. In this context, it seems that the French courts have
not escaped the difficulties, well known to English and American tribunals, of discrimi-
•nating between the invitee and the licensee. So a doctor taking the relative of a patient
to a consultation in his car has been submitted to the presumption of fault under article




In this passage, no explicit reference is made to the victim who has unlaw-
fully used the defendant's "thing" or unlawfully entered on the defendant's
premises. One or two cases of the adult trespasser in vehicles can, however,
be found in the texts. In 1929, the Criminal Division of the Court of Cas-
sation held that one who had hidden in the defendant's car without the de-
fendant's knowledge could not invoke article 1384.231 According to one com-
mentator, the victim's unlawful conduct in this case would also seem to pre-
clude the defendant's liability under the general fault doctrine of article
1382.232 In the same year, on the other hand, another court held that a train
passenger who rode in a second class compartment while holding a third
class ticket could successfully invoke article 1382 for an injury to his thumb
while closing the door.233 It would be rash indeed to assume that the nature
of the plaintiff's presence as a trespasser will automatically rule out the appli-
cation of articles 1384 and 1386. The impingement of the trespass on these
articles can only be understood by considering the general nature of the
plaintiff's fault as a defense.
French courts commonly say that the defendant cannot displace the bur-
den placed on him under article 1384 and escape liability by demonstrating
that he was not personally at fault. He must prove affirmatively that the
accident was due to an unforeseeable or foreign cause, of which the most
common example is the fault of the victim. 234 What the defendant really must
show is that the accident was in no way the fault of the thing of which he
had guard.2 35 The fault of the victim plaintiff will not exonerate the defend-
ant completely unless it was the sole cause of damage which itself was un-
foreseeable and inevitable. If the victim's negligence falls short of this measure
but was, nevertheless, a contributory cause of the damage, the French courts
apply the doctrine of apportionment and the damages will be reduced.2 3 6 It
231. Arthur v. Ollivier, Cour de Cassation (Ch. crim.), July 18, 1929, [19321 S. I.
159, [1929] G.P. II. 618. 1 SAvATiER 165-66.
232. 1. SAVAT aR 166.
233. 2 MAZEAUD 374 n.1460(1), citing Tribunal Civil de Saumur, Feb. 28, 1929,
[1929] G.P. II. 28; see Cour d'Appel de Besanqon, June 14, 1944, [1945] S. II. 21.
234. Chem. de fer de l'Ouest v. Marcault, Cour de Cassation (Ch. civ.), Jan. 21,
1919, [1922] D. I. 25, [1922] S. I. 265; 1. SAVATIER 487-88; 2 COLIN & CAPITANT 228,
267-68; LALou 255-56.
235. Savatier puts the matter in this way: "Under Article 1382 cas fortidt is estab-
lished by any kind of proof which excludes fault. But to rebut under Article 1384 it is
not enough to show the absence of fault; it must be shown further that the damage did
not spring from the activity of the thing as well as from that of the guardian." 1 SAvA-
TIER 487.
236. Jehan v. Chem. de fer D~partmentaux de la Mayenne, Cour de Cassation (Ch.
civ.), Feb. 9, 1937, [1937] S. I. 127; 2 COLIN & CAPITANT 228. Savatier argues that the
victim who was at fault should always be denied under article 1384 and referred to
article 1382. He stresses the difficulties of applying the doctrine of apportionment under
article 1384, when the defendant's fault cannot be measured, as it exists only by virtue
of a presumption. The real fault of the plaintiff must be measured against the presump-
tive fault of the defendant. 1 SAVATIER 498. However, the courts have not hesitated to
make apportionments in such cases. Soc. Durand-Frare et Seurat et Comp. d'assur. La
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has been suggested that, at present, the courts are tending to admit the fault
of the victim as a defense more readily. 237 They are relaxing somewhat the
requirements of unforeseeability and now demand only that the victim's con-
duct be normalenzent iprvisible.238
The evolution of these doctrines can be seen in the decisions on injury done
to trespassing children. The French courts are not so willing to lower the
standard of care demanded from children for their own preservation as are
English and American courts,22 9 but the actual decisions in these cases do
not differ markedly from the probable outcome in common-law jurisdictions.
For example, an electric authority has been held responsible to a nine-year-
old child who climbed a pylon and received a damaging shock, even though
the authority had complied with the statutory minimum requirements for
preventive measures. The fault of the child was held to be no defense, since
the authority could have done even more by way of precaution.2 40 But a de-
fendant who, on a Sunday, left a threshing machine under a tarpaulin at a
spot off the highway, a location where such machines were customarily kept.
was not liable to a child injured while playing with it. In this case, the fault
of the child was held to be a complete defense. 241 A child who broke into a
locked storeroom and stole an explosive cartridge could not recover, even
though the defendant had failed to observe some of the statutory requirements
for storing explosives..2 42 The liability of the defendant was reduced by half
in a case in which a child climbed an electric transformer ;.243 by four fifths
in a case where a child climbed scaffolding. 244 The defendants were held not
to be liable at all to a child who was injured after having pierced the roof of
an electric transformer and pushed a wire through,2 45 nor to a child who had
Pr6servatrice v. Vve. Hainglaise, Cour de Cassation (Ch. req.), April 13, 1934, [1934]
D. I. 41, [19341 S. 1. 313; 1 SAVATimR 495-97. The Court of Cassation takes the view
that the victim's fault is only a ground for reducing damages unless the defendant can
show that it was l'unique faute. Antokolsk) v. Nessi, Cour de Cassation (Ch. req.),
Jan. 31, 1938, [1938] S. I. 229; 1 SAVATIER 495-97.
237. "As far as one can make out trends in the case law in recent years, it seems
that we are witnessing a slight reversion to the principle of fault and a stabilization of
the law of civil responsibility." 1 MAZEAUD 95; see 2 id. at 519-23.
238. Cour de Cassation (Ch. civ.), Jan. 25, 1956, 119561 Juris Classeur P riodique
2.9153; 2 MAZEAUD 520.
239. 1 MAZEAUD 529-31.
240. Soc. des Forces Motrices de la Loue v. Jallon, Cour de Cassation (Ch. req.),
Dec. 23, 1929, [19301 D.H. 102, [1930] G.P. I. 341; 1 SAxATIER 237.
241. 1 SAVATIER 237, citing Cour d'Appel de Montpellier, Oct. 22, 1937, [1938] D.H.
44.
242. 1 SAVATwR 237, citing Cour d'Appel de Chamb~ry, Nov. 18, 1937, [1938] D.H.
72.
243. 2 MAZFAUD 379 n.1468(4) (4th ed. 1947), citing Cour d'Appel de Douai, Oct.
30, 1930, 11930] Recueil Douai 326.
244. 2 MAZEAUD 379 n.1468(4) (4th ed. 1947), citing Cour d'Appel de Colmar, April
22, 1932, 11932] G.P. IT. 51.
245. 2 MAZEAUD 379 n.1468(4) (4th ed. 1947), citing Cour d'Appel d'Amiens, May
12, 1937, [1937] G.P. II, 441.
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started up a turntable.2 46 A seventeen-year-old boy who was injured after
putting his hand through the grille of an elevator door was permitted to re-
cover only partial damages.247 The French decisions are thus not noticeably
more solicitous of the trespassing child than those in many Anglo-American
jurisdictions. Indeed, they might appear somewhat harsher.
If an action is brought under article 1386 (dealing with the collapse of
buildings), the probabilities of recovery seem much the same as under 1384.
One treatise describes the effect of 1386 as "a presumption of fault, which
can only be rebutted by showing the fault of the victim (as, for example,
when the victim has entered another's property) or force majeure" ;248 and
another cites the illegal presence of the victim as a defense under 1386.29
Apparently, however, the illegal presence of the victim will completely ex-
onerate the defendant under article 1386 only if it is taken to be the sole
cause of the damage. Otherwise fault will be apportioned and damages re-
duced.250
Summary
An action for damages brought by one who has suffered injury while on
the premises of another will, in French law, most naturally fall under the
scope of article 1384 or 1386, and will thus involve a presumption of fault
against the defendant. If the plaintiff was illegally present on the premises,
he may be held, in some cases, to have barred himself thereby from invoking
246. 2 MAZEAUD 379 n.1468(4) (4th ed. 1947), citing Cour d'Appel de Nogent-le-
Rotrou, July 20, 1937, G.P. II. 2.706.
247. 2 MAZEAUD 379 n.1468(4) (4th ed. 1947), citing Cour d'appel de Seine, Oct. 23,
1942, [1942] G.P. II. 2.266.
A few cases, decided under article 1385, of injuries caused to trespassing plaintiffs by
defendant's animals are also interesting here. In Desplats v. Garabet, Cour de Cassation
(Ch. civ.), Feb. 16, 1956, [1956] D. 445, [1956] S. 6, the deceased was a member of a
hunting party which, in returning home, crossed the defendant's field. The deceased was
attacked and killed by the defendant's steer. The Court of Cassation reversed a judgment
,,f the court below which had found the defendant not liable. The Court of Cassation
took notice of the fact that the defendant tolerated people crossing his field and held
that the deceased's fault was h q/re and could not exonerate the defendant completely.
This decision may be contrasted with Muhr v. Defaye, Cour de Cassation (Ch. civ.),
March 15, 1956, [1956] D. 445, [1956] S. 6, and Genoud v. Perret, Cour d'Appel de
Chambery, Dec. 1, 1953, [1954] D. 175. in the first of these cases the Court of Cas-
sation confirmed the lower court's denial of recovery to a plaintiff who had gone un-
invited into the defendant's field and had been kicked by defendant's wild colt while at-
tempting to pet the animal (see Marlor v. Ball, [1900] 16 T.L.R. 239 (C.A.)); in the
other decision recovery was denied the plaintiff who had gone into the defendant's en-
closed field and been gored by a steer.
248. 2 COLIN & CAPITANT 263.
249. 2 MAZEAUD 506.
250. Ville de Coutances v. Dandeville, Cour de Cassation (Ch. civ.), June 21, 1930,
11936] S. IT. 156 (note), [1930] G.P. II. 337; 1 SAVATIER 531 n.(3). Some writers take
the view that the illegal presence of the victim leads to a total exoneration of the de-
fendant under article 1386. 2 MAZEAUD 506 n.1519(2).
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article 1384. Proof of fault must then proceed under article 1382. If, on the
other hand, the trespasser is not taken to have accepted the risk--often the
rule with child trespassers-the plaintiff may utilize article 1384. Here, to
escape liability, the defendant must show that the plaintiff's fault was the
sole cause of the accident in the sense that his conduct was unforeseeable and
unavoidable. Failing this, the defendant may have the damages reduced by
showing that the plaintiff's fault was a contributing cause of the accident. In
any case, the totality of facts bears upon the final determination.2ri'
EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION
The French experience is a demonstration of the practicality of a general
theory of liability in this field, and at the same time shows that such a gen-
eral theory need not lead to incessant verdicts in favor of the plaintiff. French
law has shifted from its nineteenth century insistence on proof of fault to an
acceptance of semistrict liability, demanding from the defendant, before he can
be exonerated, proof that the accident was caused by the plaintiff's own fault
251. The clash between the French and common-law approaches in the Canadian
province of Quebec is interesting. In Quebec the prevailing legal system is historically
derived from the coutonze de Paris and is now consolidated in a Civil Code, dating from
1866. The portions of the Code dealing with responsibility are almost identical with those
of the French Civil Code. See THOMsoN, LAW oF NEGLIGENCE AND DELICTS IN CANADA
9-14, passim (1946). In the area of liability of occupiers to those who come on their
land, however, the courts of Quebec have often declared that the application of the Civil
Code is identical with that of the rules of common law. See, e.g., Caza v. Clercs parois-
siaux ou catchistes de St. Viateur, 41 REvUE DE JURISPRUDENCE 70, 84 (Qu. 1935),
where the court said: "Our courts . . . have always applied the doctrines of the common
law of England to questions of the duties of owners and occupiers towards persons com-
ing on to their premises." (Translated from the French.) Other cases cited in the
opinion to support this proposition were Cit6 de Verdun v. Yeoman, 1925 Rapports Cour
Supreme 177; Brochu v. The King, 15 Can. Exch. 501 (1914) [incorrectly cited: correct
citation is 15 Can. Exch. 50]; Montreal Tramways Co. v. Simpchechen, 24 Qu6. B.R.
81 (1915); Montreal Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Lowrie, 25 Qu6. B.R. 367 (1916):
Ladurantaye v. Grand Trunk Ry., 55 Qu6. C.S. 48 (1918) ; Quebec Ry. Light Heat &
Power Co. v. Rousseau, 39 Qu6. B.R. 65 (1924); Grand Trunk Ry. v. Barnett, [19111
A.C. 361. (P.C.) (Ont.). This tendency to assimilation has drawn a sharp comment from
a former judge of the Supreme Court of Canada:
This term [trespasser] can only be translated into French by making use of a
circumlocution, such as-one who goes on to the property of another without per-
mission. . . In our law when there is a question of tortious liability, the only
enquiry is whether there was any harm resulting from fault and in this respect
the law makes no distinctions. Thus we have no need of the arbitrary categories
used in English law. Even the trespasser will have his action if he has been in-
jured by conduct on the part of the occupier which amounts to fault.
Mignault, Chronique de Jatrisprudence: Conservons notre droit civil, 15 REvE DU DROIT
28, 30, 33 (1936). (Translated from the French.) See also Montreal Light, Heat &
Power Co. v. Lowrie, 25 Qu6. B.R. 367 (1916), where the French speaking majority
of the Quebec Court of King's Bench found for the plaintiff despite a dissent by the
English speaking judge who drew on English precedents.
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or by an unforeseeable and unavoidable extraneous intervention. The nature of
the plaintiff's entry on the premises is accordingly taken up under the broad
consideration of the decisiveness of his fault in bringing on his injury. That
he would constitute a trespasser under common-law doctrines is to the French
courts by no means a conclusive circumstance against him. This area of law
is, indeed, one of the sharpest illustrations of the mythical nature of the be-
lief cherished by common lawyers that a codified system leads to preordained
and mechanical decisions. While the French have achieved a fluid but rational
approach which allows a policy-oriented implementation of the notion of fault,
it is the common-law jurisdictions that have been beset by the hardened
arteries of a rigid categorization.
If, in this area of the law, there is a development shared by all the com-
mon-law jurisdictions examined, it is the tendency to proliferate subsidiary
concepts and adventitious doctrines around the simple precepts of the nine-
teenth-century cases. Those early cases introduced distinctions between tres-
passers, licensees and invitees. Subsequently, the notion of trespasser itself
was refined by the qualifications of seen and unseen trespassers, the "tech-
nical" trespasser, the trespasser who may become a licensee by the inactivity
of the occupier, and the conditional child licensee who reverts to the status
of trespasser when unaccompanied by an adult. 5 2 The privileges of the oc-
252. The notion that a child of tender years may be a trespasser if unaccompanied
by an adult has received some currency in England and was reiterated by the Court of
Appeal in Bates v. Stone Parish Council, [1954] 1 Weekly L.R. 1249 (C.A.). The
proposition there was that a license to children to come into a public playground may
be construed not to include a young child unaccompanied by a suitable guardian. See
Williams, Note, 18 MODERN L. REv. 59 (1955). In Phipps v. Rochester Corp., [1955]
1 Q.B. 450, 469-70 (1954), Mr. Justice Devlin rejected this approach as being too diffi-
cult in application. He felt that it would be enormously troublesome to decide what are
tender years, who is a suitable guardian, and what principle to apply if the attention
of the guardian should be distracted (as indeed happened in O'Connor v. British Transp.
Comm'n, [1958] 1 Weekly L.R. 346 (C.A.), where a child of three, travelling with her
mother, opened a door and fell out of a train while the mother was seeking a light for
her cigarette). Mr. Justice Devlin's attention was not drawn to the judgment of the
Court of Appeal in the Bates case. But though rejecting the conditional licensee approach,
Mr. Justice Devlin emphasized that the licensor's duty is not unlimited and that parents
must accept a large measure of responsibility for the safety of their children. See Wil-
liams, Note, 18 MODERN L. REV. 393 (1955). For a recent affirmation in the United
States of the duty of parents, see Jones v. City of Aberdeen, 138 F. Supp. 727 (D. Md.
1956) where a 23-month-old child strayed from his house, across a field, and on to
railroad tracks where he was injured by a train; stressing the duty of parents, the
court denied liability. It wvould certainly be quite wrong to minimize the duty which
a parent owes to his child, but there must be a realistic appraisal of the limits
within which this duty can humanly be discharged. And where the parent has neglected
to do what he could, we are still left with the disturbing contemplation of a child visited
with an uncompensated injury for the sins of his parents. This contemplation has not always
disturbed commentators.
The fact is, that the vast majority of children have protectors appointed alike by
nature and by law, viz., their parents, who have legal power to control their
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cupier defendant have, in some jurisdictions, been denied to those who are
not themselves occupiers, though at this point the jurisdictions diverge and
the doctrine is subjected to considerable internal refinement. Furthermore.
reckless or wanton or willful conduct has been differentiated from simple
negligence. Attractive nuisances and traps are often vital considerations. Or.
everything may turn on the distinction between an activity and a condition.
Conditions themselves are subdivided into natural and artificial ones, and
artificial conditions bifurcate further into those dangerous and highly danger-
ous.
These complications were inevitable, for the simplicity of the nineteenth-
century approach was a simplicity of harshness, reflecting a social bias which
could not long be tolerated. Admittedly, the accretion of the subsidiary doc-
trines sometimes leads to the expression of factual differences which may be
relevant to the decisional process. But whether their elevation to categories
of decisive significance is an aid or an impediment to justice is another
question.
This inquiry must begin with an examination of the reasons which could
underlie limiting the right to recovery of trespassers as a class. Justification
might be found in the element of wrongdoing that accompanies the commis-
sion of a trespass, on the theory that the trespasser ought not to recover for
injury caused through his voluntary self-involvement in illegal conduct. But
in all jurisdictions the inherence of some element of illegality in the plaintiff's
conduct, taken alone, has been rejected as an insufficient ground for denying
him a remedy.25 Surely this is proper, for only an extreme theory of retri-
bution could transform any taint of illegality into a bar against damages for
injury. In any event, the trespasser usually is not in breach of penal law andgenerally commits a tort only in the barest sense-one that would entitle the
occupier to nominal damages. Under any fault doctrine, he may be altogether
guiltless in that the trespass resulted from an innocent mistake.
But, it may be said, in the case of the trespasser the causal connection be-
tween the plaintiff's illegal conduct and the damage is apparent and strong.
The illegality consists of his very presence in the place where he is injured.
actions, and whose moral duty to keep their children from entering upon dangerous
premises is generally regarded as at least equal to the moral obligation of the
landowner to fence them out .... If those who brought the child into the world
are unable, by reason of poverty, to provide him a playground, this may afford
an argument for the passage of a statute imposing that duty upon the municipality,
in which case each landowner would have to contribute his proportion of the
expense. But this is quite another thing from assessing upon a single unfortunate
landowner the entire damage arising from the want of such a playground.
Smith, Liability of Landowners to Children Entering Without Permission, 11 HARV. L.
REV. 349, 371-72 (1898). This was perhaps a reasonably enlightened view for a time
before the development of liability insurance. The fact is that the dilemma cannot be
satisfactorily resolved while we look for fault in the defendant. It is fundamentally a
problem of insurance.
253. See PaossER, ToRTs 162 (2d ed. 1955).
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Unlike an instance of coincidental illegality which no more than synchronizes
with the infliction of injury, for example, damage to an unregistered auto-
mobile, the trespasser's unlawful act is a sine qua non of the infliction of harm.
The answer to this argument is that all jurisdictions recognize liability in
the defendant who acts recklessly toward a trespasser of whose presence he
is aware. The trespass of that known plaintiff remains equally a sine qua non
of the injury, but some acts simply are not permitted the defendant under
these circumstances. Thus, illegality is not always a defense and, by itself.
therefore, is not an adequate explanation of the trespasser plaintiff's inferior
position.
The argument of illegality can be stated in a more sophisticated and palat-
able form by speaking in terms of voluntary assumption of risk or contribu-
tory negligence. In the sense of cheerfully accepting the prospect of injury,
the trespasser, of course, does not assume the risk. Usually, he will no more
expect to be injured than will the invitee or licensee. The matter is obscured
by the lack of any clear demarcation between the defenses of voluntary as-
sumption of risk and contributory negligence. In an analysis by Glanville
Williams, assumption of risk is a doctrine which, for the sake of clarity,
should be confined to cases in which the plaintiff has accepted the "legal risk"
-that is, cases involving some evidence of an agreement between plaintiff
and defendant whereby the former waives his rights of action with respect
to a known source of danger.25 4 As Williams points out, given such an
analysis the defense of voluntary assumption of risk can scarcely be applicable
in a negligence action (except where the negligence is incidental to a con-
tractual relationship), since plaintiffs do not, as a rule, bargain to waive rights
of action for defendants' future carelessness. Certainly, assumption of risk
could hardly be applied to a trespasser plaintiff,255 though it is quite possible
to conceive of its application to the licensee or invitee who enters with warn-
ing of a defect in the condition of the premises.
Williams suggests that his analysis of the meaning of assumption of risk
is supported by English case-law developments. The situation seems some-
what different in the United States. XVriting of the relationship between the
two defenses, Prosser says: "[T]he courts have arrived at the conclusion
that assumption of risk is a matter of knowledge of the danger and intelligent
acquiescence in it, while contributory negligence is a matter of some fault or
departure from the standard of reasonable conduct .... ,6
Williams' analysis sets up a much sharper and seemingly more rational
distinction. In England, the present need for such a clear division between
254. GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, JOINT ToRTS AND CON-IRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE: A STUDY
0l CONCURRENT FAULT §§ 72-75 (1951).
255. Though it was so applied in Ilott v. Wilkes, 3 B. & AId. 304, 106 Eng. Rep.
t,74 (K.B. 1820), where the trespasser had been injured by a spring-gun he knew to be
present. See WILLIAMS, op. cit. supra note 254, § 73, at 297.
256. PROSSER, TORTS 305 (2d ed. 1955). See also 2 HARPER & JAMES § 22.2, at 1201
(1956).
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the two defenses is pressing, since, under the Law Reform (Contributory
Negligence) Act of 1945,257 damages may be apportioned in a case of con-
tributory negligence, while assumption of risk is a total defense. In most
United States jurisdictions, this pressure for distinction does not exist, and
it is only important to be aware of the overall scope of the two defenses.
Nevertheless, to view the trespassing status of the plaintiff as raising the issue
of contributory negligence rather than that of assumption of risk is not only
more elegant, but more realistic as well.
That the trespassing status of the plaintiff does inevitably raise the issue
of contributory negligence is not disputed, but what must be vehemently as-
serted is that affixing the label "trespasser" is a hopelessly inadequate method
of solving the contributory negligence issue which is raised. The category of
trespasser includes many diverse personalities. A random selection of tres-
passers might be: a burglar; a canvasser who ignores a "No Canvassers"
notice ;258 a man who deliberately takes a short cut over his neighbor's field:
a man who mistakenly walks on another's land believing it to be his own;'
a man who is wrongly directed into premises which he has no permission to
enter; a man who in good faith accepts an unauthorized invitation to go into
another's premises; a policeman who walks through the open door of a ware-
house at night to satisfy himself that all is well ;260 a girl whose father takes
her out for a ride in his employer's truck.26 ' To classify all these persons
under one doctrinal rubric for the purposes of contributory negligence makes
no sense.
Courts have not, of course, been unaware that the behavioral classification
may not be a functional one. The growth of doctrines of "technical" trespass
and licensee by acquiescence represents attempts to escape the rigidity of the
trespasser label. But they no more than dent the surface of the concept, which
257. 8 & 9 Geo. 6, c. 28 (1.945).
258. In Christian v. Johannesson, [1956] N.Z.L.R. 664, the plaintiff, who bad entered
a yard to solicit an order, was bitten by a dog. He had not seen a sign which read
"Private Property: Keep Out." It was held that the sign was not so placed that it could
reasonably be expected to be seen and the plaintiff was accordingly not a trespasser.
259. Whether those who mistakenly go on to another's property are to be regarded
as trespassers is not a well settled topic. Cf. FI.mEING, ToRTs 42-43, 462-63 (1957) ; 1
HARPER & JAMES 10-16 (1956) ; RESTATEMENT, ToaTs § 165 (1934) (suggesting that,
where the invasion is unintentional, there should be no liability in the absence of actual
damage) ; WINF ELD, TORT 362-93 (6th ed. Lewis 1954) ; Green, Landowner v. Intruder;
Intruder v. Landowner: Basis of Responsibility in Tort, 21 MIcH. L. REv. 495, 496
(1923).
260. Great Cent. Ry. v. Bates, [1921] 3 K.B. 578 (C.A.). See also Davis v. Lisle,
[1936] 2 K.B. 434 (police officer who enters private premises to make inquiry about an
obstruction in the street becomes a trespasser if he refuses to leave when requested to
do so). Compare Racine v. Morris, 136 App. Div. 467, 121 N.Y. Supp. 146 (1910), aff'd,
201 N.Y. 240, 94 N.E. 864 (1911) (police officer on patrol found door ajar and entered
the building; stepped down an unguarded elevator shaft; held a licensee).




for the most part still dominates the field. What is needed here is an ability
to consider the precise circumstances in which each individual plaintiff found
himself on the defendant's premises, for the character of the entry is certainly
a relevant consideration. The point of this criticism is, indeed, not that we
should ignore the trespassing status of the plaintiff but rather that the con-
cept of trespass is a hopelessly unsubtle one which precludes any real con-
sideration of the precise circumstances of his entry. At present, in a case
where the plaintiff is a "real" trespasser so that the court does not wish to
allow recovery, it will rest easy on a simple application of the wanton-and-
willful rule. If the plaintiff is a trespasser in some lesser sense, the court,
wishing to grant recovery, will either seek to deny his trespasser status or,
should this prove impossible, seek some subsidiary reason for refusing to
apply the wanton-and-willful rule. The result is unpredictability in adminis-
tration and hopeless confusion. Only the introduction of general negligence
theory can alleviate this state of affairs. Far from creating vagueness and
uncertainty, a general theory would introduce a rational, easily comprehen-
sible and uniform approach.
Analyzed from the defendant's viewpoint, the conventional argument is
found to rest on the free use of land. The occupier's interest in free use, it
is assumed, necessitates restricting the trespasser's right of recovery.2 62 But
this assumption ignores the fact that two separate considerations are involved
here as, indeed, in all tortious remedies. In the first place, the voice of the
immediate victim cries out for his peculiar compensation. Second, the im-
position of liability has a general, educative impact. Apprehension of liability
breeds a socially therapeutic caution which, though difficult to measure, is
surely present. Public policy should be concerned not only with whether the
individual trespasser deserves to recover as an ethical problem, but also with
imposing an awareness of possible liability on potential tortfeasors in order
to curtail the maiming of individuals. Naturally, a part must be played both
by the future plaintiff's sense of self-preservation and, especially, by the super-
vision and education of children21 3 but the threat of liability posed at the
occupier can add a not inconsiderable supplement. Furthermore, it can scarce-
ly be thought today that society's interest in the occupier's unrestricted use
262. See Smith, Liability of Landowners to Children Entering Without Permission,
11 HARv. L. REv. 349, 361-62 (1898):
The beneficial use of land is a primal necessity; not only to those individual land-
owners who happen to be defendants in lawsuits, but to the entire humanrace....
To say, for instance, that B must keep his land in safe condition to be trespassed
upon, would often result in practically depriving B of certain modes of beneficial
enjoyment unless he takes precautions which are incompatible with profitable user,
and might in effect amount to a confiscation of his land for the benefit of tres-
passers.
263. For a discussion of children's attitudes to trespass and the extent to which
these attitudes may be modified by environment and education, see Latham, Children's
Concepts Concerning Trespass, 1928 (unpublished thesis in State University of Iowa
Library).
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of his premises outweighs its interest in the life and limb of its members--
especially of its children.
The other traditional argument for restricting the occupier's liability rests
on the great principle of fault as a cornerstone of liability. Chipped and
eroded as this cornerstone may be, it still underlies and supports a great area
of tort dialectics. Indeed, it may be suggested that, more than the interest
in land use, it was the seeming absence of fault in the occupier which under-
lay the nineteenth-century limitations on the trespasser's rights of recovery.2 4
The rule as to liability for willful and wanton misconduct toward a known
trespasser may be taken as a nineteenth-century exception in those instances
where fault might be found in the occupier's conduct. This rule has come
under increasing strain with the simultaneous advent of the broadening inter-
pretation of fault and the increasing unimportance of the fault principle.
Where the occupier has reason to anticipate the presence of trespassers and
at the same time maintains without adequate safeguards a dangerous activity
or dangerous structures or artificial conditions on his land, it becomes pos-
sible to call his fault decisive. Where the occupier is involved in highly
dangerous activities such as erecting or maintaining high-voltage electrical
apparatus, the position of the trespasser plaintiff has also been ameliorated
by the impingement of the general doctrines of strict liability. Nobody has
advocated strict liability toward trespassers, but the readiness to employ
theories of strict liability to assist plaintiffs other than trespassers must have
encouraged the discovery of fault in the occupier toward a trespasser plain-
tiff in similar situations.
The deeper question here is the extent to which the trespasser's recovery
must still be moored to the presence of fault in the defendant, and this, of
course, is a problem which underlies the whole development of the law of
torts. It is a commonplace that this development is proceeding gradually in
the direction of a system of social insurance. The common law is supple-
mented by statutory schemes of compensation which, in different jurisdictions
to a greater or lesser extent, have the air of national insurance. In matters
which preserve the formal structure of an adversary system, notions of lia-
bility have been significantly molded by the incidence of private liability in-
surance. The test of liability, it has been suggested, may become the avail-
ability of insurance to the defendant.2 65
264. See Smith, supra note 262, at 368: "The plaintiff's action is defeated not be-
cause his own wrong bars a recovery against the landowner who has neglected to per-
form a duty owing to him, but because he has not succeeded in establishing the primary
proposition that the landowner owed to him the duty in question." Smith used this as
an argument for putting child plaintiffs in the same position as adults.
265. Ehrenzweig, Assurance Oblige-A Comparative Study, 15 LAW & CONTE r.
PROB. 445 (1950). See also Friedmann, Social Insurance and the Principles of Tort
Liability, 63 HARv. L. REV. 241 (1949) ; Greene, Must We Discard Our Law of ATcgli-
gence in Personal Injury Cases?, 19 Onio ST. L.J. 290 (1958) ; James, Social Insurance
and Tort Liability: The Problem of Alternative Remedies, 27 N.Y.U.L. REv. 537 (1952);
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The area of liability to trespassers, with its frequent cases involving maimed
children, is one where insurance principles ought to dominate. Society's loss
through the destruction of its young potential is great. If injury to children
cannot be avoided, society still has the most pressing interest in providing
means for the rehabilitation of the victims so that they may yet be useful to
the limit of their remaining capacities. Apart from these utilitarian considera-
tions, the stricken child is one of life's most afflicting spectacles. The inability
to obliterate entirely the agony of accidents to children makes the faint as-
suagement that money can provide all the more necessary. This should come
from a national system of insurance, but, so long as such a solution continues
to be utopian, the courts must work as best they can with the materials of
the law of torts. The burden of making the occupier pay for the inevitable
horrors of life is mitigated by the already widespread incidence of insurance.
Industrial premises are almost invariably insured against liability to those
who are injured on the premises, either through external assurers or a form
of self-insurance. A great number of private householders also carry such in-
surance. Many do not, of course, and vast areas of rural land are not so pro-
tected. But insurance is always available, and the premiums are not heavy.
An increase in the number of verdicts favoring trespassing plaintiffs would
necessitate only a very slight inflation of insurance premiums. 2 66 This cost
cannot be viewed as a serious infringement on the beneficial use of land, and,
if any special burdens are revealed, they should be accommodated by legis-
lation affording tax relief to the occupier. Thus, the entire community might
pay part of the financial burden as it reflects the inevitability of accidents on
land. The availability of private insurance has made the beneficial use of land
a weak excuse for the occupier's immunities which, in turn, have disguised
the reality of the social harm done by injuries to trespassers, and obscured
the means available for its rectification.
An award of damages by a jury is admittedly not the perfect instrument
for adjusting a social imbalance. Jury awards are influenced by the capricious
operation of sentiment, and they exhibit distressing fluctuations from juris-
diction to jurisdiction. The variations are particularly evident in cases of the
death of children, where the considerations ought to be very different from
James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALE
L.J. 549 (1948); James & Thornton, The Impact of Intsurance on the Law of Torts,
15 LAW & CONTIXUP. PROB. 431 (1950).
266. This was the opinion, given to the author in conversation, of an insurance
executive of experience in this field. 2 HARPER & JAMES § 27.3, at 1438, speaks of the
risk as "readily and reasonably insurable." In the case of Bates v. Stone Parish Coun-
cil, [1954] 1 Weekly L.R. 1249 (C.A.), see note 252 supra, the plaintiff child was in-
jured in a playground operated by the defendant Council. In the trial court damages of
£17,500 were awarded, which the Court of Appeal reduced to £9,000. The Council car-
ried only £5,000 insurance and the rest of the sum would have to be borrowed. Since
the community consisted of only 8,000 inhabitants, this might appear burdensome. See
Williams, Note, 18 MODERN L. Rnv. 59 (1955). The moral is perhaps not that damages
should be smaller but that insurance coverage should be higher.
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cases of injury to a plaintiff who is still living. The time is overdue for ex-
tensive research into the theory and quantum of compensatory damages, but
such an investigation is quite outside the scope of the present discussion. We
must for the moment assume the employment of existing institutions..2 117
267. On damages in the United States generally, see 2 HARPER & JAMaS §§ 25.8-
25.23, at 1316-60, and, with particular reference to wrongful death, 3 FRUmER & BENOIT,
PERSONAL INJURY: ACTIONS, DEFENSES, DAMAGES §§ 3.01-3.19, at 300-21 (1957); Mc-
CORMICK & FRITZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON DAMAGES 371-74 (1952); OLECK, DAMAGES
TO PERSONS AND PROPERTY: STATE AND FEDERAL §§ 195-98B (1957). For the wrongful
death of children, the calculation of damages with respect to the estate is generally per-
formed on the same basis as with adults. With respect to an action by the survivors the
measure of damages is generally the prospective services that the child might render,
plus the prospective contributions he might make from his earnings, minus the cost of
his upbringing. Some jurisdictions further allow damages for anguish or bereavement, 3
FRUmER & BENOIT, op. cit. supra § 3.09, at 310 n.6. Actual awards are so variable that
only an extended study could offer much guidance. The following are random examples:
Northern Pac. R.R. v. Everett, 232 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1956) (death of girl of sixteen;
surviving father whom she had helped with farm work given $8,000) ; McEntyre v. Jones,
128 Colo. 461, 263 P.2d 313 (1953) (surviving mother of girl of thirteen awarded
$7,500) ; Svient v. Pennsylvania R.R., & Ill. App. 2d 360, 132 N.E.2d 83 (1956) (boy of
six awarded $55,000 for severe burns) ; Kentucky & Ind. Terminal R.R. v. Mann, 312
S.W.2d 451 (Ky. 1958) (two-and-a-half-year-old boy awarded $175,000 for loss of right
arm and right leg; on review new trial ordered on the question of damages; court said
better practice was to require itemized verdict) ; Courtney v. Apple, 345 Mich. 223, 76
N.W.2d 80 (1956) (death of boy of two; award of $700 funeral expenses confirmed),
criticized in 18 NACCA L.J. 374-80 (1956), citing cases of large awards for the death
of children; Wytupeck v. City of Camden, 25 N.J. 450, 136 A.2d 887 (1957) (nine-year-
old boy received injuries which necessitated amputation of leg and caused 90% disability
of left hand: award of $150,000 to boy and $20,000 to parents held not excessive).
In England, in the event of a tortious death, claims may be made under the survival
statute for the benefit of the estate, Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 24
& 25 Geo. 5, c. 41 (1934), and under the wrongful death statute for the benefit of de-
pendents, Fatal Accidents Act, 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93 (1846). English courts have come
to recognize that in a claim for personal injuries an element of damages to be considered
is "loss of expectation of life." Flint v. Lovell, [1935] 1 K.B. 354 (C.A. 1934). In Rose
v. Ford, [1937] A.C. 826, the House of Lords held that such a claim survived for the
benefit of the estate under the Law Reform Act of 1934. In Benham v. Gambling, [1941]
A.C. 157 (1940), the House of Lords said that, in considering loss of expectation of
life as an element of damages, "the thing to be valued is not the prospect of length of
days, but the prospect of a predominantly happy life." Id. at 166 (Viscount Simon, L.C.).
Proceeding on this basis, the House took the view that in the case of the death of a
young, child damages under this head should be small. "The main reason, I think, why
the appropriate figure of damages should be reduced in the case of a. very young child
is that there is necessarily so much uncertainty about the child's future that no confident
estimate of prospective happiness can be made." Id. at 167. In Benham v. Gambling
itself the House of Lords reduced the trial judge's award of £1200 to £200, and in later
cases of the death of children the figure has been pegged at around £200-£300. See
MUNKMAN, DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURIES AND DEATH 74-77, 141 (1956). Under
the wrongful death statute in England, damages for the death of an infant child are
awarded to the parents for loss of the services of the child or for loss of anticipated
support from the child. Damages again are small, usually not exceeding a few hundred
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The argument for the adoption of a general negligence theory has, so far,
assumed that broadening the prospects of recovery for trespassing plaintiffs
would be socially desirable. But even if this assumption be denied, as it will
be by many, the general negligence approach may, nonetheless, be preferable.
An alternative argument proceeds on the ground that this approach, in con-
trast to rigid categorization, allows all relevant factors to be considered, and,
by employing the essentially vague concept of reasonableness, permits judge
and jury to carve out expressions of whatever policies seem to them most
desirable. The present state of the law can be attacked not only because it
makes for harsh results, but also because it is an unnecessarily ugly and
cumbersome way of reaching any result at all. The very contrast between the
"reasonableness" standard of behavior which is exacted of the defendant in
pounds. See 2 KEMP & KEMP, THE QUANTUM OF DAMAGES 117-22 (1956). Under Eng-
lish law no damages may be awarded in the nature of a solatium for grief. Where the
child is injured and survives, damages for loss of expectation of life are again low.
MUNKMAN, op. cit. supra at 77. But here larger damages are likely for pain and suffer-
ing, incapacity and disfigurement. Courts have taken notice of the dubious proposition
that the sorrows of the child are less enduring than those of the adult. 1. KEMP & KEMP,
op. cit. supra at 71, cites the opinion of Lord Justice Romer in the unreported case
of Taylor v. Mayor of Southampton (1952): "They [certain photographs] disclose a
terrible state of affairs but on the question of pain and suffering I am reminded of what
a very learned judge (the late Eve J.) once said to the effect that the pains and sorrows
of childhood are mercifully transient. So I do not attach undue weight to the photo-
graphs, or to the undoubted suffering which this little girl underwent." In the examples
offered in KEMP & KEMP the following cases of children are indicative of the range of
damages common in English courts: Wheten v. The Lord Mayor, Aldermen and Citizens
of Cardiff (1953, unreported, cited in id. at 156) (thirteen-year-old boy with severe injury to
frontal bone, necessity for future operation, remote possibility of meningitis developing,
10% possibility of epilepsy--awarded £2250, confirmed by Court of Appeal) ; Lee v. Lord
Mayor, Aldermen and Citizens of Manchester (1953, unreported, cited in id. at 287) (five-
year-old girl had right leg amputated below knee, several operations, skin-grafting; award
of £7000 reduced by Court of Appeal to 4000) ; Taylor v. Mayor, Aldermen and Burgesses
of Southampton (1952, unreported, cited in id. at 323) (six-year-old girl had all toes of
left foot amputated, left with flat foot, had to wear special shoe; danger of arthritis;
award of £1500 increased by Court of Appeal to £3000).
English courts have said that damages awarded to a child must not be diminished by
reason of the prospect that considerable interest may accrue before the child receives
them. See Gold v. Essex County Council, [1942] 2 KB. 293, 303, 313 (C.A.). The posi-
tion in Scotland is reviewed in WALKER, LAw OF DAMAGES IN SCOTLAND (1955). In
Scotland the award is commonly made by a jury and a solatium for grief is allowed but
damages nevertheless tend to be low. Id., app. B at 808, app. D at 813-15 gives, among
others, the following examples: Redpath v. S.M.T. Co. (unreported, cited in id. at 808)
(child blinded and permanently disfigured; awarded £6000); Sharp v. Glasgow Corp.,
[1952] Scots L.T.R. 69 (Sheriff's Ct.) (£390 awarded to parents for death of eight-year-
old son, including, comments Professor Walker, £40 for outlays and a deduction of one
eighth for contributory negligence); Sands v. Devan, [1945] Sess. Cas. 380 (Scot.)
(£250 awarded for death of five-year-old son) ; Inglis v. L.1S. Ry., [1941] Sess. Cas.
551 (Scot.) (£300 awarded for death of eight-year-old son, but Professor Walker com-
ments that this was a heavy award in the nature of a solatium, as the parents were
particularly attached to the child, who was stone deaf).
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the ordinary negligence suit and the criterion of wanton or willful conduct
by which the occupier is judged in a trespasser's suit makes no sense. Is
there any point in saying that the duty of the occupier toward the trespasser
differs from his duty to one who is not the trespasser? Do we mean that the
occupier is not bound to act reasonably toward trespassers? This seems an
abhorrent way for a civilized system of law to put it. Is it not more elegant
and rational to say that what may be reasonable in some circumstances will
not be in others? It is a truism that there are no abstract canons of reason-
ableness; we can only employ the idea of reasonableness meaningfully with
regard to particular conduct in a given situation. No advantage can be seen
in the offensive statement that an occupier is not bound to act reasonably
toward trespassers.26 The more sensible formulation will be to say that
occupation by the defendant and the character of the plaintiff's entry are
factors to be considered in assessing the reasonableness of the defendant's
conduct. Occupation by the defendant could then be deemed a fact of such
central importance that it would always exempt the defendant from respon-
sibility for anything he might do toward a trespasser. But of course the
common law has never gone so far. Instead, it has placed the occupier in a
special doctrinal category and said that he is liable only for willful or wanton
conduct. Now what is reasonable for a butcher may not be reasonable for a
mechanic, but we do not set up legal categories for butchers and mechanics.
When a man's conduct is called into question we remember that he is a
butcher or a mechanic and that is enough.
WAhether or not great importance ought to be attached to the fact of oc-
cupation in cases of injury on premises is not a legal question. No matter
what value is assigned to occupation, concrete cases can still be solved with-
in the notion of reasonableness. Lord Ellenborough and Lord Denning might
have very different ideas on what is reasonable for an occupier, but both
views could function equally well within the general framework of negligence.
The reason for the disjunction between this branch of the law and the
general tort of negligence is quite simply that the special rules pertaining to
injuries on premises antedate the development of an overall theory of negli-
gence.2 69 But the separation is now indefensible. I have an interest in driving
my car but I must compensate the man whom I injure by driving it in an
unreasonable fashion. My interests in and duties respecting my possession of
property can equally well be comprehensively stated by saying that I must
268. This was a point perceived by Peaslee, Duty to Seen, Trespassers, 27 HAR. L.
R-v. 403, 405 (1914), but he considered it disposed of by asserting that the usual way
of putting the matter was no more than a clumsy contraction of the proposition that one
cannot owe a duty of care to a person of whom one is not aware. Peaslee's analysis,
though attractively and plausibly argued, does not give subtle enough consideration to
the foreseeability of trespass in some circumstances and the gravity of the threat which
an occupier may pose at anyone who may come on his land.
269. Marsh, The History and Comparative Law of Inzttees, Licensees and Tres-
passers, 69 L.Q. REv. 182, 184 (1953).
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not injure my fellow men by using my property unreasonably with respect
to them.
Varying degrees of awareness of the clumsy nature of the old approach
have been responsible for the variety of modifications, sometimes overlapping
or competing, which have emerged in the last few decades. But these efforts
have only made the structure more hideous. They are like an attempt to
convert a bicycle into an automobile by adding parts. Each fresh distinction,
each supplementary doctrine, comes, no doubt, from a well-meaning design
to nuzzle closer to the real problems which clamor for scrutiny in these cases,
but often it will have the paradoxical effect of smothering the issues and
making their appraisal impossible.
The distinction between the positions of the occupier defendant and the
nonoccupier defendant which has emerged so forcefully in England is a good
illustration of the obfuscation latent in rigid categories. Under the present
English rule, the wanton-and-willful doctrine is to be confined to occupier
defendants, while nonoccupiers are to be judged by the general negligence
duty of care. Now "occupation" is not a highly refined term of art of the
common law, though it is used in a number of statutes. Perhaps the best-
known English pronouncement on the nature of occupation is that in Queen
v. Assessment Committee of St. Pancras:
Occupation includes possession as its primary element, but it also in-
cludes something more. Legal possession does not of itself constitute an
occupation. The owner of a vacant house is in possession, and may main-
tain trespass against any one who invades it, but as long as he leaves it
vacant he is not rateable [taxable] for it as an occupier. If, however,
he furnishes it, and keeps it ready for habitation whenever he pleases
to go to it, he is an occupier, though he may not reside in it one day in
a year.
On the other hand, a person who, without having any title, takes
actual possession of a house or piece of land, whether by leave of the
owner or against his will, is the occupier of it.2 70
Thus, the central ideas of occupation are control and use, notions certainly
vague enough to cause difficulty.271 In Bent v. Roberts it was held that a
police officer, living in a police house in which he was required to reside by
the terms of his employment and from which he was liable to be moved to
another station at any time, was not the occupier.272 Does this mean that he
would not be the occupier of the premises for the purposes of a tort action
by a plaintiff who had been injured on the premises? In In re Garland,273
270. 2 Q.B.D. 581, 588 (1877). The case was concerned with whether the appellant
was an "occupier of land" under the Valuation (Metropolis) Act of 1869, 32 & 33 Vict.,
c. 67.
271. See FLEmING, ToRTs 430-31 (1957).
272. 3 Ex. D. 66 (1877). The decision was to determine liability for income tax or
inhabited house duty.
273. [1934] Ch. 620, applying the observations of Mr. Justice Lusk in Queen v.
Assessment Comm. of St. Pancras, supra note 270.
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a testator had devised to his wife any house of which he might be in occupa-
tion at the time of his death. \When he died, his wife was living in a house
which the testator had bought and furnished but in which he had never lived.
The court held that, for the purposes of the will, the testator could be re-
garded as having been in occupation of the house at his death. Would the
decision have been the same in an action for an injury sustained on the
premises? In Paterson v. Gas Light & Coke Co., the court observed that
"the term 'occupier' is ambiguous. In one sense a caretaker is an occupier,
but in another sense his occupation is that of some other person. '27 ' When,
if ever, can a caretaker be an occupier in the law of tort?
Confusion is compounded by the suggestion that occupation need not be
exclusive, that there can be more than one occupier of the same premises.
Dicta to this effect were adverted to in Creed v. McGeoch',15 which seemed
to find this idea of dual occupation plausible. Courts detected dual occupa-
tion in the Australian decision of Burton v. Melbourne Harbor Tr st,2 70 and
in the New Zealand case of Napier v. Ryan.2 71 The notion of occupation is
thus one on which a great deal of labor may have to be expended if the
present development of the case law continues. To clarify the concept of oc-
cupation will of course be perfectly possible, but the prospect is unattractive
when the whole task could easily be dispensed with and when the distinction
itself seems to lead to unfortunate results in its application. As one judge
confessed in Creed v. McGeoch: "It may appear surprising, at least to the
parties, that the measure of the defendants' obligation to the plaintiff should
depend upon the answer to the question whether they were in occupation of
the land .... It seems to me, however, that there is no escape from the con-
clusion that as the authorities stand the distinction . . . does exist. ' 2 71
In Creed, the court concluded that the defendants could be regarded as
occupying only that portion of the land on which actual construction work
was proceeding. Since the defendants' trailer was parked on a part of the
land where they had temporarily ceased work, they were not in occupation
and consequently were liable to the plaintiff. The conclusion is inescapable
that, if the trailer had been parked and the accident had occurred on a part
of the land where construction work was still in progress, the defendants
would not have been liable.27 9 The reaction to such reasoning may well be
stronger than the surprise anticipated by the court.
274. [1896] 2 Ch. 476, 482 (C.A.).
275. [1955] 1 Weekly L.R. 1005, 1008 (Liverpool Assizes). The dicta come from
the high authority of the House of Lords in Glasgow Corp. v. Muir, [1943] A.C. 448,
462-63 (Lord Wright), cited and applied in Hartwell v. Grayson Rollo & Clover Docks
Ltd., [1.947] K.B. 901, 913 (C.A.); see Donovan v. Cammell Laird & Co., [1949] 2 All
E.R. 82 (Liverpool Assizes).
276. [1954] Vict. L.R. 353, 357.
277. [1954] N.Z.L.R. 1234; FLE ING, TORTS 430-31 (1957).
278. [1955] 1 Weekly L.R. at 1008. See the discussion of this case in text at note
109 supra.
279. A point made by Montrose, Note, 19 MODERN L. REv. 79, 81 (1956).
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Use of the occupancy concept as a way of deciding the New Zealand case
of Napier v. Ryall 280 seems equally arbitrary. In that case, the court found
both defendants to be in occupation and control of the carousel and accord-
ingly exempted them from liability. A valuable comment on this decision has
pointed out the vacuity of extending the theory of beneficial use of land to
those who control movable structures in public places.2 8' If any remnant of
justification can be found for the distinction between the positions of the
occupier and the nonoccupier, it can only lie in the need to protect the oc-
cupier in the beneficial use of his real property. To extend the notion of
occupation with its attendant immunities to all those who are in control of
structures would be to make drastic inroads into the general principles of
negligence.
The distinction between occupier and nonoccupier in the United States has
at least a modicum of rationality, since in most jurisdictions the underlying
theory, thin as it may be, is applied so as to extend the occupier's immunities
to anyone who is on the land for the occupier's purposes.28 2 In its English
application, the distinction has lost all attachment to this function and must
be viewed as an utterly arbitrary way of enlarging the trespasser's rights of
recovery.28 3 Although any such enlargement is in some sense welcome, this
device must be regarded as a totally irrational means of securing it.
The division between "occupancy duty" and "activity duty," between static
conditions for which the defendant may not be liable and activities or opera-
tions for which he will be held to the usual duty of care, appears a somewhat
more rational and attractive modification of the old doctrines. On closer ex-
amination, however, it is not acceptable as a mature solution of the difficulties.
Its weakness derives from the basic antithesis between condition and activity
as a criterion of duty or danger. A diving board poised over shallow water 284
and a smouldering submerged fire 285 have been regarded as static conditions
280. [1954] N.Z.L.R. 1234, discussed in text at notes 185-87 supra.
281. Davis, Liability for Dangerous Premises, 32 N.Z.L.J. 135 (1956). See also
Bowett, Law Reform and Occupier's Liability, 19 MoDERN L. REv. 172, 176-80 (1956).
Professor Davis's solution is to propose that the immunities of the occupier ought to apply
only to "immovable property such as open land, houses, railway stations and bridges"
and not to "things on such land such as vehicles, merry-go-rounds and houses in the
course of demolition." He is undoubtedly right in his demonstration that the application
of traditional occupiers' immunities to such movable structures is particularly obtuse,
but it may be suggested that his solution is only a partial one. Professor Davis's article
contains a close and valuable analysis of Napier v. Ryan.
282. RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 380-87 (1934).
283. See cases discussed in text at notes 102-10 supra, where a simple distinction is
taken between occupiers and nonoccupiers and no attempt is made to investigate the
nature of the nonoccupier's presence.
284. Perkowski v. Wellington City Corp., [1957] N.Z.L.R. 39 (C.A. 1956), discussed
in text at notes 128-89 supra.
285. Rush v. Plains Township, 371 Pa. 117, 89 A.2d 200 (1952), discussed in text
at note 74 supra.
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for which no recovery is possible, while switching a light off2816 or leaving
wax on a floor 287 are held to be current operations for which the plaintiff
may recover. The diving board and the fire are perfect examples of traps,
and there seems to be no reason why the adult trespasser should be unable
to recover for injury sustained from a trap when he can recover for injury
sustained from an activity of the occupier. Is it intrinsically more reprehen-
sible to injure a man by doing something which may harm him than by neg-
ligently constructing a condition which may harm him, if in both cases his
presence was to be anticipated?
The difficulty of abating a condition as compared with the ease of refrain-
ing from an active intervention has also been suggested as a rationale for the
imposition of liability for dangerous activities. This contrast makes some sense
in the extreme cases of, on the one hand, removing some vast natural hazard
such as a lake, and, on the other, abstaining from a single dangerous act,
such as shooting off a gun, when the presence of a trespasser is known or
thought possible. But the discrimination between conditions and activities in-
fluences a much wider field of conduct than these simple poles. It may be
much more burdensome to abstain from some activities than to remove some
conditions. To repair a crumbling step is less disrupting than to cease operat-
ing a railroad. And at what point does an incident in an activity become a
static condition ?288 If construction workers leave a wall in an unsafe state
over the weekend, is this an activity or a condition ?289 If they leave an un-
secured and unsafe trailer on the land over the weekend, is that an activity
or a condition ?29o Is the determination of this question the best way to in-
quire into the reasonableness of their behavior? The distinction between oc-
cupancy duties and activity duties reflects a brave attempt by harassed tri-
bunals to escape from the wanton-and-willful doctrines, but it is unacceptable
as a final solution.
If the supplementary doctrines are designed to raise the issues of negli-
gence and contributory negligence, they fail in the attempt. The notions of
technical trespasser and licensee by acquiescence do a little to sharpen the
bluntness of the trespasser category as a criterion of the plaintiff's contribu-
tory negligence, but they do not go nearly far enough. True, the old doctrine
of attractive nuisance, and the more recent theories of nonoccupier liability
286. Dunster v. Abbott, [1954] 1 Weekly L.R. 58 (C.A. 1953), discussed in text at
note 118 supra.
287. Slade v. Battersea & Putney Nosp. Management Comm., [1955] 1 Weekly L.R.
207, [1955] 1 All E.R. 429 (Q.B.), discussed in text at note 120 so pra.
288. See the comment of the New Jersey court in Simmel v. New Jersey Co-Up C ..
47 N.J. Super. 509, 514, 136 A.2d 301, 304 (App. Div. 1957), quoted in text at note 63
supra; Jeffrey, Accidents to Children, 31 AUSTL. L.J. 442, 449-50 (1957).
289. As happened in Davis v. St. Mary's Demolition & Excavation Co.. 110541 1
Weekly L.R. 592 (Q.B. 1953), discussed in text at notes 107-08 supra.
290. As happened in Creed v. McGeoch, [1955] 1 Weekly L.R. 1005. discuss-l in
text at notes 109-10, 275, 278 supra.
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and activity duty, sometimes allow the defendant's negligence to be considered,
but their arbitrary nature fails to insure this possibility. Most important of
all, the fictitious and artificial nature of these doctrines exercises its own
mesmeric effect, so that the judiciary may tend to lose sight of their essential
purpose and may apply them blindly to defeat the very ends they were meant
to serve.
Unconcealed integration of this branch of the law into the general theory
of negligence is the only satisfactory solution. This step would not seem to
exceed the powers of judicial lawmaking, at least in the few jurisdictions
that have already traveled a way along the road. In any event, a simple legis-
lative enactment could achieve the purpose. The nature of such reform would
involve the elimination of plaintiff's status as a legal category carrying a cor-
responding special degree of duty; the imposition of a general duty of care
on defendants; the abandonment of occupation as a legal category; and the
adoption of a rule that, in determining whether the duty of care has been dis-
charged, all circumstances of the case must be considered. To make this re-
form more precise, the statute might include express reference to such doc-
trines as attractive nuisance, dangerous condition, activity duty, etc., and
advise that, prospectively, they are to be of evidential, not decisive, signifi-
cance. If necessary, express reference might be made to the nature of the
plaintiff's entry upon the premises as a circumstance to be considered with
all the others in determining whether the defendant discharged his duty of
care, and whether the plaintiff is guilty of contributory negligence.
The impact of such a reform on the outcome of litigation is, of course,
speculative. That it is a workable approach is clearly shown by the French
experience where, in contrast with common-law jurisdictions, this branch of
the law operates in a framework of stark simplicity. A powerful objection
that inevitably will be raised in United States jurisdictions is that an exten-
sion of negligence doctrine will unduly increase the power of the jury. In
England, where the jury has all but disappeared in civil litigation, this ob-
jection is irrelevant; but, in this country, the argument must be met.2 9 1
291. Marsh, The History and Comparative Lazw, of Invitees, Licensees and Tres-
passers, 69 L.Q. REv. 182, 185-86 (1953), gives evidence of the awareness in nineteenth-
century English judges of the generosity which a jury might show to plaintiffs injured
on premises. He quotes from the judgment of Mr. Justice Williams in Toomey v. Lon-
don, Brighton & So. Coast Ry., 3 C.B. (n.s.) 146, 150, 140 Eng. Rep. 694, 696 (C.P.
1857): "[Elvery person who has had any experience in courts of justice knows very
well that a case of this sort against a railway company could only be submitted to a
jury with one result." The same view was expressed in a leading nineteenth-century
American commentary in this field:
Suppose even that the judge . . . tells the jury that, in determining what is rea-
sonable care, they should take into account, not only the desirability of preserving
innocent children from harm, but also the desirability of making beneficial use of
land. Hiw much weight will the jury allow to the latter consideration when put
in competition with the former in a concrete case appealing to their sympathies?
I low much consideration will they give to the general impolicy of hampering the
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Admittedly, any extension of a general negligence approach enlarges the
ambit of the jury's role. Further, the current belief that, by and large, the
jury is the plaintiff's friend is no doubt justified. Nevertheless, this charac-
terization is not universally accurate; it depends largely on the context of the
litigation and the pressures and interests which bear on the judiciary in a
particular area. Often, a jury is sought by the defense and opposed by the
plaintiff.292 Even accepting this hypothesis-that relegating cases of trespasser
plaintiffs to juries under instructions couched in the language of negligence
will increase the number of verdicts against defendants-no vital objection is
encountered. Many would encourage an increase in verdicts for the plaintiff
as a matter of general policy. Apart from this, there is something distasteful
in the view that tribunals cannot be afforded the best equipment for reaching
sensible decisions because that equipment is likely to be abused. How long can
a legal system survive when it goes in terror of one of its fundamental insti-
tutions? No amount of cautionary tales can ultimately obscure the realization
that we must either trust the jury or get rid of it.293 One cannot afford to
sympathize for long with the view that a legal system must carry the burden
of fictitious and obscurantist doctrine in order to keep vital issues away from
that tribunal which was constituted to decide them.
The fundamental questions which surely will emerge from a general negli-
gence approach to this area of law are these: the nature of the plaintiff's entry
on the land ;294 the foresight which the defendant had or ought to have had
use of land with troublesome and expensive restrictions when they have hefore
them a maimed child, or the mourning relatives of a deceased infant?
Smith, Liability of Landowniers to Children Entering Without PermissiOn, 11 -ARv. L.
Rav. 434, 438-39 (1898).
292. This was the opinion and the experience given to the author in conversation
with an attorney acting for an insurance company in this field of litigation. On jury
habits with respect to damage awards see Kalven, A Report on the Jury Project of the
University of Chicago Law School, 24 INs. CouNsEL J. 368, 375-78 (1957).
293. This is not meant as a plea for allowing the jury omnipotence in all cases.
Some division of function and some restriction on the kind of question which it is a
jury's province to answer is of course necessary. But, accepting the institution of the
jury, then the question of reasonable behavior for the purposes of the law of negligence
is eminently not a fit subject for reservation.
294. A point that is worthy of further discussion here is the position of the tres-
passer plaintiff who is injured while engaged in criminal activity. Here we must dis-
tinguish between the trap deliberately laid for the illegal entrant and an injury caused
accidentally to him. In England the position is now clear that it is not permitted to set
up deadly devices to repel trespassers. WINFIELD, ToRT 60-61 (6th ed. Lewis 1954). In
the United States a distinction is taken between those who break and enter and petit
thieves or simple trespassers. The former may be unable to recover even for injury
caused by a deadly device, while the latter in such circumstances will be allowed to re-
cover. Some of the cases are reviewed in 31 TEXAS L. REv. 80 (1952). For a full dis-
cussion, see 2 HARPER & JAMES 1440-42. An interesting illustration of the problem oc-
curred in the Canadian case of Danluk v. Birkner, [1946] Ont. L.R. 427, [1946] 3 D.L.R.
172 (C.A.), aff'd on other grounds, [1.947] Can. Sup. Ct. 484, [1947] 3 D.L.R. 337. In
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of such an entry; the kind of threat posed by the defendant to those who
might come on his land; the social utility of the process or condition main-
tained by the defendant ;295 the ease with which the defendant could protect
the plaintiff from this threat; the measures which the plaintiff took or ought
to have taken for his own protection. All were suggested and occasionally
clearly and comprehensively raised under the old doctrines, but too often they
were perceived only in a fragmentary and clouded fashion or were stifled
completely. Courts cannot be forced to sensible decisions, but at least they
can be offered the theoretical equipment which may best enable them to reach
such decisions.
The general negligence approach has not lacked advocates. The current
peaks of development are the New Jersey Appellate Division's decision in
Shmnel v. New Jersey Coop Co.2 9( and the Australian case of Thompson v.
Bankstown. 29 7 In England, notable contributions have been made by Lord
that case the plaintiff had been present in a betting establishment when a police raid
took place. In seeking for an avenue of escape, he ran out through a door which opened
on a sheer drop. In an action against the proprietors of the betting establishment, the
Ontario Court of Appeal held that his participation in criminal activity barred his re-
covery. The Supreme Court of Canada affirmed the decision on the ground of the plain-
tiff's rashness and did not discuss the question of his involvement in a criminal activity.
For similar United States cases, see Manning v. Bishop of Marquette, 345 Mich. 130,
76 N.W.2d 75 (1956) (recovery allowed plaintiff injured when leaving church after play-
ing bingo there; Ontario Court of Appeal decision in Danluk v. Birkner criticized);
Shiroma v. Itano, 10 Ill. App. 2d 428, 135 N.E.2d 123 (1956) (plaintiff injured in hall
when invited by a tenant of apartment house to play poker; in an action against the landlord
a directed verdict for defendant was reversed). In Danluk v. Birkner and Manning v.
Bishop of Marquette the defendants were of course the plaintiff's accomplices in illegal
conduct. If it is felt that the general negligence approach does not provide a firm rationale
for taking proper account of the plaintiff's criminal conduct, the general principle of
ex turpi causa non oritur actlo is always available.
295. The social utility aspect received express discussion in Dugan v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 387 Pa. 25, 127 A.2d 343 (1956). In that case the plaintiff, an eleven-year-old boy,
was injured while climbing over the cars of a stationary freight train, when he pointed
to an overhead high voltage wire to warn his younger brother. The current jumped,
causing him severe injuries. The appellate court reversed a verdict for the plaintiff, say-
ing that the attractive nuisance doctrine is now superseded in Pennsylvania by § 339 of
the Restatement of Torts, which requires, for the child plaintiff to recover, that the con-
dition maintained by the occupier be of slight utility when weighed against the risk to
children. Here, the court felt, the electric wires were of great utility and it would be
impractical to expect the defendants to provide patrolling guards or a fence. To this it
may be said in reply that if railroad technology can offer no means of making such
wires safer, then railroads ought to shoulder the burden of insuring children against the
injuries they may suffer in the course of their natural explorations. It is time to sweep
away these vestigial remnants of the nineteenth-century belief that uncompensated ac-
cidents to children are a regrettable but inevitable toll levied by the paramount demands
of commerce and travel.
296. 47 N.J. Super. 509, 136 A.2d 301 (App. Div. 1957), discussed in text at note
61 supra.
297. 87 Commw. L.R. 619, [1953] Argus L.R. 165 (Austl.), discussed in text at
notes 178-84 supra.
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Denning,298 and in Canada by Justice of Appeal O'Halloran. 299 In juristic
writing, the approach has been urged by Marsh 300 and Montrose3"' in
Britain, by Jeffrey 3 02 in Australia, and by Harper and James 03 in the
United States. At the same time, there have been voices of protest. In an
article commenting on the English Occupiers' Liability Act,30 4 Payne raises
two points which appear troublesome and must be met.30 5 He thinks that,
despite an initial reform, the courts may in time rebuild the strict rules as to
what constitutes due care in particular circumstances, so that the virtue of
integration into general negligence theory may be overrated. 300 Courts will
take notice of the plaintiff's entry onto land without permission; they will
take notice of the kind of threat posed by an activity as compared with a
condition; they will take notice of the practicality of abating an artificial dan-
ger as compared with a natural one. As cases cluster and precedents harden,
we shall be back where we started.
If the old distinctions were accurate and subtle reflections of the issues of
negligence and contributory negligence, this criticism would be most astute.
Payne was referring expressly to the cases of invitee and licensee plaintiffs.
With respect to trespassers, it is suggested, the old distinctions are in fact
vehicles of disguise and distortion and their re-emergence is therefore not to
be expected. In the area of automobile injuries to pedestrians, no distinction
between accidents caused by the defective state of an automobile and those
attributable to careless operation has emerged. Such a distinction might be
relevant in a particular case, but as a category of decision it is hopelessly
irrelevant. Payne assumes, at least as to licensees and invitees, that the old
distinctions are natural reflections of necessary principle. With trespasser
plaintiffs this is not so.
298. See the opinions of Lord Justice Denning, as he then was, in the cases discussed
in text accompanying notes 118, 123, 133 supra.
299. See the opinions of Justice of Appeal O'Halloran in the cases discussed in text
accompanying notes 164, 167, 168 supra.
300. Marsh, The History and Comparative Law of Invitees, Licensees and Tres-
passers (pts. 1-2), 69 L.Q. REv. 182, 359 (1953). These very valuable articles by Mr.
Marsh include brief treatments of the law of Scotland, South Africa, France and Ger-
many.
301. In a series of case notes in the Modern Law Review cited in notes 98, 103,
104, 118, 120, 123, 131 supra.
302. Jeffrey, Accidents to Children, 31 Ausm. L.J. 442 (1957). Mr. Jeffrey's valu-
able article and very stimulating argument is confined to cases of child plaintiffs.
303. 2 HARPER & JAMES 1470: "[T]he right of exclusive possession does not carri
with it the privilege to engage in conduct fraught with unreasonable probability of harm
to the lives and limbs of people merely because there is no consent to their presence."
304. 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31 (1957).
305. Payne, The Occupiers' Liability Act, 21 MODERN L. REv. 359 (1958).
306. Mr. Payne adopts here the argument of Mr. Diplock, Q.C., in his dissenting
opinion to the Law Reform Committee, Third Report: Occuepiers' Liability to Ithitecs.
Licensees and Trespassers, CGm. No. 9305 (1954). Odgers, Occupiers' Liability: .
Further Comment, 1957 CAmB. L.J. 39, 54 (1957), also takes the view that specific
amendments to the old law would have been preferable to a general remodeling.
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Payne's other and perhaps more fundamental point is that the advocates of
the general negligence approach belong to that band of "critics of mechanical
jurisprudence" who "appear sometimes to forget that a legal system has the
practical function of resolving and preventing disputes and to place a pathetic
trust in the infallibility of judicial discretion. °3 0 7 The function of resolving
disputes is certainly the last thing one ought to forget and the advocacy of a
general negligence approach is directed precisely to this end: it seeks the
rational and just solution of disputes. But Payne is also concerned with pre-
venting disputes. He amplifies this when he says:
The greater the discretion conferred on the court, the more uncertain
the outcome of a case will be, and therefore the higher will be the pro-
portion of cases that go to trial instead of being settled out of court. 30
A legal system must, in the nature of things, create and impose its own
comparatively rigid categories on the phenomena which it seeks to con-
trol. and the seemingly arbitrary operation of them in borderline cases
is the price one has to pay for some degree of legal certainty and for
the exclusion of bias in the judicial process.30 9
Here Payne's trust in the definitive efficacy of legal rules seems at least as
pathetic as that which he sees in the critics of mechanical jurisprudence. To
be convincing in this position, he would have to show that personal injury
suits brought by wanted or unwanted visitors under the present dispensation
are proportionately fewer than those in the area of general negligence. Even
a showing to that effect would be inconclusive, for the differential might well
be due to the inadequacy of the present rules. The introduction of a National
Health Service in Britain brought with it a vast increase in demands for den-
tal and optical treatment, but to deplore this one would have to be more con-
cerned with the leisure of doctors than with the health of the people. Judicial
discretion is scarcely infallible, however, it is preferable to a set of bad rules,
and may sometimes be preferable to a set of good ones. Payne's view-that
injustice in the borderline case is "in the nature of things" and "the price
one has to pay"°10 -i. both unrealistic and unpersuasive.
One fear that underlies Payne's opposition to the general negligence ap-
proach is his belief that, in the English system of trial by a single judge
without a jury, greater discretion conferred on the judge will lead to more
appeals.-" ' There is, he suggests, a tendency to treat questions of fact as
questions of law in appeals from judges sitting alone, with the result that any
introduction of general negligence theory might be followed by a series of
pronouncements from appellate courts on the standard of care owed in par-
ticular circumstances. Here he has a valid point, but the fault is surely one
307. Payne, The Occupiers' Liability Act, 21 MODERN L. REV. 359, 374 (1958).
308. Ibid.
309. Id. at 373.
310. Ibid.
311. Cf. Payne, Appeals on Questions of Fact, in 11 CURRENT LFcAr. PROLIMS 185
(1958).
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in English appellate practice and not in negligence law. The American desire
to complicate the law in order to insulate the jury seems to be matched by
an English desire to complicate the law to compensate for the absence of a
jury. United States jurisdictions may, on this point, take comfort in the pres-
ence of the jury which, it seems, is a great nuisance when you have it, but,
like vitamins and money, may be even more troublesome when you don't.
The plea for a free adjudication of cases of injury to trespassers within
the notions of reasonable conduct is made in the belief that this is a small but
especially poignant segment of the eternal problem of accident and pain and
grief. Where national insurance does not exist, private insurance must be in-
cited to cover as wide a field as possible. We are dealing here with rules of
law which emerge from the agony of children. In these disputations over
their broken bodies, unreflecting dogma must be a trespasser to which no
leave and license can be granted.
